A Difference-In-Difference Approach to Estimate the Price Effect of Market Entry in High-Speed Rail

Q3 Business, Management and Accounting Competition and Regulation in Network Industries Pub Date : 2022-09-01 DOI:10.1177/17835917221088770
P. Beria, S. Tolentino, Evgeniia Shtele, V. Lunkar
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

The effect of competition on prices in the passenger transport sector can be difficult to estimate because of many influencing factors such as state regulation, demand, seasonality, and reactions of indirect competitors. A case of great interest in the rail sector is Italy, where on-track competition in the high-speed segment has been in place for nearly ten years. The paper aims at answering the question whether—and how much—incumbent’s prices are affected when competition starts on a route previously in monopoly. The case is the start of operations on the Turin–Milan–Venice route, where Italo entered in May 2018. Adopting a difference-in-difference approach, we check if Trenitalia changed the price strategy on the route before and after the entry, with respect to two control groups. The addition of placebo tests allows us to understand the ranges of significance of the results and to estimate the noise level of the estimates. Our findings suggest that the start of competition led to lower prices in the short-medium period. In the specific case, the Milano–Venezia route saw Trenitalia’s prices reduced by 21–26% (±2–5%) in a time span of 84–140 days after Italo’s entry and for advanced bookings from 2 to 10 days. Last-day prices remain unchanged, while early bookings are reduced by just 9%. This price reduction does not remain stable in the longer term, when other effects add up and blur the effect of the entry. Nevertheless, we keep observing a smaller, ∼15%, but still negative prices change.
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高铁市场准入价格效应的差分法估计
由于许多影响因素,如国家管制、需求、季节性和间接竞争者的反应,竞争对客运部门价格的影响很难估计。意大利的铁路部门是一个非常有趣的例子,该国高速铁路领域的轨道竞争已经存在了近十年。这篇论文的目的是回答这样一个问题:当竞争开始在以前处于垄断状态的路线上时,在位者的价格是否会受到影响——以及影响程度有多大。本案是都灵-米兰-威尼斯航线的开始运营,Italo于2018年5月进入该航线。采用差异中的差异方法,我们检查了意大利铁路公司是否在进入之前和之后改变了路线上的价格策略,相对于两个对照组。安慰剂试验的增加使我们能够理解结果的显著性范围,并估计估计的噪声水平。我们的研究结果表明,竞争的开始导致了中短期内价格的下降。具体来说,米兰-威尼斯航线的价格在ititalo进入后的84-140天内下降了21-26%(±2 - 5%),提前预订的价格在2 - 10天内下降。最后一天的价格保持不变,而提前预订仅减少了9%。这种降价在长期内不会保持稳定,因为其他影响加起来会模糊进入的影响。尽管如此,我们仍然观察到较小的(约15%)价格变化,但仍然是负的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Competition and Regulation in Network Industries
Competition and Regulation in Network Industries Business, Management and Accounting-Business, Management and Accounting (all)
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
14
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