{"title":"Unnecessary and Insufficient Factual Causes","authors":"Jane Stapleton","doi":"10.1515/jtl-2023-0030","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Law recognizes a necessary (i.e., but-for) factor as a factual cause. However, it is a common misconception that the but-for test is the exclusive test of factual causation. Longstanding case law reveals that a factor may be a factual cause of an outcome, even if it was neither necessary nor sufficient for it. This was recently unanimously confirmed by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in Financial Conduct Authority v. Arch Insurance (UK) Ltd (2021). In the law, there seems to be a uniform concept of what it means to be a factual cause, one that is wider than necessity and includes unnecessary and insufficient factors which are recognized as factual causes across a wide variety of legal contexts. This uniform concept of factual cause can be captured in a forensically straightforward way in an “extended but-for test”. Appreciation of unnecessary and insufficient factual causes, which are common, provides a more coherent frame in which to view the outcomes of certain earlier cases. It also illuminates the importance for clarity of legal reasoning of separating the context-independent factual cause issue from context-dependent analytical stages such as the scope of the rule and remedy, including loss quantification.","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Tort Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2023-0030","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Abstract Law recognizes a necessary (i.e., but-for) factor as a factual cause. However, it is a common misconception that the but-for test is the exclusive test of factual causation. Longstanding case law reveals that a factor may be a factual cause of an outcome, even if it was neither necessary nor sufficient for it. This was recently unanimously confirmed by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in Financial Conduct Authority v. Arch Insurance (UK) Ltd (2021). In the law, there seems to be a uniform concept of what it means to be a factual cause, one that is wider than necessity and includes unnecessary and insufficient factors which are recognized as factual causes across a wide variety of legal contexts. This uniform concept of factual cause can be captured in a forensically straightforward way in an “extended but-for test”. Appreciation of unnecessary and insufficient factual causes, which are common, provides a more coherent frame in which to view the outcomes of certain earlier cases. It also illuminates the importance for clarity of legal reasoning of separating the context-independent factual cause issue from context-dependent analytical stages such as the scope of the rule and remedy, including loss quantification.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Tort Law aims to be the premier publisher of original articles about tort law. JTL is committed to methodological pluralism. The only peer-reviewed academic journal in the U.S. devoted to tort law, the Journal of Tort Law publishes cutting-edge scholarship in tort theory and jurisprudence from a range of interdisciplinary perspectives: comparative, doctrinal, economic, empirical, historical, philosophical, and policy-oriented. Founded by Jules Coleman (Yale) and some of the world''s most prominent tort scholars from the Harvard, Fordham, NYU, Yale, and University of Haifa law faculties, the journal is the premier source for original articles about tort law and jurisprudence.