Traité des premières vérités by Claude G. Buffier (review)

IF 0.7 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI:10.1353/hph.2023.0011
Jeffrey D. Burson
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Abstract

conclusively. To prove convincingly that the Dutch Cartesians served as the midwives to the birth of a philosophy of science, a significantly longer work would be needed—one that spends more time detailing philosophy’s relation to science not only in previous traditions but also in those outside the Dutch context in the same centuries. Strazzoni also makes far-reaching claims on the need for foundationalism; however, the book would have benefited from offering a more robust defense against possible counterexamples and objections. Strazzoni does point to Regius, who conspicuously leaves out much of Descartes’s metaphysics, as a powerful counterexample, but holds him to be both an exception and the catalyst driving the shift to foundational concerns. This might be seen as problematic in light of the book’s strongest claim: just how successful Strazzoni is in problematizing the very meaning of “foundation.” Throughout the book, we see ethics as the goal of a foundation, logic as a foundation, reliability as a gauge for foundations, metaphysics as foundational, and all manners of approaches to epistemic foundationalism, which leaves the reader wondering if there really is a consistent thread motivating these various thinkers or if there could be any common origin. We might also question what was unique in the Dutch context, as questions and debates over many of these themes also emerged in France, for example, where there were prominent Cartesians who disregarded foundational concerns, such as Jacques Rohault, and many others who were deeply engaged in them. While I have raised some criticisms, it is important to note that they are less about the substance of the book than they are about the packaging. Strazzoni’s book severely problematizes any assumptions one might have about a single kind of foundationalism as a consistent theme throughout Cartesianism, while also giving an excellent vantage point to assess the various ends that these six thinkers had in mind. His insight also presents a compelling narrative of the complex interrelations among Dutch Cartesians with too many novel observations to note here. A a r o n S p i n k Dartmouth College
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克劳德·g·布菲耶的《第一真理论》(回顾)
结论。要令人信服地证明荷兰笛卡尔学派是科学哲学诞生的助推器,就需要一部更长的著作——一部花更多时间详细阐述哲学与科学的关系的著作,不仅是在以前的传统中,而且是在同一世纪荷兰以外的背景下。斯特拉佐尼还对基础主义的必要性提出了深远的主张;然而,这本书本可以提供一个更有力的防御,以反对可能的反例和反对意见。斯特拉佐尼的确把雷吉乌斯作为一个有力的反例,他明显地忽略了笛卡尔的形而上学,但他认为雷吉乌斯既是一个例外,也是推动向基础问题转变的催化剂。考虑到书中最强烈的主张:斯特拉佐尼是如何成功地将“基础”的含义问题化,这可能会被视为有问题的。在整本书中,我们看到伦理学是基础的目标,逻辑是基础,可靠性是基础的衡量标准,形而上学是基础,以及所有关于认识论基础主义的方法,这让读者想知道是否真的有一个一致的线索激励着这些不同的思想家,或者是否有任何共同的起源。我们也可能会质疑荷兰的独特之处,因为关于这些主题的问题和辩论在法国也出现了,例如,在法国,有一些著名的笛卡尔主义者,他们忽视了基本问题,比如雅克·罗奥,还有其他许多人,他们对这些问题很感兴趣。虽然我提出了一些批评,但重要的是要注意,这些批评与其说是关于这本书的实质,不如说是关于它的包装。斯特拉佐尼的书严重质疑了人们可能对一种单一的基础主义作为贯穿笛卡尔主义的一贯主题的任何假设,同时也提供了一个极好的有利位置来评估这六位思想家心目中的各种目的。他的见解也为荷兰笛卡尔派之间复杂的相互关系提供了令人信服的叙述,其中有太多新颖的观察,无法在此赘述。我在达特茅斯学院(Dartmouth College)任教
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.20
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0.00%
发文量
72
期刊介绍: Since January 2002, the Journal of the History of Philosophy has been published by The Johns Hopkins University Press. For subscriptions, change of address, and back issues, please contact Subscription Services. In addition to photocopying allowed by the "fair use" doctrine, JHP authorizes personal or educational multiple-copying by instructors for use within a course. This policy does not cover photocopying for commercial use either by individuals or publishers. All such uses must be authorized by JHP.
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