The regulatory framework concerning defense procurement has evolved considerably since the start of the millennium. In addition to the general Public Procurement Directive and the Defense Procurement Directive, the European Commission recently formulated a proposal for a Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR). Nonetheless, defense sector particularities continue to produce tensions in public procurement, and significant blind spots remain.In view of policy objectives to strengthen the European Defense Technological & Industrial Base (EDTIB), it is necessary to first study the current state of EU defense procurement. To that end, we perform an analysis of 14,207 EU27-tenders spanning the period 2009-2020. In addition, a case study approach investigates six tender procedures by the Belgian military, establishing material points of note.Key insights include: (1) the number of defense procurement procedures won by third country bidders is limited, (2) tenders won by non-EU27-tenderers are larger and less competitive on average, and (3) an overly strong focus on price efficiency in public procurement award procedures inhibits attaining EDTIB goals. In short, the data shows a chasm between stated policy aims of strengthening the EDTIB through positive action in public procurement, on the one hand, and public procurement practices, on the other.
{"title":"Governing Defense Procurement: Strengthening the EU’s Defense Technological & Industrial Base","authors":"L. Vandercruysse, C. Du Bois, C. Buts","doi":"10.15355/epsj.18.1.35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15355/epsj.18.1.35","url":null,"abstract":"The regulatory framework concerning defense procurement has evolved considerably since the start of the millennium. In addition to the general Public Procurement Directive and the Defense Procurement Directive, the European Commission recently formulated a proposal for a Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR). Nonetheless, defense sector particularities continue to produce tensions in public procurement, and significant blind spots remain.In view of policy objectives to strengthen the European Defense Technological & Industrial Base (EDTIB), it is necessary to first study the current state of EU defense procurement. To that end, we perform an analysis of 14,207 EU27-tenders spanning the period 2009-2020. In addition, a case study approach investigates six tender procedures by the Belgian military, establishing material points of note.Key insights include: (1) the number of defense procurement procedures won by third country bidders is limited, (2) tenders won by non-EU27-tenderers are larger and less competitive on average, and (3) an overly strong focus on price efficiency in public procurement award procedures inhibits attaining EDTIB goals. In short, the data shows a chasm between stated policy aims of strengthening the EDTIB through positive action in public procurement, on the one hand, and public procurement practices, on the other.","PeriodicalId":43334,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Peace and Security Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49046841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Introduction to the EPSJ syposium of European defense in the light of the Ukariane war.
乌克兰战争背景下EPSJ欧洲防务专题讨论会简介。
{"title":"Symposium introduction: European defense from the perspective of the Ukraine war","authors":"Renaud Bellais, C. Du Bois","doi":"10.15355/epsj.18.1.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15355/epsj.18.1.5","url":null,"abstract":"Introduction to the EPSJ syposium of European defense in the light of the Ukariane war.","PeriodicalId":43334,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Peace and Security Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46313388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Bohuslav Pernica, J. Dvorak, Zsolt Lazar, Balázs Taksás, Alex Maskalík
This article investigates the changes in the defense industrial base (DIB) of the small NATO post-communist countries: Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. It considers the historical development of their industries from the Soviet era and the developments caused by the Crimea and Ukraine conflicts. It finds that exports to the markets of the former communist Czechoslovakia continued for Czechia with the DIB owned and controlled by oligarchs—who have been able to leverage this power to influence defense policy. In Slovakia, the DIB is insignificant and mainly under the influence of Czechia. The Hungarian DIB is being redeveloped by the richest members of Hungarian society, through international joint ventures, with the aim of expanding exports. The DIBs of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania produce only what is needed by their national armed forces—which seems unlikely to change.
{"title":"Defense industrial bases (DIB) in six small NATO post-communist countries","authors":"Bohuslav Pernica, J. Dvorak, Zsolt Lazar, Balázs Taksás, Alex Maskalík","doi":"10.15355/epsj.18.1.53","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15355/epsj.18.1.53","url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates the changes in the defense industrial base (DIB) of the small NATO post-communist countries: Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. It considers the historical development of their industries from the Soviet era and the developments caused by the Crimea and Ukraine conflicts. It finds that exports to the markets of the former communist Czechoslovakia continued for Czechia with the DIB owned and controlled by oligarchs—who have been able to leverage this power to influence defense policy. In Slovakia, the DIB is insignificant and mainly under the influence of Czechia. The Hungarian DIB is being redeveloped by the richest members of Hungarian society, through international joint ventures, with the aim of expanding exports. The DIBs of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania produce only what is needed by their national armed forces—which seems unlikely to change.","PeriodicalId":43334,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Peace and Security Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48554959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For European arms-producing countries, launching a cooperative program represents a compromise between preserving their domestic industrial base and achieving an affordable acquisition. Nevertheless, scientific literature is marred with criticisms regarding the effectiveness of such an approach. Paradoxically, this does not prevent European states from committing to new cooperative programs—the European Commission has set up mechanisms for improving the effectiveness of European defense industry based, de facto, on incentives to launch cooperative programs. This article looks at the place of cooperative programs in Europe to understand whether the new initiatives of the European Union can succeed in improving the effectiveness of military spending as well as enhancing European strategic autonomy. It analyzes the organization of the European armament market to explain why cooperative programs appear unavoidable. It explores how the European Commission could overcome current limitations through community-funded programs, given that such funding would foster the emergence of a European defense technological and industrial base.
{"title":"The future of cooperative programs in Europe, paradox of a hybrid market","authors":"Renaud Bellais","doi":"10.15355/epsj.18.1.76","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15355/epsj.18.1.76","url":null,"abstract":"For European arms-producing countries, launching a cooperative program represents a compromise between preserving their domestic industrial base and achieving an affordable acquisition. Nevertheless, scientific literature is marred with criticisms regarding the effectiveness of such an approach. Paradoxically, this does not prevent European states from committing to new cooperative programs—the European Commission has set up mechanisms for improving the effectiveness of European defense industry based, de facto, on incentives to launch cooperative programs. This article looks at the place of cooperative programs in Europe to understand whether the new initiatives of the European Union can succeed in improving the effectiveness of military spending as well as enhancing European strategic autonomy. It analyzes the organization of the European armament market to explain why cooperative programs appear unavoidable. It explores how the European Commission could overcome current limitations through community-funded programs, given that such funding would foster the emergence of a European defense technological and industrial base.","PeriodicalId":43334,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Peace and Security Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43434662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The future European defense firm will be radically different, being determined by future threats, novel technology, and yet to come European defense policy. The immediate threat arises from the war in Ukraine, but longer-term European defense policy based on the Strategic Compass will provide the framework for the future European defense firm. Past developments offer some indication of the future and it is predicted that the defense firm has a future and will survive. The past trend of smaller numbers of larger defense firms will continue with firms being even more technologically-intensive—reflecting Augustine weapons systems, which are characterized by continuously rising unit costs and smaller volumes. There will be more mergers between European defense firms and more joint European projects developing and producing combat air and naval systems, tanks, and cyber systems.
{"title":"The future of the European defense firm","authors":"K. Hartley","doi":"10.15355/epsj.18.1.66","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15355/epsj.18.1.66","url":null,"abstract":"The future European defense firm will be radically different, being determined by future threats, novel technology, and yet to come European defense policy. The immediate threat arises from the war in Ukraine, but longer-term European defense policy based on the Strategic Compass will provide the framework for the future European defense firm. Past developments offer some indication of the future and it is predicted that the defense firm has a future and will survive. The past trend of smaller numbers of larger defense firms will continue with firms being even more technologically-intensive—reflecting Augustine weapons systems, which are characterized by continuously rising unit costs and smaller volumes. There will be more mergers between European defense firms and more joint European projects developing and producing combat air and naval systems, tanks, and cyber systems.","PeriodicalId":43334,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Peace and Security Journal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41473739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since 2016 the European Union has embarked on a step-change in the way it financially supports and incentivizes defense-industrial cooperation. The year 2022 will go down as another important moment in this process with the EU announcing a series of measures, such as joint defense procurement and joint planning and programming. Russia’s war on Ukraine has only underlined the importance of such steps, but it has also exposed the vulnerabilities of the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base. This article provides an account of the development of EU defense-industrial policy since Russia’s war on Ukraine and it critically engages with some of the challenges that have emerged for Europe’s defense industry, EU Institutions and EU Member States. In so doing, the article asks whether the war on Ukraine will lead to a genuine step-change in EU defense-industrial cooperation.
自2016年以来，欧盟开始逐步改变其财政支持和激励国防工业合作的方式。2022年将是这一进程中的又一个重要时刻，欧盟将宣布联合防务采购、联合规划和规划等一系列措施。俄罗斯对乌克兰的战争只是凸显了这些措施的重要性，但它也暴露了欧洲国防技术和工业基地(European Defense technology and Industrial Base)的脆弱性。本文介绍了自俄罗斯对乌克兰发动战争以来欧盟国防工业政策的发展，并批判性地探讨了欧洲国防工业、欧盟机构和欧盟成员国面临的一些挑战。在这样做的过程中，文章询问乌克兰战争是否会导致欧盟国防工业合作的真正转变。
{"title":"Strategic competition: Toward a genuine step-change for Europe’s defense industry?","authors":"Daniel Fiott","doi":"10.15355/epsj.18.1.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15355/epsj.18.1.7","url":null,"abstract":"Since 2016 the European Union has embarked on a step-change in the way it financially supports and incentivizes defense-industrial cooperation. The year 2022 will go down as another important moment in this process with the EU announcing a series of measures, such as joint defense procurement and joint planning and programming. Russia’s war on Ukraine has only underlined the importance of such steps, but it has also exposed the vulnerabilities of the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base. This article provides an account of the development of EU defense-industrial policy since Russia’s war on Ukraine and it critically engages with some of the challenges that have emerged for Europe’s defense industry, EU Institutions and EU Member States. In so doing, the article asks whether the war on Ukraine will lead to a genuine step-change in EU defense-industrial cooperation.","PeriodicalId":43334,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Peace and Security Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42209532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines the strategic choices of countries regarding their acquisition of defense equipment, given the strategic and economic constraints that they have faced since the end of the Cold War. As Augustine’s laws make it increasingly complicated to develop and produce all the necessary weapons for a single country, countries must balance the wishful thinking of preserving industrial strategic autonomy and the cost of doing so under the constraint of meeting the needs of their armed forces. We discuss a trilemma of the European countries between independence, manageable costs, and economic spinoff. We analyze several procurement alternatives, including national production, European cooperative production, licensed production, off-the-shelf purchase, leasing, and capacity abandonment. Maximizing both strategic and economic advantages, is a myth. There is no “silver bullet” in terms of acquisition choice, and the returns on investment depend on countries’ preferences, goals, and markets.
{"title":"50 shades of procurement: the European defense trilemma in defense procurement strategies","authors":"Josselin Droff, J. Malizard","doi":"10.15355/epsj.18.1.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15355/epsj.18.1.18","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the strategic choices of countries regarding their acquisition of defense equipment, given the strategic and economic constraints that they have faced since the end of the Cold War. As Augustine’s laws make it increasingly complicated to develop and produce all the necessary weapons for a single country, countries must balance the wishful thinking of preserving industrial strategic autonomy and the cost of doing so under the constraint of meeting the needs of their armed forces. We discuss a trilemma of the European countries between independence, manageable costs, and economic spinoff. We analyze several procurement alternatives, including national production, European cooperative production, licensed production, off-the-shelf purchase, leasing, and capacity abandonment. Maximizing both strategic and economic advantages, is a myth. There is no “silver bullet” in terms of acquisition choice, and the returns on investment depend on countries’ preferences, goals, and markets.","PeriodicalId":43334,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Peace and Security Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46104896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Anke Hoeffler, Frederike Kaiser, Birke Pfeifle, Flora Risse
As part of recording the progress toward promoting peaceful societies as envisioned in the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16, it is important to provide accurate estimates of violence-related deaths (SDG 16.1). These estimations face a number of methodological challenges, resulting in rather conservative estimates in the social sciences. In this article, we discuss SDG indicator 16.1.2 on conflict-related deaths, proposing its enlargement to cover different forms of collective violence. Various types of collective violence, their definition, measurement, and methods to combine them without double counting are reviewed. Comparing the Georeferenced Events Dataset (GED) to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) shows that events of armed conflict and terrorism overlap to a certain degree. Our argument is that merging data from different event databases can provide a more accurate account of collective violence. We augment the GED data on organized armed conflict with data on terrorism—as a result, our estimates of the numbers of collective violence-related deaths are indeed significantly higher than suggested by GED (one of the most widely used databases in the social sciences).
{"title":"Tracking the SDGs: A methodological note on measuring deaths caused by collective violence","authors":"Anke Hoeffler, Frederike Kaiser, Birke Pfeifle, Flora Risse","doi":"10.15355/epsj.17.2.32","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15355/epsj.17.2.32","url":null,"abstract":"As part of recording the progress toward promoting peaceful societies as envisioned in the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16, it is important to provide accurate estimates of violence-related deaths (SDG 16.1). These estimations face a number of methodological challenges, resulting in rather conservative estimates in the social sciences. In this article, we discuss SDG indicator 16.1.2 on conflict-related deaths, proposing its enlargement to cover different forms of collective violence. Various types of collective violence, their definition, measurement, and methods to combine them without double counting are reviewed. Comparing the Georeferenced Events Dataset (GED) to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) shows that events of armed conflict and terrorism overlap to a certain degree. Our argument is that merging data from different event databases can provide a more accurate account of collective violence. We augment the GED data on organized armed conflict with data on terrorism—as a result, our estimates of the numbers of collective violence-related deaths are indeed significantly higher than suggested by GED (one of the most widely used databases in the social sciences).","PeriodicalId":43334,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Peace and Security Journal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42972993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Evidence is mounting that unprecedented economic growth experienced by human societies over the past two centuries has induced a state of crisis for the Earth’s ecological systems—a crisis that threatens human society’s existence and heightens the risk of violent conflict. This article presents a simplified model of bioenergetic evolution on a planetary level. It examines human energy exploitation based on three strategies vis-à-vis the natural world: (1) predation, (2) competition, and, more cursorily, (3) mutualism. Predation involves the capture of energy pre-processed by the biotic community (living organisms sharing a common environment). Competition involves appropriating lands to capture solar-generated energy, edging the biotic community out. Mutualism involves engaging the biotic community in a mutualistic effort to harvest energy (and discard energy waste in the form of heat) outside of the planetary system. The model implies that, theoretically, substantial government investment in Earth-based solar generation may be required to effect a planetary energy transition to avert ecological collapse. The model suggests that this transition is not likely to happen automatically as a function of substitution by individual economic actors prior to ecological collapse; rather, it requires top-down coercive and/or incentive measures applied by government.
{"title":"The bioeconomics of planetary energy transitions—a theoretical note","authors":"Topher L. McDougal","doi":"10.15355/epsj.17.2.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15355/epsj.17.2.5","url":null,"abstract":"Evidence is mounting that unprecedented economic growth experienced by human societies over the past two centuries has induced a state of crisis for the Earth’s ecological systems—a crisis that threatens human society’s existence and heightens the risk of violent conflict. This article presents a simplified model of bioenergetic evolution on a planetary level. It examines human energy exploitation based on three strategies vis-à-vis the natural world: (1) predation, (2) competition, and, more cursorily, (3) mutualism. Predation involves the capture of energy pre-processed by the biotic community (living organisms sharing a common environment). Competition involves appropriating lands to capture solar-generated energy, edging the biotic community out. Mutualism involves engaging the biotic community in a mutualistic effort to harvest energy (and discard energy waste in the form of heat) outside of the planetary system. The model implies that, theoretically, substantial government investment in Earth-based solar generation may be required to effect a planetary energy transition to avert ecological collapse. The model suggests that this transition is not likely to happen automatically as a function of substitution by individual economic actors prior to ecological collapse; rather, it requires top-down coercive and/or incentive measures applied by government.","PeriodicalId":43334,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Peace and Security Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45394843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article considers the effects of humanitarian military interventions (HMIs) on conflict in the countries in which they have been used. Theoretically, neutral HMIs, in which interveners target all violent actors, are expected to have a pacifying effect on conflict intensity by increasing the cost of violence for all parties—while biased HMIs can escalate conflict intensity, by reducing the cost of violence and so encouraging the supported parties to become more violent. The empirical results show that neutral HMIs do seem to lead to lower conflict intensity in the targeted countries, relative to other conflict-affected countries. Anti-rebels HMIs are, observed to escalate conflict both in the short and the long run, while the evidence for anti-government HMIs is mixed.
{"title":"Conflict escalation during neutral and biased humanitarian military interventions","authors":"Luqman Saeed","doi":"10.15355/epsj.17.2.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15355/epsj.17.2.19","url":null,"abstract":"This article considers the effects of humanitarian military interventions (HMIs) on conflict in the countries in which they have been used. Theoretically, neutral HMIs, in which interveners target all violent actors, are expected to have a pacifying effect on conflict intensity by increasing the cost of violence for all parties—while biased HMIs can escalate conflict intensity, by reducing the cost of violence and so encouraging the supported parties to become more violent. The empirical results show that neutral HMIs do seem to lead to lower conflict intensity in the targeted countries, relative to other conflict-affected countries. Anti-rebels HMIs are, observed to escalate conflict both in the short and the long run, while the evidence for anti-government HMIs is mixed.","PeriodicalId":43334,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Peace and Security Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44939228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：