SELF-GOVERNANCE, ROBUST POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND THE REFORM OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

IF 0.3 4区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Social Philosophy & Policy Pub Date : 2020-04-14 DOI:10.1017/S0265052521000273
Vlad Tarko
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Abstract

Abstract This essay explains how to use the calculus of consent framework to think more rigorously about self-governance, and applies this framework to the issue of evaluating federal regulatory agencies. Robust political economy is the idea that institutions should be designed to work well even under weak assumptions about decision-makers’ knowledge and benevolence. I show how the calculus of consent can be used to analyze both incentives and knowledge problems. The calculus is simultaneously a theory of self-governance and a tool for robust political economy analysis. Applying this framework to the case of public administration leads to the conclusion that private goods (such as medicine) tend to be over-regulated, public goods tend to be under-regulated (such as enabling too much pollution), and regulatory agencies tend to be over-centralized (and should in most cases either be replaced with certification markets or moved to state level).
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自治、健全的政治经济和公共行政改革
摘要本文解释了如何使用同意框架的演算来更严格地思考自治问题,并将该框架应用于评估联邦监管机构的问题。稳健的政治经济学认为,即使在有关决策者的知识和仁慈的薄弱假设下,制度也应该设计得运转良好。我展示了如何使用同意的演算来分析动机和知识问题。微积分既是一种自治理论,也是一种强有力的政治经济分析工具。将这一框架应用于公共行政的情况,可以得出这样的结论:私人物品(如药品)往往监管过度,公共物品往往监管不足(如造成过多污染),监管机构往往过于集中(在大多数情况下,要么用认证市场取代,要么转移到州一级)。
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来源期刊
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期刊介绍: Social Philosophy and Policy is an interdisciplinary journal with an emphasis on the philosophical underpinnings of enduring social policy debates. The issues are thematic in format, examining a specific area of concern with contributions from scholars in different disciplines, especially philosophy, economics, political science and law. While not primarily a journal of policy prescriptions, some articles in each issue will typically connect theory with practice. The 2006 issues are "Justice and Global Politics" and "Taxation, Economic Prosperity, and Distributive Justice". The 2007 issues will be "Liberalism: Old and New" and "Ancient Greek Political Theory".
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