Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1017/S0265052523000080
M. Rizzo, R. Epstein, D. Schmidtz
Abstract Taxation is more than one thing. Taxes can be levied in various ways on various things, with varying effects on a culture and an economy, and raising different challenges of justification.
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Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1017/S0265052523000043
Allison Christians
Abstract Who should tax multinationals? National political figures sometimes signal their assumptions by making superior or even exclusive claims about who may tax “their” multinational companies, and it is common to hear such companies or their incomes referred to as “belonging” to one nation or another. The rhetoric reflects conventional wisdom about sovereign nations and their assumed entitlements, and is often invoked to curb or even sanction the seemingly excessive tax jurisdictions of some nations. But this conventional wisdom often ignores the fundamental dependence of multinationals on ongoing, extensive, and multifaceted regulatory cooperation involving most of the nations of the world. The goal of this essay is to demonstrate that given this dependence, there are no clear legal or normative boundaries to virtually any asserted tax jurisdiction. The claim provides a solution for neither double taxation nor the problems associated with excessive tax competition, but the essay concludes that recognizing the dependence of governments and “their” multinationals on multilateral cooperation should lead to an increase in focus on how nations go about negotiating the terms of their cooperation on tax.
{"title":"WHO SHOULD TAX MULTINATIONALS?","authors":"Allison Christians","doi":"10.1017/S0265052523000043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052523000043","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Who should tax multinationals? National political figures sometimes signal their assumptions by making superior or even exclusive claims about who may tax “their” multinational companies, and it is common to hear such companies or their incomes referred to as “belonging” to one nation or another. The rhetoric reflects conventional wisdom about sovereign nations and their assumed entitlements, and is often invoked to curb or even sanction the seemingly excessive tax jurisdictions of some nations. But this conventional wisdom often ignores the fundamental dependence of multinationals on ongoing, extensive, and multifaceted regulatory cooperation involving most of the nations of the world. The goal of this essay is to demonstrate that given this dependence, there are no clear legal or normative boundaries to virtually any asserted tax jurisdiction. The claim provides a solution for neither double taxation nor the problems associated with excessive tax competition, but the essay concludes that recognizing the dependence of governments and “their” multinationals on multilateral cooperation should lead to an increase in focus on how nations go about negotiating the terms of their cooperation on tax.","PeriodicalId":46601,"journal":{"name":"Social Philosophy & Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56898578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1017/S0265052523000092
M. Fleischer
Abstract Imagine two friends. Anna inherits nothing and works for every penny she has, while Mary inherits millions. How should a world that respects individual autonomy and private property rights treat Anna’s earnings and Mary’s inheritance? Should it tax them the same, or tax one more heavily than the other? If the latter, which one? The conventional wisdom holds that although some “right” libertarian theories justify taxing income, none justify taxing inheritances. Such taxes are “expropriations” and “an especially cruel injury” that “run[] roughshod over [a] deceased’s interest in the ends his property will serve.” This essay explores the standard libertarian objections to taxing gifts and bequests and argues that libertarians overstate their case when distinguishing the taxation of gratuitous transfers from other types of taxation. At minimum, the benefit theory of taxation embraced by many minimal statists and classical liberals mandates that the receipt of gifts and bequests should be taxed to the recipient. Moreover, the goals of curbing inherited political power and preventing wealthy families from insulating their members from market competition provide two additional explanations for why taxing inheritances to recipients is compatible with classical liberal values.
{"title":"DEATH AND TAXES: A LIBERTARIAN REAPPRAISAL","authors":"M. Fleischer","doi":"10.1017/S0265052523000092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052523000092","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Imagine two friends. Anna inherits nothing and works for every penny she has, while Mary inherits millions. How should a world that respects individual autonomy and private property rights treat Anna’s earnings and Mary’s inheritance? Should it tax them the same, or tax one more heavily than the other? If the latter, which one? The conventional wisdom holds that although some “right” libertarian theories justify taxing income, none justify taxing inheritances. Such taxes are “expropriations” and “an especially cruel injury” that “run[] roughshod over [a] deceased’s interest in the ends his property will serve.” This essay explores the standard libertarian objections to taxing gifts and bequests and argues that libertarians overstate their case when distinguishing the taxation of gratuitous transfers from other types of taxation. At minimum, the benefit theory of taxation embraced by many minimal statists and classical liberals mandates that the receipt of gifts and bequests should be taxed to the recipient. Moreover, the goals of curbing inherited political power and preventing wealthy families from insulating their members from market competition provide two additional explanations for why taxing inheritances to recipients is compatible with classical liberal values.","PeriodicalId":46601,"journal":{"name":"Social Philosophy & Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56898699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1017/S0265052523000079
R. Epstein
Abstract Over its entire life, the Internal Revenue Code (like other tax systems) has never tried to tax economic income as such, because of the administrative and liquidity problems that arise from taxing any combination of values consumed and from appreciation (or depreciation) of capital stocks. Instead, the common practice limits tax occasions to a realization of income from sale or other disposition of property. Even then, if the proceeds of the transaction are not cash or marketable securities, as with many corporation reorganizations, taxation is deferred until these assets are converted in cash or marketable securities. Any effort to eliminate these twin filters by taxing income—and income regardless of realization—will overburden government agencies and private taxpayers, while reducing economic activity. A wealth tax scores even worse by these welfare measures, creating massive problems of evasion and enforcement that will reduce capital formation across the board in the effort to transfer wealth from the ultra-rich to everyone else. A simple tax structure with affordable rates is the only path to economic prosperity.
{"title":"REALIZATION AND RECOGNITION UNDER THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE","authors":"R. Epstein","doi":"10.1017/S0265052523000079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052523000079","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Over its entire life, the Internal Revenue Code (like other tax systems) has never tried to tax economic income as such, because of the administrative and liquidity problems that arise from taxing any combination of values consumed and from appreciation (or depreciation) of capital stocks. Instead, the common practice limits tax occasions to a realization of income from sale or other disposition of property. Even then, if the proceeds of the transaction are not cash or marketable securities, as with many corporation reorganizations, taxation is deferred until these assets are converted in cash or marketable securities. Any effort to eliminate these twin filters by taxing income—and income regardless of realization—will overburden government agencies and private taxpayers, while reducing economic activity. A wealth tax scores even worse by these welfare measures, creating massive problems of evasion and enforcement that will reduce capital formation across the board in the effort to transfer wealth from the ultra-rich to everyone else. A simple tax structure with affordable rates is the only path to economic prosperity.","PeriodicalId":46601,"journal":{"name":"Social Philosophy & Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56898639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1017/S0265052523000110
J. Paul
Abstract The following essay analyzes the arguments made by the principal academic proponent of income taxation, Columbia University economist E. R. A Seligman, after it was found to be unconstitutional in 1894. Seligman thought that the prevalent theory of just taxation, that it should be based on a natural right to one’s person and property, was wrong. The principal American philosophical proponent of this natural rights-based approach to taxation was the late Brown University philosopher and economist, Francis Wayland. The essay analyzes the flaws in Seligman’s contention that there are no natural rights and, therefore, no natural property rights, so that taxation could not be justified by the benefits received for the protection of such rights. Instead, he claimed taxation should rest upon a person’s financial capacity. Since that capacity would be most accurately measured by net worth, we would have expected Seligman to endorse a proportionately assessed net worth tax (which was commonly used by the states in the nineteenth century). Alternatively, he argued for an income tax progressively assessed. This essay argues that since income is only a portion of financial capacity, his argument fails.
以下文章分析了所得税的主要学术支持者、哥伦比亚大学经济学家E. R. A .塞利格曼在1894年所得税被裁定违宪后所作的争论。塞利格曼认为，普遍流行的公正征税理论是错误的，它应该基于对个人和财产的自然权利。这种以自然权利为基础的税收方法的主要美国哲学支持者是布朗大学已故哲学家和经济学家弗朗西斯·韦兰(Francis Wayland)。本文分析了塞利格曼的论点的缺陷，即没有自然权利，因此没有自然产权，因此税收不能被保护这些权利所获得的利益所证明。相反，他声称税收应该取决于一个人的经济能力。由于这种能力可以用净资产来最准确地衡量，我们本以为塞利格曼会支持按比例评估的净资产税(这在19世纪被各州普遍采用)。另外，他主张征收累进式所得税。这篇文章认为，由于收入只是经济能力的一部分，他的论点站不住脚。
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Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1017/S0265052523000109
Linda D. Jellum
Abstract In this essay, I explore the question of who should determine what an ambiguous tax statute means, the courts or the Department of Treasury. The answer to that question is based on two administrative law doctrines: Chevron and Brand X. Here, I explain why Chevron and Brand X violate the Administrative Procedure Act and are unworkable. Then, using a provision in the tax code, I propose that we return to a standard that is both consistent with the APA and easier to implement: Skidmore.
{"title":"INTERPRETING AMBIGUOUS TAX STATUTES","authors":"Linda D. Jellum","doi":"10.1017/S0265052523000109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052523000109","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this essay, I explore the question of who should determine what an ambiguous tax statute means, the courts or the Department of Treasury. The answer to that question is based on two administrative law doctrines: Chevron and Brand X. Here, I explain why Chevron and Brand X violate the Administrative Procedure Act and are unworkable. Then, using a provision in the tax code, I propose that we return to a standard that is both consistent with the APA and easier to implement: Skidmore.","PeriodicalId":46601,"journal":{"name":"Social Philosophy & Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56898712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1017/S0265052523000134
Fabian Wendt
Abstract Lockeans regard taxation as a—perhaps sometimes permissible—infringement of moral property entitlements. This essay discusses whether, or in what form, this charge is defensible. In doing so, it will explore the truth and the limits of the conventionalist reply of Murphy and Nagel to Lockean challenges to taxation. It argues that there is a moral rationale for property conventions that is independent of the question whether and how one can acquire natural, pre-conventional property rights in the state of nature, that this rationale sets a moral standard for how good property conventions are and whether they are justifiable at all, and that once property conventions are in place, people’s moral property entitlements are at least partly determined by these conventions, sometimes even by unjustifiable ones that ought to be reformed. Because taxation can be a part of property conventions, taxation as such is not an infringement of moral property entitlements. But the essay will also argue that some taxation—excessive taxation—does infringe on moral property entitlements. This is because the moral rationale for property conventions sets some standards for what owners should be entitled to, and so excessive taxation will infringe upon moral entitlements that are partly not convention-based.
{"title":"TAXATION AND THE MORAL AUTHORITY OF CONVENTIONS","authors":"Fabian Wendt","doi":"10.1017/S0265052523000134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052523000134","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Lockeans regard taxation as a—perhaps sometimes permissible—infringement of moral property entitlements. This essay discusses whether, or in what form, this charge is defensible. In doing so, it will explore the truth and the limits of the conventionalist reply of Murphy and Nagel to Lockean challenges to taxation. It argues that there is a moral rationale for property conventions that is independent of the question whether and how one can acquire natural, pre-conventional property rights in the state of nature, that this rationale sets a moral standard for how good property conventions are and whether they are justifiable at all, and that once property conventions are in place, people’s moral property entitlements are at least partly determined by these conventions, sometimes even by unjustifiable ones that ought to be reformed. Because taxation can be a part of property conventions, taxation as such is not an infringement of moral property entitlements. But the essay will also argue that some taxation—excessive taxation—does infringe on moral property entitlements. This is because the moral rationale for property conventions sets some standards for what owners should be entitled to, and so excessive taxation will infringe upon moral entitlements that are partly not convention-based.","PeriodicalId":46601,"journal":{"name":"Social Philosophy & Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56898848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1017/S0265052523000031
Jonathan H. Choi
Abstract Scholars have long debated the appropriate balance between efficiency and redistribution. But recently, a wave of critics has argued not only that efficiency is less important, but that efficiency analysis itself is fundamentally flawed. Some say that efficiency is incoherent because there is no neutral baseline from which to judge inefficiency. Others say that efficiency is biased toward those best able to pay (generally, the rich). This essay contends that efficiency is not meaningfully incoherent or biased. The most widely discussed forms of efficiency do not require any particular baseline, and even those that do require a baseline can still serve as useful approximations of more theoretically sound but computationally demanding measures. Moreover, arguments of bias do not account for the source of funds in public projects, produce unintuitive results, and draw an arbitrary cutoff between bias and non-bias that elides important distributional details. Ultimately, the tradeoff between efficiency and redistribution remains the most useful frame for policy debate.
{"title":"A LIMITED DEFENSE OF EFFICIENCY AGAINST CHARGES OF INCOHERENCY AND BIAS","authors":"Jonathan H. Choi","doi":"10.1017/S0265052523000031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052523000031","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Scholars have long debated the appropriate balance between efficiency and redistribution. But recently, a wave of critics has argued not only that efficiency is less important, but that efficiency analysis itself is fundamentally flawed. Some say that efficiency is incoherent because there is no neutral baseline from which to judge inefficiency. Others say that efficiency is biased toward those best able to pay (generally, the rich). This essay contends that efficiency is not meaningfully incoherent or biased. The most widely discussed forms of efficiency do not require any particular baseline, and even those that do require a baseline can still serve as useful approximations of more theoretically sound but computationally demanding measures. Moreover, arguments of bias do not account for the source of funds in public projects, produce unintuitive results, and draw an arbitrary cutoff between bias and non-bias that elides important distributional details. Ultimately, the tradeoff between efficiency and redistribution remains the most useful frame for policy debate.","PeriodicalId":46601,"journal":{"name":"Social Philosophy & Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56898565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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