Judicial Selection and Criminal Punishment

IF 0.8 Q2 LAW Journal of Law and Courts Pub Date : 2021-01-25 DOI:10.1086/713470
T. Taylor
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

This paper develops and tests a theory that in states with judicial elections, criminal justice outcomes will be more punitive than in states without elections. Leveraging a data set previously unused in the judicial politics literature, I estimate time-series regressions of state sentencing and incarceration rates over a 38-year period while distinguishing between types of judicial elections to establish support for the theory. I find that states where trial judges are reelected are generally more punitive than states without judicial elections, and this punitiveness is in response to the public’s ideological preferences, indicating that elections serve as an important judicial accountability mechanism for citizens.
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司法选择与刑事处罚
本文发展并测试了一种理论,即在有司法选举的州,刑事司法结果将比没有选举的州更具惩罚性。利用司法政治文献中以前未使用的数据集,我估计了38年期间国家量刑和监禁率的时间序列回归,同时区分了司法选举的类型,以建立对该理论的支持。我发现,审判法官连任的州通常比没有司法选举的州更具惩罚性,这种惩罚性是对公众意识形态偏好的回应,表明选举是公民重要的司法问责机制。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
16
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