Engaging the Plural Parts of Science: Assessing Flat and Aspect Realization through an Integrative Pluralist Lens

Abstract

I outline an integrative pluralist account of the models/ explanations in a case in physiology, cell biology, and molecular biology, including compositional models/explanations positing realization between properties. I then use this integrative pluralist framework to assess both the older 'flat' theory and Piccinini's (2020) new 'aspect' view as accounts of realization in the sciences. Using our concrete scientific case, I show that these philosophical views of realization should be rejected for two reasons. First, the flat and aspect views of realization fail to accommodate the layers of individuals, and/or powers, we find with realization relations in the sciences. And, second, because the flat and aspect accounts of realization cannot allow the integration between the models positing realization between properties, and the models positing composition between activities, that we find in actual scientific practice.