Defending Libertarianism through Rethinking Responsibility for Consequences

Abstract

Abstract This article defends indirect libertarianism against those arguments which attempt to show that blameworthiness cannot be traced back to earlier blameworthy acts in most cases. More precisely, I focus on those arguments according to which responsibility cannot be traced back in most cases because agents are unable to foresee the distant consequences of their acts . Since indirect libertarianism claims that we are responsible for many actions, omissions, beliefs, attitudes because they can be traced back to earlier free acts, the success of the arguments against tracing would be fatal to indirect libertarianism. In the literature, there are some answers to the problem of tracing, but they are either implausible or unacceptable for indirect libertarians who hold that indeterministic free decisions are the ultimate sources of moral responsibility. On the basis of works by Björnsson, Persson, Robichaud, and Wieland, I provide a solution to the problem of tracing that preserves the crucial role of indeterministic decisions. In other words, I provide a libertarian solution to the problem of tracing.