Pub Date : 2023-12-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.11.080
Miriam Kyselo
I focus on an early article by Francisco Varela, 'Not One, Not Two' (1976), to argue that his non-dualistic epistemology entails a paradigm shift towards a fundamentally co-embodied, and thus social, view of self. Varela argued that the mind–body duality could be resolved by understanding the mind as embodied. Both Varela and Evan Thompson have later elaborated on this and suggested an enactive, essentially embodied view of the self in terms of selforganized, organismic autonomy. I will argue that the enactive view of the self remains ambiguous with regards to the role of social interactions: are they constitutive for the minimal self-organization of the self or do they only play a shaping, secondary factor? I rely on Varela's epistemology in 'Not One, Not Two' to support my argument that the minimal self-organizational network that is the human self entails both individual bodily and joint co-embodied processes so that the self is already and constitutively social.
我将重点放在弗朗西斯科·瓦雷拉早期的一篇文章《不是一个，不是两个》(1976)上，认为他的非二元论认识论需要一种范式转变，即从根本上向共同体现的、因此是社会的自我观转变。Varela认为身心的二元性可以通过将心灵理解为具身来解决。瓦雷拉和埃文·汤普森后来都对此进行了详细阐述，并提出了一种主动的、本质上体现的自我观点，即自组织的、有机的自主。我认为，关于社会互动的作用，自我的行为观仍然是模棱两可的:它们是构成自我的最小自我组织的组成部分，还是只起到塑造的、次要的作用?我依靠Varela在" Not One, Not Two "中的认识论来支持我的观点，即最小的自我组织网络即人类自我包含了个体身体和联合共同体现的过程，因此自我已经并且在本质上是社会性的。
{"title":"What Self in Self-Organization? Engaging Varela's Epistemology for the Co-embodied Self","authors":"Miriam Kyselo","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.11.080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.11.080","url":null,"abstract":"I focus on an early article by Francisco Varela, 'Not One, Not Two' (1976), to argue that his non-dualistic epistemology entails a paradigm shift towards a fundamentally co-embodied, and thus social, view of self. Varela argued that the mind–body duality could be resolved by understanding\u0000 the mind as embodied. Both Varela and Evan Thompson have later elaborated on this and suggested an enactive, essentially embodied view of the self in terms of selforganized, organismic autonomy. I will argue that the enactive view of the self remains ambiguous with regards to the role of social\u0000 interactions: are they constitutive for the minimal self-organization of the self or do they only play a shaping, secondary factor? I rely on Varela's epistemology in 'Not One, Not Two' to support my argument that the minimal self-organizational network that is the human self entails both\u0000 individual bodily and joint co-embodied processes so that the self is already and constitutively social.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":"117 47","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138609356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.11.104
Rodrigo Benevides, T. E. Feiten, Anthony Chemero
This paper examines two twenty-first-century developments in the enactive approach in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. The first is the surging interest in Hans Jonas, which begins with Weber and Varela's 'Life After Kant' (2002) and continues up to the present. The second is the 'social turn' that the enactive approach has taken, especially after De Jaegher and Di Paolo's (2007) work on participatory sense-making. We look at these two developments through the lens of the problem of other minds. We argue that they are incompatible due to a residual solipsism in Jonasian phenomenology. Ultimately, this leaves enactive theory with a choice between embracing Jonas or embracing the social turn in enactive theory. We recommend replacing Jonasian influences with those from the late work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. We argue that enactivism can evade the problem of other minds using Merleau-Ponty's discussion of 'flesh' and 'expression'.
{"title":"Life After 'Life After Kant' Other Minds with Jonas and Merleau-Ponty","authors":"Rodrigo Benevides, T. E. Feiten, Anthony Chemero","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.11.104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.11.104","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines two twenty-first-century developments in the enactive approach in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. The first is the surging interest in Hans Jonas, which begins with Weber and Varela's 'Life After Kant' (2002) and continues up to the present. The second is\u0000 the 'social turn' that the enactive approach has taken, especially after De Jaegher and Di Paolo's (2007) work on participatory sense-making. We look at these two developments through the lens of the problem of other minds. We argue that they are incompatible due to a residual solipsism in\u0000 Jonasian phenomenology. Ultimately, this leaves enactive theory with a choice between embracing Jonas or embracing the social turn in enactive theory. We recommend replacing Jonasian influences with those from the late work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. We argue that enactivism can evade the problem\u0000 of other minds using Merleau-Ponty's discussion of 'flesh' and 'expression'.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" 14","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138614703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.11.214
Hanne De Jaegher
In a paper from the late 1990s, Francisco Varela indicates that a science of inter-being is on the horizon. But how to envisage such a science? Here I propose that an enactive science of inter-being will benefit from engaging with recent innovative autism research that starts from autistic experience and intersubjectivity. Properly intersubjective autism research is both more ethically just and scientifically richer than cognitivist explanations that have dominated research, discourse, and practice for a long time, and which have tended to set people apart more than connect them. I discuss the work of Bervoets and Hens (2020), who show how autism research is unavoidably theorethical, and must be in order to move past the catch-22 they identify between autism and dysfunction. This kind of research exemplifies a participatory sense-making between subjects and scientists, and it is here that 'steps to a science of inter-being' (Varela, 1999a) are being taken.
{"title":"Cognitive Science Today, What is it to You?","authors":"Hanne De Jaegher","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.11.214","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.11.214","url":null,"abstract":"In a paper from the late 1990s, Francisco Varela indicates that a science of inter-being is on the horizon. But how to envisage such a science? Here I propose that an enactive science of inter-being will benefit from engaging with recent innovative autism research that starts\u0000 from autistic experience and intersubjectivity. Properly intersubjective autism research is both more ethically just and scientifically richer than cognitivist explanations that have dominated research, discourse, and practice for a long time, and which have tended to set people apart more\u0000 than connect them. I discuss the work of Bervoets and Hens (2020), who show how autism research is unavoidably theorethical, and must be in order to move past the catch-22 they identify between autism and dysfunction. This kind of research exemplifies a participatory sense-making between\u0000 subjects and scientists, and it is here that 'steps to a science of inter-being' (Varela, 1999a) are being taken.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":"21 1‐3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138623118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.11.238
Natalie Depraz
I would like to show here that Varela, besides being a scientist and a Buddhist practitioner, also has the stature of a philosopher. In order to do so, I chose to illuminate his thought in the light of a concept that he did not use much, at least at the beginning, but which constitutes the cornerstone of his philosophy. It is the concept of surprise. I will show first how surprise is at the core of what I call his 'Valence' article; time, affect, and intersubjectivity being the main coordinates of surprise. Then I will prove how the structural concepts of autopoiesis, enaction, and co-generativity are all supported by surprise as a dynamic model. In parallel, I will indicate how some seemingly side concepts (I call 'operative'), such as creation, novelty, unpredictibility, openness, and otherness, are actually key candidates for demonstrating the relevance of Varela as a philosopher of surprise. ...the nature of the self is precisely its non-findability. There is nothing to grasp that would make persons and phenomena what they are (Sanscrit: anatman; Tibetan: bdag med gnyis)... The usual translation of anatman is 'non-self', or 'emptiness of self'. However, this is again too close to the original Buddhist language... For the practitioner, anatman is manifest, experienced as superabundant: it is a nonknowledge that holds a host of surprises. (Varela, 2000/2017, p. 134)
我想在这里说明，瓦雷拉除了是一位科学家和佛教徒之外，还有一位哲学家的地位。为了做到这一点，我选择用一个概念来阐明他的思想，这个概念至少在一开始并没有使用太多，但它构成了他的哲学的基石。这是惊喜的概念。我将首先展示惊奇是如何在我称之为“瓦朗斯”的文章的核心;时间，情感和主体间性是惊喜的主要坐标。然后，我将证明自创生(autopoiesis)、制定(enaction)和共生(co-generativity)的结构概念是如何被惊喜作为一个动态模型所支持的。同时，我将指出一些看似次要的概念(我称之为“操作性”)，如创造，新颖性，不可预测性，开放性和差异性，实际上是证明Varela作为惊喜哲学家的相关性. ...的关键候选人自我的本质恰恰是它的不可发现性。没有什么东西可以使人和现象成为他们的样子(梵语:anatman;藏语:bdag med gnyis…anatman通常的翻译是“无我”或“自我的空虚”。然而，这又太接近原始的佛教语言了……对于实践者来说，无我是明显的，是丰富的:它是一种拥有大量惊喜的非知识。(Varela, 2000/2017，第134页)
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Pub Date : 2023-12-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.11.047
Louis H University of Illinois Chicago, USA
The main objective of this paper is to explore a model of autopoiesis as presented by Maturana, Uribe and Varela (1974); more specifically, to analyse this model and its implications through the lens of the notions of eigenform and fixed points through a variety of different perspectives and examples. The paper also puts forward original philosophical reflections and generalizations about its various conclusions concerning specific examples, with the aim of contributing to a unified way of understanding living systems within the context of natural sciences and the pervasive nature of awareness and conscious observation.
{"title":"Autopoiesis, Autonomy, and Eigenform","authors":"Louis H University of Illinois Chicago, USA","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.11.047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.11.047","url":null,"abstract":"The main objective of this paper is to explore a model of autopoiesis as presented by Maturana, Uribe and Varela (1974); more specifically, to analyse this model and its implications through the lens of the notions of eigenform and fixed points through a variety of different perspectives\u0000 and examples. The paper also puts forward original philosophical reflections and generalizations about its various conclusions concerning specific examples, with the aim of contributing to a unified way of understanding living systems within the context of natural sciences and the pervasive\u0000 nature of awareness and conscious observation.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" 80","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138611854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.11.259
Andreas Weber
Francisco Varela highlighted many links between his philosophy of cognition and Buddhism. This paper focuses on those connections which Varela did not make explicit. Varela was a disciple of Tulku Urgyen Rinpoche, a renowned master of the Nyingma school of Tibetan Buddhism. This school emphasizes the direct experience of the 'nature of the mind' — hence, reality. Only by taking into account how this experience formed Varela's thinking do we understand the full scope of his idea of life. For Varela, living beings act from the perspective of a self, although this self does not exist as a place or organ in the organism. In his training with Tulku Urgyen Rinpoche, Varela realized that this 'selfless' self in the centre of an organism is the activity of giving life. In it, matter and inwardness, the subjective perspective and the perspective of 'being everything', are not separate. An organism is the gift of life coming from this centre, which is pure original consciousness — the 'nature of the mind'.
{"title":"Beyond Emptiness 'Compassion' as the Hidden Ground of Francisco Varela's Thinking","authors":"Andreas Weber","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.11.259","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.11.259","url":null,"abstract":"Francisco Varela highlighted many links between his philosophy of cognition and Buddhism. This paper focuses on those connections which Varela did not make explicit. Varela was a disciple of Tulku Urgyen Rinpoche, a renowned master of the Nyingma school of Tibetan Buddhism. This school\u0000 emphasizes the direct experience of the 'nature of the mind' — hence, reality. Only by taking into account how this experience formed Varela's thinking do we understand the full scope of his idea of life. For Varela, living beings act from the perspective of a self, although this self\u0000 does not exist as a place or organ in the organism. In his training with Tulku Urgyen Rinpoche, Varela realized that this 'selfless' self in the centre of an organism is the activity of giving life. In it, matter and inwardness, the subjective perspective and the perspective of 'being everything',\u0000 are not separate. An organism is the gift of life coming from this centre, which is pure original consciousness — the 'nature of the mind'.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138616145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.11.017
Sebastjan Vörös
Francisco Varela's extensive body of work spans a wide range of subjects, making it challenging to discern their underlying connections. This issue becomes particularly acute when we compare Varela's early mathematical enquiries with his later phenomenological investigations. I argue that the 'missing link' — the common thread running through Varela's oeuvre — is the act of distinction. When talking about 'distinction', it is important to differentiate between the ready-made distinctions (distinctions as entities) and distinctions in their act of distinguishing (distinctions as processes). My contention is that distinction in this second sense forms the bedrock of Varela's non-dual thought style, the aim of which was to address and supersede the challenges inherent in the dualist (modernist) thought style, especially the infamous two-pronged problem of the bifurcation and disenchantment of nature. The paper delves into Varela's explorations of the act of distinction by tracing its origins in the works of Spencer-Brown, examining its underlying philosophical implications (non-dual onto-epistemology), and exploring its connections to different aspects of his work (form dynamics, autopoiesis, and phenomenology).
{"title":"At the Cradle of Things The Act of Distinction and Francisco Varela's Non-Dualist Thought","authors":"Sebastjan Vörös","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.11.017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.11.017","url":null,"abstract":"Francisco Varela's extensive body of work spans a wide range of subjects, making it challenging to discern their underlying connections. This issue becomes particularly acute when we compare Varela's early mathematical enquiries with his later phenomenological investigations. I argue\u0000 that the 'missing link' — the common thread running through Varela's oeuvre — is the act of distinction. When talking about 'distinction', it is important to differentiate between the ready-made distinctions (distinctions as entities) and distinctions in their act of distinguishing\u0000 (distinctions as processes). My contention is that distinction in this second sense forms the bedrock of Varela's non-dual thought style, the aim of which was to address and supersede the challenges inherent in the dualist (modernist) thought style, especially the infamous two-pronged problem\u0000 of the bifurcation and disenchantment of nature. The paper delves into Varela's explorations of the act of distinction by tracing its origins in the works of Spencer-Brown, examining its underlying philosophical implications (non-dual onto-epistemology), and exploring its connections to different\u0000 aspects of his work (form dynamics, autopoiesis, and phenomenology).","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" 19","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138614998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.11.131
Konrad Werner
This paper targets the concept of enactment as a genuinely metaphysical idea. Its goals are two-fold. First, a reappraisal of enactment in its proper historical context, as well as an articulation of the core innovations enactment brings to traditional metaphysics. Here the idea of 'productive' cognition, as I provisionally term it, comes to the fore. The second goal is a reinterpretation of certain themes from traditional metaphysics, including the key question of why there is something rather than nothing, so as to make it more open to insights originating from enactivism. For that, the concept of 'situated metaphysics' is introduced and elaborated upon.
{"title":"Enactment: A Preliminary Study in Varela and Traditional Metaphysics","authors":"Konrad Werner","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.11.131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.11.131","url":null,"abstract":"This paper targets the concept of enactment as a genuinely metaphysical idea. Its goals are two-fold. First, a reappraisal of enactment in its proper historical context, as well as an articulation of the core innovations enactment brings to traditional metaphysics. Here the idea of\u0000 'productive' cognition, as I provisionally term it, comes to the fore. The second goal is a reinterpretation of certain themes from traditional metaphysics, including the key question of why there is something rather than nothing, so as to make it more open to insights originating from enactivism.\u0000 For that, the concept of 'situated metaphysics' is introduced and elaborated upon.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":"6 19","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138609614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.11.190
T. Froese, J. Sykes
Varela's enactive approach to cognitive science has been elaborated into a theoretical framework of agency, sense-making, and sociality, while his key methodological innovation — neurophenomenology (NP) — continues to inspire empirical work. We argue that the enactive approach was originally expressed in NP as three core tenets: (1) phenomenological pragmatics, (2) embodied cognition, and (3) conscious efficacy. However, most efforts in NP have focused on applying tenet 1, while tenet 2 has received notably less attention, and there is even explicit distancing from tenet 3. By way of a critical review of four case studies, we show how NP thereby falls short of its full potential. Crucially, it needs to demonstrate that the first-person perspective matters, not only as a source of correlations with third-person data, but because lived experience, as such, makes a difference in its own right to the living body's dynamics. Given that methods for improving subjective reports have become accepted in human neuroscience (tenet 1), and given the increasing availability for recording multi-scalar organismic activity during embodied action (tenet 2), we propose it is time to integrate these research strands by using this issue of conscious efficacy as a pivot point (tenet 3). The development of genuinely experience-involving accounts of neurophysiological activity during embodied action holds promise for rebooting neurophenomenology in stronger form.
{"title":"The Pragmatics, Embodiment, and Efficacy of Lived Experience Assessing the Core Tenets of Varela's Neurophenomenology","authors":"T. Froese, J. Sykes","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.11.190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.11.190","url":null,"abstract":"Varela's enactive approach to cognitive science has been elaborated into a theoretical framework of agency, sense-making, and sociality, while his key methodological innovation — neurophenomenology (NP) — continues to inspire empirical work. We argue that the enactive approach\u0000 was originally expressed in NP as three core tenets: (1) phenomenological pragmatics, (2) embodied cognition, and (3) conscious efficacy. However, most efforts in NP have focused on applying tenet 1, while tenet 2 has received notably less attention, and there is even explicit distancing from\u0000 tenet 3. By way of a critical review of four case studies, we show how NP thereby falls short of its full potential. Crucially, it needs to demonstrate that the first-person perspective matters, not only as a source of correlations with third-person data, but because lived experience, as such,\u0000 makes a difference in its own right to the living body's dynamics. Given that methods for improving subjective reports have become accepted in human neuroscience (tenet 1), and given the increasing availability for recording multi-scalar organismic activity during embodied action (tenet 2),\u0000 we propose it is time to integrate these research strands by using this issue of conscious efficacy as a pivot point (tenet 3). The development of genuinely experience-involving accounts of neurophysiological activity during embodied action holds promise for rebooting neurophenomenology in\u0000 stronger form.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":"82 S365","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138621843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.11.159
E. D. Di Paolo
Knowing is an activity through which agents and world produce themselves. This is often expressed by the enactive claim that agents bring forth a world. I analyse this idea for different modes of agent–environment engagement: interactional, transactional, and constitutional. Something is produced in each case. Bringing forth a world is not only an epistemic but an ontological claim. Acts in their fine structure result from a process of fact production, or f/acts. F/acts co-emerge with their 'preconditions', e.g.intentions, affordances, across the subject/object divide. F/acts define their inner temporality and affectivity, comprising both event and experience. A plurality of worlds is admitted in this enactive view, without entailing antirealism. We cannot bring forth just any world. World resistance organizes action and experience. I touch on the implications for objectivity and free will and discuss the primordiality of activity, community, and relationality. From a notion of groundlessness in early enactive work, I suggest that a participatory universe is better conceived as a meshwork of groundless grounds.
{"title":"F/acts Ways of Enactive Worldmaking","authors":"E. D. Di Paolo","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.11.159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.11.159","url":null,"abstract":"Knowing is an activity through which agents and world produce themselves. This is often expressed by the enactive claim that agents bring forth a world. I analyse this idea for different modes of agent–environment engagement: interactional, transactional, and constitutional. Something\u0000 is produced in each case. Bringing forth a world is not only an epistemic but an ontological claim. Acts in their fine structure result from a process of fact production, or f/acts. F/acts co-emerge with their 'preconditions', e.g.intentions, affordances, across the subject/object divide.\u0000 F/acts define their inner temporality and affectivity, comprising both event and experience. A plurality of worlds is admitted in this enactive view, without entailing antirealism. We cannot bring forth just any world. World resistance organizes action and experience. I touch on the implications\u0000 for objectivity and free will and discuss the primordiality of activity, community, and relationality. From a notion of groundlessness in early enactive work, I suggest that a participatory universe is better conceived as a meshwork of groundless grounds.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":"14 16","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138624921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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