Fictional Names: Reference, Definiteness and Ontology

Abstract

Definite linguistic expressions, for example proper names and singular and plural pronouns, are easy to introduce. Indefinite expressions may pave the way, but are not essential. It is also not essential that there be entities to which the successfully introduced definites refer. This is the underlying fact that makes fiction possible, and it gives guidance about fictional names: we have no need in general to suppose that there exist entities to which they refer. 1. Discourse referents and speculation ... the appearance of an indefinite noun phrase establishes a discourse referent just in case it justifies the occurrence of a coreferential pronoun or a definite noun phrase later in the text. ... We maintain that the problem of coreference within a discourse is a linguistic problem and can be studied independently of any general theory of extra-linguistic reference. (Kartunnen 1976) Kartunnen is focused on the way in which an indefinite noun phrase can “justify” a subsequent definite one, as in the classic example “A man came into the bar. He ordered a martini”. A singular pronoun like “he” is normally supposed to refer to a specific (male) person, and it is natural to suppose that understanding a token of the pronoun requires knowing what it refers to. In a sense, we do know what this occurrence of “he” refers to: the man who came into the bar. But more demanding tests for knowledge of reference may fail: we may have no further information to offer concerning the man, and we might be unable to distinguish him from other men. Since we understand the classic two-sentence example perfectly well, including its occurrence of “he”, these failures shows that the tests for understanding were overdemanding: understanding a definite pronoun does requires neither any substantive ability to distinguish its referent from other things nor the possession of further information concerning the referent. Furthermore, our understanding is not undermined by our ignorance of whether the two sentences are true, and whether they were uttered with full assertive seriousness, or with some non-truth-involving intention. Understanding does not require that we believe that there exists a real referent for “he”, or even that we believe the utterer believes this or wants us to believe it. A discourse referent, as I understand its role in Kartunnen’s theory, and in the Discourse Representation Theories his work inspired, is a definite mental representational vehicle, singular or plural. There may or may not be some entity or entities to which it refers (so the expression