An orthodox view of tort law sees it as primarily a means of assigning costs -- for economic reasons, on some views, or for moral reasons, on others. Gregory Keating compellingly challenges this orthodoxy, showing how tort is essentially a matter of setting prospective norms designed to protect rational agents from wrongful harms, to which it attaches special negative significance. Here I discuss two areas that may raise complications for this account -- strict liability and the tortious infliction of pain -- and propose a reconciliation.
{"title":"Against Harm: Keating on the Soul of Tort Law","authors":"Jeffrey S. Helmreich","doi":"10.1515/jtl-2024-2003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2024-2003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 An orthodox view of tort law sees it as primarily a means of assigning costs -- for economic reasons, on some views, or for moral reasons, on others. Gregory Keating compellingly challenges this orthodoxy, showing how tort is essentially a matter of setting prospective norms designed to protect rational agents from wrongful harms, to which it attaches special negative significance. Here I discuss two areas that may raise complications for this account -- strict liability and the tortious infliction of pain -- and propose a reconciliation.","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":"49 19","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141107535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Reasonableness and Risk offers two main claims that might open up fruitful avenues for further reflection. The first claim has to do with the need to abandon form and turn our attention to substance. The argument is that we cannot understand or justify the law of torts without attending to the interests that it protects. The second claim is related to the need to abandon the habit of treating torts in isolation and instead study its integration within a web of institutions which share responsibility for protecting the urgent interests of members of society. The argument here is that our urgent interest in physical integrity exceeds (goes beyond and is greater than) the law of torts. In engaging with these claims, this paper points out potential connections with some pressing questions for both tort law and risk regulation brought to the fore by the recent emergence of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems.
{"title":"Situating Tort Law Within a Web of Institutions: Insights for the Age of Artificial Intelligence","authors":"María Guadalupe Martínez Alles","doi":"10.1515/jtl-2024-2002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2024-2002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 \u0000 Reasonableness and Risk offers two main claims that might open up fruitful avenues for further reflection. The first claim has to do with the need to abandon form and turn our attention to substance. The argument is that we cannot understand or justify the law of torts without attending to the interests that it protects. The second claim is related to the need to abandon the habit of treating torts in isolation and instead study its integration within a web of institutions which share responsibility for protecting the urgent interests of members of society. The argument here is that our urgent interest in physical integrity exceeds (goes beyond and is greater than) the law of torts. In engaging with these claims, this paper points out potential connections with some pressing questions for both tort law and risk regulation brought to the fore by the recent emergence of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems.","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":"31 15","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141106325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Every day, state common law courts define the duty of care in negligence law. There is no formula for how courts should determine duty. Yet when judges are charged with important decisions about whether to open or shut the courthouse doors to whole categories of claimants, judges need some framework for decision. This article commends as an exemplar, the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in Boynton v. Kennicott Utah Copper, a take-home asbestos exposure case. The power of Boynton is not only the answer it provides, but also the coherent framework for analysis that Justice Constandinos Himonas’ opinion sets forth. The opinion’s framework incorporates established principles as well as important tort policies such as harm prevention. Boynton’s structure at once provides the stability and consistency of precedent befitting common law adjudication while also incorporating the public policy and pragmatic concerns that have long guided tort law’s development. Boynton’s framework achieves a similar result to the one in the Third Restatement—creating duty and no-duty rules with possibility of exception based on principle and policy factors. However, Boynton does so through traditional terminology that has aquired meaning through repeated historical application. Courts, scholars and students would be well advised to examine the Utah Supreme Court’s approach to duty analysis.
{"title":"What We Talk About When We Talk About the Duty of Care in Negligence Law: The Utah Supreme Court Sets an Example in Boynton v. Kennecott Utah Copper","authors":"Ellen M. Bublick","doi":"10.1515/jtl-2024-0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2024-0004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Every day, state common law courts define the duty of care in negligence law. There is no formula for how courts should determine duty. Yet when judges are charged with important decisions about whether to open or shut the courthouse doors to whole categories of claimants, judges need some framework for decision. This article commends as an exemplar, the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in Boynton v. Kennicott Utah Copper, a take-home asbestos exposure case. The power of Boynton is not only the answer it provides, but also the coherent framework for analysis that Justice Constandinos Himonas’ opinion sets forth. The opinion’s framework incorporates established principles as well as important tort policies such as harm prevention. Boynton’s structure at once provides the stability and consistency of precedent befitting common law adjudication while also incorporating the public policy and pragmatic concerns that have long guided tort law’s development. Boynton’s framework achieves a similar result to the one in the Third Restatement—creating duty and no-duty rules with possibility of exception based on principle and policy factors. However, Boynton does so through traditional terminology that has aquired meaning through repeated historical application. Courts, scholars and students would be well advised to examine the Utah Supreme Court’s approach to duty analysis.","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":"2 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140354124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In re Facebook preserved a class action brought against Facebook based on its mass collection of web browsing data. Although the plaintiffs brought several common law and statutory causes of action, I will focus on the court’s analysis of intrusion upon seclusion. This is where the case makes its greatest contribution to 21st century jurisprudence. It clears up several puzzles that had troubled the tort (and indeed my own thinking) to the great benefit of tort theory and the progress of privacy law.
In re Facebook 案保留了因 Facebook 大量收集网页浏览数据而对其提起的集体诉讼。虽然原告提出了多项普通法和法定诉讼理由，但我将重点关注法院对侵犯隐私行为的分析。这是本案对 21 世纪法理学的最大贡献。它厘清了困扰侵权法的几个难题（实际上也是我自己的想法），对侵权理论和隐私法的进步大有裨益。
{"title":"Liking the Intrusion Analysis in In Re Facebook","authors":"Jane R. Bambauer","doi":"10.1515/jtl-2023-0044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2023-0044","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 \u0000 In re Facebook preserved a class action brought against Facebook based on its mass collection of web browsing data. Although the plaintiffs brought several common law and statutory causes of action, I will focus on the court’s analysis of intrusion upon seclusion. This is where the case makes its greatest contribution to 21st century jurisprudence. It clears up several puzzles that had troubled the tort (and indeed my own thinking) to the great benefit of tort theory and the progress of privacy law.","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":" 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140383710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While largely unknown, the Indiana Supreme Court’s 2017 opinion Escamilla v. Shiel Sexton Co. deserves to be canonized for closely examining – and, ultimately, rejecting – the incursion of federal immigration law and policy into state tort law. For over two decades, state and federal courts have relied on the United States Supreme Court’s 2002 ruling in Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, to deny future lost wages awards to successful tort claimants who lack documentation. Escamilla reveals the faulty logic underlying this caselaw and provides a clear and straightforward framework for future courts to employ when faced with this issue. Ultimately, Escamilla demonstrates why plaintiffs’ undocumented status, alone, is insufficient to allow tortfeasors to escape paying tort victims what often amounts to substantial damages. In doing so, Escamilla fortifies the compensation and deterrence functions of tort law.
{"title":"Disentangling Immigration Policy From Tort Claims for Future Lost Wages","authors":"Shefali Milczarek-Desai","doi":"10.1515/jtl-2023-0024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2023-0024","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 \u0000 While largely unknown, the Indiana Supreme Court’s 2017 opinion Escamilla v. Shiel Sexton Co. deserves to be canonized for closely examining – and, ultimately, rejecting – the incursion of federal immigration law and policy into state tort law. For over two decades, state and federal courts have relied on the United States Supreme Court’s 2002 ruling in Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, to deny future lost wages awards to successful tort claimants who lack documentation. Escamilla reveals the faulty logic underlying this caselaw and provides a clear and straightforward framework for future courts to employ when faced with this issue. Ultimately, Escamilla demonstrates why plaintiffs’ undocumented status, alone, is insufficient to allow tortfeasors to escape paying tort victims what often amounts to substantial damages. In doing so, Escamilla fortifies the compensation and deterrence functions of tort law.\u0000","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":"13 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140418537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Brown v. USA Taekwondo grapples with the problems that have dogged California law governing the determination of duty in negligence for more than fifty years now. The great California duty decisions of the late 1960s—Rowland v. Christian and Dillon v. Legg—were the bookends to an age of American tort law inaugurated by MacPherson v. Buick and Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad. MacPherson and Palsgraf altered both the internal structure of negligence law and tort law’s relation to contract and property by making reasonable foreseeability of harm the master principle of responsibility in tort. Rowland and Dillon brought the age of reasonable foreseeability to a close. As their implications unfolded over time, we learned that making reasonable foreseeability of harm the fundamental test for both the existence of obligation and the extent of liability imposes more responsibility than we can bear. Reaching the limits of reasonable foreseeability as the master principle of duty doctrine left courts hard-pressed to say when fundamental responsibilities of care should be expanded and when they should be contracted. Ever since, California courts have been muddling their way through duty cases. They have been uncertain both about when an actor bears some responsibility for reducing a risk or mitigating a harm and about how they should go about making such determinations. USA Taekwondo’s efforts to recast Rowland’s laundry list of relevant factors as a two-step test shows us how we might begin to bring our own age of confusion to a close.
{"title":"Putting “Duty” Back on Track","authors":"Gregory C. Keating","doi":"10.1515/jtl-2024-2001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2024-2001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 \u0000 Brown v. USA Taekwondo grapples with the problems that have dogged California law governing the determination of duty in negligence for more than fifty years now. The great California duty decisions of the late 1960s—Rowland v. Christian and Dillon v. Legg—were the bookends to an age of American tort law inaugurated by MacPherson v. Buick and Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad. MacPherson and Palsgraf altered both the internal structure of negligence law and tort law’s relation to contract and property by making reasonable foreseeability of harm the master principle of responsibility in tort. Rowland and Dillon brought the age of reasonable foreseeability to a close. As their implications unfolded over time, we learned that making reasonable foreseeability of harm the fundamental test for both the existence of obligation and the extent of liability imposes more responsibility than we can bear. Reaching the limits of reasonable foreseeability as the master principle of duty doctrine left courts hard-pressed to say when fundamental responsibilities of care should be expanded and when they should be contracted. Ever since, California courts have been muddling their way through duty cases. They have been uncertain both about when an actor bears some responsibility for reducing a risk or mitigating a harm and about how they should go about making such determinations. USA Taekwondo’s efforts to recast Rowland’s laundry list of relevant factors as a two-step test shows us how we might begin to bring our own age of confusion to a close.","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":"138 S248","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140429266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article considers the UK Supreme Court decision in Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police. It explains the significance of the decision in terms of its affirmation of the principle that public authorities, in the case, the police, are subject to the same duties of care as private individuals in the tort of negligence. While offering some support for this ‘equality principle’, the article questions whether the principle is justifiably applied so as to restrict public authorities’ liability to that of private individuals.
{"title":"Public Authority Liability for Careless Failure to Protect from Harm","authors":"Sandy Steel","doi":"10.1515/jtl-2023-0040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2023-0040","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article considers the UK Supreme Court decision in Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police. It explains the significance of the decision in terms of its affirmation of the principle that public authorities, in the case, the police, are subject to the same duties of care as private individuals in the tort of negligence. While offering some support for this ‘equality principle’, the article questions whether the principle is justifiably applied so as to restrict public authorities’ liability to that of private individuals.","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":"16 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139379976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Fearn v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery, required the UK Supreme Court to resolve claims that by operating an open-air terrace, from which visitors could enjoy a high-level view of London, the defendants were committing the tort of private nuisance against the owners of nearby luxury flats. The Court decided that the intrusive staring into the flats by visitors to the terrace could be a form of private nuisance, but split as to whether the tort was being committed; a minority thought that it would be necessary to take account of the claimants’ flats being glass-walled, and consequently unusually vulnerable to ocular intrusion, and the possibility of the claimants mitigating their discomfort by using blinds, whilst the majority insisted that it was straightforward to hold the defendants liable. This article concentrates on the majority’s re-statement of the basic test for liability in private nuisance, in particular their shift from an approach that assesses the “reasonableness” (or otherwise) of the defendant’s activity to one that relies heavily on a distinction between “common and ordinary” and “special and unusual” uses of land. It concludes that several key elements in the re-statement will require further elucidation, and that the key distinction does not reflect the values that its proponents hoped that it would.
{"title":"Private Nuisance: The UK Supreme Court Take a View","authors":"Roderick Bagshaw","doi":"10.1515/jtl-2023-0043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2023-0043","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Fearn v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery, required the UK Supreme Court to resolve claims that by operating an open-air terrace, from which visitors could enjoy a high-level view of London, the defendants were committing the tort of private nuisance against the owners of nearby luxury flats. The Court decided that the intrusive staring into the flats by visitors to the terrace could be a form of private nuisance, but split as to whether the tort was being committed; a minority thought that it would be necessary to take account of the claimants’ flats being glass-walled, and consequently unusually vulnerable to ocular intrusion, and the possibility of the claimants mitigating their discomfort by using blinds, whilst the majority insisted that it was straightforward to hold the defendants liable. This article concentrates on the majority’s re-statement of the basic test for liability in private nuisance, in particular their shift from an approach that assesses the “reasonableness” (or otherwise) of the defendant’s activity to one that relies heavily on a distinction between “common and ordinary” and “special and unusual” uses of land. It concludes that several key elements in the re-statement will require further elucidation, and that the key distinction does not reflect the values that its proponents hoped that it would.","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":"59 30","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138587913","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article addresses the intersection of three important topics: sexual assault, police misconduct, and employer liability for employee torts. As to the last of these, while there have long been debates among jurists in the U.S. concerning the proper scope of respondeat superior liability, courts have mostly adhered to an approach that focuses on whether the employee acted for the purpose of serving the employer’s interests. The narrowness of this purpose-based test, as compared to available alternatives, makes it imperative for lawyers, judges, and scholars to be attentive to other, less well-known, bases for employer liability. In Sherman v Department of Public Safety , the Delaware Supreme Court applied a particular version of one such doctrine – the “aided-by-agency” doctrine – to hold a police department accountable for its officer’s sexual assault of an arrestee. By articulating this doctrine in a thoughtful and circumscribed manner, the Court affirmed its reputation as a leader in the development of agency law, while also providing a helpful framework that can be applied to hold certain employers liable when employees take advantage of their employment-based authority over their victims to perpetrate assaults.
{"title":"<i>Sherman v. Department of Public Safety</i>: Institutional Responsibility for Sexual Assault","authors":"John C. P. Goldberg, Benjamin C. Zipursky","doi":"10.1515/jtl-2023-0034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2023-0034","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article addresses the intersection of three important topics: sexual assault, police misconduct, and employer liability for employee torts. As to the last of these, while there have long been debates among jurists in the U.S. concerning the proper scope of respondeat superior liability, courts have mostly adhered to an approach that focuses on whether the employee acted for the purpose of serving the employer’s interests. The narrowness of this purpose-based test, as compared to available alternatives, makes it imperative for lawyers, judges, and scholars to be attentive to other, less well-known, bases for employer liability. In Sherman v Department of Public Safety , the Delaware Supreme Court applied a particular version of one such doctrine – the “aided-by-agency” doctrine – to hold a police department accountable for its officer’s sexual assault of an arrestee. By articulating this doctrine in a thoughtful and circumscribed manner, the Court affirmed its reputation as a leader in the development of agency law, while also providing a helpful framework that can be applied to hold certain employers liable when employees take advantage of their employment-based authority over their victims to perpetrate assaults.","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135585061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This Essay integrates two ambitions: to lay out new theoretical foundations for antidiscrimination law and to demonstrate the practical significance of these foundations to tackle instances of wrongful discrimination beyond the reach of the current legal regime. Concerning theory, we articulate an account of wrongful discrimination grounded in private law’s basic commitment to reciprocal respect for the self-determination and substantive equality of private persons. Concerning practice, we argue that antidiscrimination law is currently at its pre-MacPherson v. Buick stage, meaning it is made up of isolated pockets of liability for discriminatory behavior. The gaps between them are indefensible since they necessarily undermine people’s fundamental right to be treated as equals by holders of normative powers such as proprietors, employers, and lessors. Nothing short of a full-blown tort of discrimination will enable antidiscrimination law to reach its own MacPherson moment. The theoretical account we develop provides the necessary framework for embarking on this crucial endeavor: a clear articulation of the normative foundations of this tort as an integral and indispensable part of private law in a liberal society. Drawing on existing tort doctrines, we identify important legal tools that can be utilized for prescribing the proper elements—duty, breach, injury, causation, and remedy—of a novel, generic tort of discrimination.
{"title":"The Tort of Discrimination","authors":"Hanoch Dagan, Avihay Dorfman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.4332817","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4332817","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This Essay integrates two ambitions: to lay out new theoretical foundations for antidiscrimination law and to demonstrate the practical significance of these foundations to tackle instances of wrongful discrimination beyond the reach of the current legal regime. Concerning theory, we articulate an account of wrongful discrimination grounded in private law’s basic commitment to reciprocal respect for the self-determination and substantive equality of private persons. Concerning practice, we argue that antidiscrimination law is currently at its pre-MacPherson v. Buick stage, meaning it is made up of isolated pockets of liability for discriminatory behavior. The gaps between them are indefensible since they necessarily undermine people’s fundamental right to be treated as equals by holders of normative powers such as proprietors, employers, and lessors. Nothing short of a full-blown tort of discrimination will enable antidiscrimination law to reach its own MacPherson moment. The theoretical account we develop provides the necessary framework for embarking on this crucial endeavor: a clear articulation of the normative foundations of this tort as an integral and indispensable part of private law in a liberal society. Drawing on existing tort doctrines, we identify important legal tools that can be utilized for prescribing the proper elements—duty, breach, injury, causation, and remedy—of a novel, generic tort of discrimination.","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47825329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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