{"title":"A Paradox About Our Epistemic Self-Conception: Are You an Über Epistemic Superior?","authors":"M. Walker","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10047","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n I hope to show that each of 1, 2, and 3 are plausible, yet we can derive 4: \n \n 1.\n It is epistemically permissible to believe that our preferred views in multi-proposition disputes are true, or at least more likely true than not.\n \n \n 2.\n If it is epistemically permissible to believe that our preferred views in multi-proposition disputes are true, or at least more likely true than not, then it is epistemically permissible for us to believe that we are über epistemic superiors to our disagreeing colleagues in multi-proposition disputes.\n \n \n 3.\n It is not epistemically permissible to believe that we are über epistemic superiors to our disagreeing colleagues in multi-proposition disputes.\n \n \n 4.\n At least one of 1, 2, or 3, is false.\n \n","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2022-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10047","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
I hope to show that each of 1, 2, and 3 are plausible, yet we can derive 4:
1.
It is epistemically permissible to believe that our preferred views in multi-proposition disputes are true, or at least more likely true than not.
2.
If it is epistemically permissible to believe that our preferred views in multi-proposition disputes are true, or at least more likely true than not, then it is epistemically permissible for us to believe that we are über epistemic superiors to our disagreeing colleagues in multi-proposition disputes.
3.
It is not epistemically permissible to believe that we are über epistemic superiors to our disagreeing colleagues in multi-proposition disputes.
4.
At least one of 1, 2, or 3, is false.
期刊介绍：
As the first international journal entirely devoted to philosophical skepticism, the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism publishes high-quality articles and discussion notes on any field of research relevant to the study of skeptical thought. The journal also contains critical notices and reviews of major books on skepticism, and organizes book symposia on recent ground-breaking works. On occasion, it publishes special issues devoted to current lively debates on specific topics or authors. The wide range of areas covered includes the history and significance of ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary skepticism as well as discussions of current specific skeptical problems and arguments in epistemology, metaethics, ontology, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.
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