Arms, corruption, and the state: Understanding the role of arms trade corruption in power politics

IF 1.1 Q3 ECONOMICS Economics of Peace and Security Journal Pub Date : 2018-09-25 DOI:10.15355/EPSJ.13.2.37
Sam Perlo-Freeman
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

This article discusses patterns of corruption in the arms business around the world. It finds corruption to be widespread, almost ubiquitous in some sectors such as submarines, and affecting developed democracies as recipients as much as other countries. Anti-corruption efforts face severe challenges in proving corruption in highly complex financial cases involving multiple jurisdictions. However, they also face obstruction from exporter governments who are reluctant to prosecute their national defense industry champions so that even where investigations bear fruit, companies tend to receive light treatment. The article argues that corruption in the arms trade is not merely and simply a matter of individual and corporate greed, but is, on the seller’s side, also an element of defense industrial policy as countries seek to maintain advanced technological capabilities in the face of limited domestic demand, widespread international competition, and a buyer’s market. For recipients in buyer, and sometimes also seller, countries, an underemphasized aspect is the role of arms trade corruption as a means of securing political finance by senior politicians involved in decisionmaking. Thus, the practice occupies a systemic role in political competition, complicating efforts to tackle it.
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武器、腐败和国家:理解武器贸易腐败在强权政治中的作用
本文讨论了世界各地军火行业的腐败模式。它发现腐败现象普遍存在,在潜艇等一些行业几乎无处不在,对发达民主国家的影响与其他国家一样大。在涉及多个司法管辖区的高度复杂的金融案件中,反腐败工作在证明腐败方面面临严峻挑战。然而,他们也面临着出口国政府的阻挠,这些政府不愿意起诉他们的国防工业冠军,因此即使调查取得了成果,公司也往往会受到轻微的待遇。文章认为,武器贸易中的腐败不仅是个人和企业贪婪的问题,而且在卖方方面,也是国防工业政策的一个因素,因为各国在面对有限的国内需求、广泛的国际竞争和买方市场时寻求保持先进的技术能力。对于买方国家,有时也包括卖方国家的接受者来说,一个未被充分强调的方面是武器贸易腐败作为参与决策的高级政客获得政治资金的一种手段的作用。因此,这种做法在政治竞争中发挥着系统性作用,使解决这种问题的努力复杂化。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
7
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