Pub Date : 2024-06-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.5.151
Manuela Kirberg, Monima Chadha
This paper aims to contribute to an integrated understanding of what goes missing in adverse meditation experiences and in cases of depersonalization disorder. Depersonalization disorder is characterized by distressing alterations in, and sometimes the complete disappearance of, the 'I'-sense. This paper examines the nature of the 'I'-sense and what it means to lose it from a Buddhist perspective. We argue for a nihilist position that the loss of the sense of self arises from misidentifications of the psychophysical complex with non-self elements, such as memories, thoughts, or body movements. Drawing from meditation experiences and depersonalization symptoms, we propose that the sense of self is not a static entity given in experience but fluctuates between various senses of self (and no-self) depending on circumstances. This pluralistic understanding of the various senses of self offers a more nuanced understanding of symptoms in depersonalization disorder and adverse effects of meditation practices.
{"title":"Depersonalization, Meditation, and the Experience of (No-)Self","authors":"Manuela Kirberg, Monima Chadha","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.5.151","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.5.151","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to contribute to an integrated understanding of what goes missing in adverse meditation experiences and in cases of depersonalization disorder. Depersonalization disorder is characterized by distressing alterations in, and sometimes the complete disappearance of, the\u0000 'I'-sense. This paper examines the nature of the 'I'-sense and what it means to lose it from a Buddhist perspective. We argue for a nihilist position that the loss of the sense of self arises from misidentifications of the psychophysical complex with non-self elements, such as memories, thoughts,\u0000 or body movements. Drawing from meditation experiences and depersonalization symptoms, we propose that the sense of self is not a static entity given in experience but fluctuates between various senses of self (and no-self) depending on circumstances. This pluralistic understanding of the\u0000 various senses of self offers a more nuanced understanding of symptoms in depersonalization disorder and adverse effects of meditation practices.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141397000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.5.127
Joel Krueger
Abstract: I develop Tetsurō Watsuji's relational model of the self as 'betweenness'. After some background, I argue that Watsuji's view receives support from two case studies: solitary confinement and dementia. Both clarify the constitutive interdependence between the self and the social and material contexts of 'betweenness' that define its lifeworld. They do so by providing powerful examples of what happens when the support and regulative grounding of this lifeworld is restricted or taken away. I argue further that Watsuji's view helps see the other side of this deprivation, how reconstructing aspects of betweenness is, at the same time, a reconstruction of the self. I conclude by briefly indicating further consequences of this view.
{"title":"Selves Beyond the Skin: Watsuji, 'Betweenness', and Self-Loss in Solitary Confinement and Dementia","authors":"Joel Krueger","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.5.127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.5.127","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: I develop Tetsurō Watsuji's relational model of the self as 'betweenness'. After some background, I argue that Watsuji's view receives support from two case studies: solitary confinement and dementia. Both clarify the constitutive interdependence between the self and\u0000 the social and material contexts of 'betweenness' that define its lifeworld. They do so by providing powerful examples of what happens when the support and regulative grounding of this lifeworld is restricted or taken away. I argue further that Watsuji's view helps see the other side of this\u0000 deprivation, how reconstructing aspects of betweenness is, at the same time, a reconstruction of the self. I conclude by briefly indicating further consequences of this view.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141399646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.5.178
Itay Shani
Abstract: The thrust of the present paper is that contemporary philosophical theories of consciousness are in the grip of a distorted perspective on the nature of their subject. They are absorbed in an understanding of consciousness which overemphasizes its role in grasping intentional objects, while undervaluing its functioning as the receptive ground to whom things are given and in whom they are disclosed. I first make the distinction more precise, discerning two complementary modes of consciousness: the accusative mode and the dative mode, respectively. Taking Locke as a primary representative of the disregard for the dative mode, I proceed to show that this negligence leads to a fundamentally incomplete, and therefore ultimately incoherent, picture regarding the nature of consciousness. This is further demonstrated with regard to some contemporary philosophical theories of consciousness: higher-order monitoring theories and self-representational theories. I then move on to enquire, can the dative mode hypothesis receive support from significant trends in contemporary neuroscience? While interesting connections are drawn in relation to affective neuroscience and to spontaneous background activity, I argue that in order to do full justice to the receptive side of consciousness we must ultimately resort to the more radical concept of pure consciousness, developed primarily within Hindu and Buddhist philosophy.
{"title":"Pure Consciousness as the Ground of the Given: Or, Why There is No Perception Without Background Reception","authors":"Itay Shani","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.5.178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.5.178","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: The thrust of the present paper is that contemporary philosophical theories of consciousness are in the grip of a distorted perspective on the nature of their subject. They are absorbed in an understanding of consciousness which overemphasizes its role in grasping intentional\u0000 objects, while undervaluing its functioning as the receptive ground to whom things are given and in whom they are disclosed. I first make the distinction more precise, discerning two complementary modes of consciousness: the accusative mode and the dative mode, respectively. Taking Locke as\u0000 a primary representative of the disregard for the dative mode, I proceed to show that this negligence leads to a fundamentally incomplete, and therefore ultimately incoherent, picture regarding the nature of consciousness. This is further demonstrated with regard to some contemporary philosophical\u0000 theories of consciousness: higher-order monitoring theories and self-representational theories. I then move on to enquire, can the dative mode hypothesis receive support from significant trends in contemporary neuroscience? While interesting connections are drawn in relation to affective neuroscience\u0000 and to spontaneous background activity, I argue that in order to do full justice to the receptive side of consciousness we must ultimately resort to the more radical concept of pure consciousness, developed primarily within Hindu and Buddhist philosophy.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141407316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.5.206
D. Zahavi
In recent publications, Jay Garfield and Anil Seth have both written about the you. Whereas Garfield is a Buddhist scholar who advocates a no-self view, Seth is a neuroscientist who defends a radical form of representationalism. But is it really possible to speak meaningfully of a you (and of a we) if one denies the existence of the self, and if one declares the world of experience a neuronal fantasy? In the following, I will criticize both accounts. I will argue that they both, in different ways, are unable to deal with a real other, and, drawing on the work of Husserl, I will argue that a proper understanding of the you doesn't merely require accepting the reality of the self, but also the existence of a shared lifeworld.
{"title":"Being You — Or Not: A Challenge for Garfield and Seth","authors":"D. Zahavi","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.5.206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.5.206","url":null,"abstract":"In recent publications, Jay Garfield and Anil Seth have both written about the you. Whereas Garfield is a Buddhist scholar who advocates a no-self view, Seth is a neuroscientist who defends a radical form of representationalism. But is it really possible to speak meaningfully of a you\u0000 (and of a we) if one denies the existence of the self, and if one declares the world of experience a neuronal fantasy? In the following, I will criticize both accounts. I will argue that they both, in different ways, are unable to deal with a real other, and, drawing on the work of Husserl,\u0000 I will argue that a proper understanding of the you doesn't merely require accepting the reality of the self, but also the existence of a shared lifeworld.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141397391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.5.037
Matthew MacKenzie
This paper sketches a phenomenological-structural account of consciousness that distinguishes phenomenal consciousness, subjectivity, and the self. On this account, minimal subjectivity is an inherent feature of human phenomenal consciousness. This minimal subjectivity is then understood as, in Indian Buddhist terms, mere reflexive awareness (svasamvedanamātra), or in Western phenomenological terms, minimal pre-reflective self-awareness. This minimal subjectivity is also distinguished from the richer phenomenon of the sense of self. It is possible to have consciousness without a sense of self, but that consciousness would still be minimally subjective.
{"title":"Minimal Subjectivity and Reflexive Awareness","authors":"Matthew MacKenzie","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.5.037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.5.037","url":null,"abstract":"This paper sketches a phenomenological-structural account of consciousness that distinguishes phenomenal consciousness, subjectivity, and the self. On this account, minimal subjectivity is an inherent feature of human phenomenal consciousness. This minimal subjectivity is then understood\u0000 as, in Indian Buddhist terms, mere reflexive awareness (svasamvedanamātra), or in Western phenomenological terms, minimal pre-reflective self-awareness. This minimal subjectivity is also distinguished from the richer phenomenon of the sense of self. It is possible to have consciousness\u0000 without a sense of self, but that consciousness would still be minimally subjective.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141413304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.5.026
G. Strawson
All experience is experiencing, and therefore entails an experiencer — i.e.a subject of experience. This is an a priori truth. It does not entail that, in the case of any given episode of experience, the portion of reality that is correctly said to be the experiencer (the subject of the experience) is something ontically distinct from the portion of reality that is the episode of experience itself, and there is one metaphysically fundamental way of conceiving of the subject of experience — the thin conception — given which the subject of an experience is not ontically distinct from the experience.
{"title":"The Impossibility of Subjectless Experience","authors":"G. Strawson","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.5.026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.5.026","url":null,"abstract":"All experience is experiencing, and therefore entails an experiencer — i.e.a subject of experience. This is an a priori truth. It does not entail that, in the case of any given episode of experience, the portion of reality that is correctly said to be the experiencer (the subject\u0000 of the experience) is something ontically distinct from the portion of reality that is the episode of experience itself, and there is one metaphysically fundamental way of conceiving of the subject of experience — the thin conception — given which the subject of an experience is\u0000 not ontically distinct from the experience.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141409490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.5.062
C. Coseru
This paper defends the persistence of the subjective or selfintimating dimension of experience in non-ordinary and pathological states of consciousness such as non-dual awareness, full absorption, drug-induced ego dissolution, and the minimal conscious state. In considering whether non-ordinary and pathological conscious states display any subjective features, we confront a dilemma. Either they do, in which case there needs to be some way of accounting for these features in phenomenal terms, or they do not, in which case there is nothing it is like to be in them. But the dilemma only arises if we assume that opacity rather than phenomenality is a pervasive feature of these non-ordinary states. However, non-ordinary conscious states are deemed phenomenally opaque only by overly restrictive standards of conceivability that: (i) fail to account for the variety of nonordinary and pathological experience in non-arbitrary ways; (ii) sidestep the problem of the attribution and location of mental content (given intelligibility requirements for experience) or relegate them to illusory constructs; (iii) assume an unproblematic appeal to testimonial evidence. I discuss some cases from contemplative traditions and psychopathology and offer some plausible alternative explanations.
{"title":"Can There Be Something it is Like to Be No One?","authors":"C. Coseru","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.5.062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.5.062","url":null,"abstract":"This paper defends the persistence of the subjective or selfintimating dimension of experience in non-ordinary and pathological states of consciousness such as non-dual awareness, full absorption, drug-induced ego dissolution, and the minimal conscious state. In considering whether\u0000 non-ordinary and pathological conscious states display any subjective features, we confront a dilemma. Either they do, in which case there needs to be some way of accounting for these features in phenomenal terms, or they do not, in which case there is nothing it is like to be in them. But\u0000 the dilemma only arises if we assume that opacity rather than phenomenality is a pervasive feature of these non-ordinary states. However, non-ordinary conscious states are deemed phenomenally opaque only by overly restrictive standards of conceivability that: (i) fail to account for the variety\u0000 of nonordinary and pathological experience in non-arbitrary ways; (ii) sidestep the problem of the attribution and location of mental content (given intelligibility requirements for experience) or relegate them to illusory constructs; (iii) assume an unproblematic appeal to testimonial evidence.\u0000 I discuss some cases from contemplative traditions and psychopathology and offer some plausible alternative explanations.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141409085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.5.104
Anna Ciaunica
In this paper I focus on somatosensory attenuation of bodily signals as a core mechanism underlying the phenomenon of 'losing' one's sense of self in meditation. Specifically, I argue that somatosensory attenuation of bodily signals does not make the bodily self 'disappear' experientially. Rather, during the subjectively reported phenomena of 'self-loss', bodily sensory signals are self-attenuated, physiologically, and experientially processed in the background. Hence the term 'losing' the self or 'selfless' states may be misleading in describing these peculiar types of experiences reported during deep meditative states. What is 'lost', I claim, is a particular, ordinary way to explicitly, mentally model oneself in relation to the body and the world. Yet, the experience of being a living body, i.e.a self-organizing organism, is never 'lost' in this process. The proposal is that the explicit feeling of selfless minds may be tacitly accompanied by the implicit feeling of unlimited body, as two sides of the same coin.
{"title":"Selfless Minds, Unlimited Bodies?: Homeostatic Bodily Self-Regulation in Meditative Experiences","authors":"Anna Ciaunica","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.5.104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.5.104","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I focus on somatosensory attenuation of bodily signals as a core mechanism underlying the phenomenon of 'losing' one's sense of self in meditation. Specifically, I argue that somatosensory attenuation of bodily signals does not make the bodily self 'disappear' experientially.\u0000 Rather, during the subjectively reported phenomena of 'self-loss', bodily sensory signals are self-attenuated, physiologically, and experientially processed in the background. Hence the term 'losing' the self or 'selfless' states may be misleading in describing these peculiar types of experiences\u0000 reported during deep meditative states. What is 'lost', I claim, is a particular, ordinary way to explicitly, mentally model oneself in relation to the body and the world. Yet, the experience of being a living body, i.e.a self-organizing organism, is never 'lost' in this process. The proposal\u0000 is that the explicit feeling of selfless minds may be tacitly accompanied by the implicit feeling of unlimited body, as two sides of the same coin.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141401347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.5.006
C. Coseru
{"title":"Introduction: Is Subjectless Consciousness Possible?","authors":"C. Coseru","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.5.006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.5.006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141409261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.5.221
J. Ganeri
My aim in this paper is to discuss the imaginability of subjectless consciousness, and in particular the question of whether one can imagine de se being subjectlessly conscious. I will not engage here with the further issue as to whether imaginability entails possibility, and so with the possibility simpliciter of consciousness being subjectless. The question I am interested in is, in another formulation, whether I can imagine being no one. I shall begin by reviewing the literature on a related, if distinct, question, namely that as to whether I can imagine being someone other than the one that I am.
{"title":"Is it Possible to Imagine Being No One?","authors":"J. Ganeri","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.5.221","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.5.221","url":null,"abstract":"My aim in this paper is to discuss the imaginability of subjectless consciousness, and in particular the question of whether one can imagine de se being subjectlessly conscious. I will not engage here with the further issue as to whether imaginability entails possibility, and\u0000 so with the possibility simpliciter of consciousness being subjectless. The question I am interested in is, in another formulation, whether I can imagine being no one. I shall begin by reviewing the literature on a related, if distinct, question, namely that as to whether I can imagine being\u0000 someone other than the one that I am.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141405203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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