{"title":"The Politics of Decentralization Level: Local and Regional Devolution as Substitutes","authors":"Joan Ricart-Huguet, Emily A. Sellars","doi":"10.1353/wp.2023.0005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"abstract:Most contemporary decentralization has occurred at the local (district) rather than the regional (provincial) level. Why? The authors advance a theory highlighting the political incentives of central authorities to bypass the regional tier of government in favor of decentralizing to smaller, more fragmented units. Regional decentralization can capitalize on economies of scale and scope in public service provision, but it also enables political opposition to scale more effectively. Local decentralization provides some of the benefits of regional decentralization at less political risk, making it an imperfect but attractive substitute for central authorities. Drawing on cases from Africa and Latin America, this article discusses when and how strategic local decentralization can be an effective strategy to maintain political control in divided societies, why sometimes governments may instead opt for regional decentralization or (re)centralization, and how the choice of decentralization level depends on political geography and history as well as economic factors.","PeriodicalId":48266,"journal":{"name":"World Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"World Politics","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2023.0005","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
abstract:Most contemporary decentralization has occurred at the local (district) rather than the regional (provincial) level. Why? The authors advance a theory highlighting the political incentives of central authorities to bypass the regional tier of government in favor of decentralizing to smaller, more fragmented units. Regional decentralization can capitalize on economies of scale and scope in public service provision, but it also enables political opposition to scale more effectively. Local decentralization provides some of the benefits of regional decentralization at less political risk, making it an imperfect but attractive substitute for central authorities. Drawing on cases from Africa and Latin America, this article discusses when and how strategic local decentralization can be an effective strategy to maintain political control in divided societies, why sometimes governments may instead opt for regional decentralization or (re)centralization, and how the choice of decentralization level depends on political geography and history as well as economic factors.
期刊介绍:
World Politics, founded in 1948, is an internationally renowned quarterly journal of political science published in both print and online versions. Open to contributions by scholars, World Politics invites submission of research articles that make theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature, review articles, and research notes bearing on problems in international relations and comparative politics. The journal does not publish articles on current affairs, policy pieces, or narratives of a journalistic nature. Articles submitted for consideration are unsolicited, except for review articles, which are usually commissioned. Published for the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Affairs