Mental Health as Mitigation Evidence

Abstract

medical or psychological terms” (Toolan, p 683). Ultimately, the court found that Dr. Kelly’s testimony was permissible, because he only briefly mentioned the legal definition and then reframed his answer on objection. Second, Mr. Toolan asserted that the judge did not sufficiently explain the difference between a lack of criminal responsibility (based on mental disease or defect) and diminished capacity (based on mental impairment), and that the jury may have assumed that they cannot find that the defendant had a diminished capacity if he was criminally responsible. The court ruled that the judge’s instructions were adequate, as he presented the two concepts as two separate factors to consider. Further, in this case, the court found that the evidence regarding premeditation was so strong that any confusion was unlikely to lead to error. Finally, Mr. Toolan contended that the jury should have been instructed to consider Mr. Toolan’s inability to resist the urge to use drugs and alcohol, even if he knew the effect it would have on his mental state. He argued that this further instruction should have been given when the jury received instruction that a defendant who voluntarily uses substances, knowing the effect it would have on an existing mental disease or defect, is still criminally responsible. In affirming the convictions, the court acknowledged that the science previously relied on no longer reflects the current understanding of addiction and how it may affect a person’s urges to use drugs or alcohol. The court determined, however, that Mr. Toolan’s conduct was knowing and intentional and, therefore, did not meet the criteria for insanity.