{"title":"Doomsday Needn’t Be So Bad","authors":"Travis Timmerman","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12227","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>In his <i>Death and the Afterlife</i>, Samuel Scheffler provides a compelling argument that people <i>would</i> see less reason and be significantly less motivated to pursue most of their life's projects if they were to discover that there is no collective afterlife (i.e. future generations of humans continuing to exist after they die). Scheffler focuses on how people <i>would</i> react to learning there is no collective afterlife. In this paper, I focus on issues concerning how people <i>ought</i> to react to learning there is no collective afterlife. Answers to this question lead to surprising conclusions that challenge some of the normative claims Scheffler seems disposed to endorse. This paper has two central aims. First, I attempt to show that negative attitudes toward the lack of a collective afterlife are warranted for two reasons that have been heretofore overlooked. Interestingly, such reasons leave open the possibility that it can be appropriate to lament the lack of a collective afterlife even if it is not bad, all things considered, for anyone. Second, I argue that the lack of a collective afterlife need not be bad, all things considered, for most people. This is because there could be a sufficient number of meaningful projects available to people that would <i>compensate</i> for the loss of <i>pro tanto</i> value caused by the lack of a collective afterlife. These considerations lead to the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that the lack of a collective afterlife need not negatively affect the total value of anyone's life, yet it may still be appropriate to lament the fact that there is no collective afterlife.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 2","pages":"275-296"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12227","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"DIALECTICA","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1746-8361.12227","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In his Death and the Afterlife, Samuel Scheffler provides a compelling argument that people would see less reason and be significantly less motivated to pursue most of their life's projects if they were to discover that there is no collective afterlife (i.e. future generations of humans continuing to exist after they die). Scheffler focuses on how people would react to learning there is no collective afterlife. In this paper, I focus on issues concerning how people ought to react to learning there is no collective afterlife. Answers to this question lead to surprising conclusions that challenge some of the normative claims Scheffler seems disposed to endorse. This paper has two central aims. First, I attempt to show that negative attitudes toward the lack of a collective afterlife are warranted for two reasons that have been heretofore overlooked. Interestingly, such reasons leave open the possibility that it can be appropriate to lament the lack of a collective afterlife even if it is not bad, all things considered, for anyone. Second, I argue that the lack of a collective afterlife need not be bad, all things considered, for most people. This is because there could be a sufficient number of meaningful projects available to people that would compensate for the loss of pro tanto value caused by the lack of a collective afterlife. These considerations lead to the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that the lack of a collective afterlife need not negatively affect the total value of anyone's life, yet it may still be appropriate to lament the fact that there is no collective afterlife.
Samuel Scheffler在他的《死亡与来生》一书中提出了一个令人信服的论点,即如果人们发现没有集体的来生(即人类的后代在死后继续存在),他们就会看不到那么多理由,也就不会有那么多动力去追求他们一生中的大部分项目。Scheffler关注的是人们在得知没有集体来生后会如何反应。在这篇论文中,我关注的问题是,人们应该如何应对没有集体来生的学习。对这个问题的回答导致了令人惊讶的结论,这些结论挑战了Scheffler似乎倾向于支持的一些规范性主张。本文有两个中心目标。首先,我试图表明,对缺乏集体来生的消极态度是有道理的,原因有两个,迄今为止一直被忽视。有趣的是,这些原因留下了一种可能性,即哀叹缺乏集体的来生是合适的,即使从各个方面来看,对任何人来说都不坏。其次,我认为,从各个方面考虑,对大多数人来说,缺乏集体的来生并不一定是坏事。这是因为可能有足够多的有意义的项目可供人们使用,以弥补由于缺乏集体的来生而造成的亲坦托价值的损失。这些考虑导致了一个有点矛盾的结论,即缺乏集体的来生不一定会对任何人的生命总价值产生负面影响,但哀叹没有集体的来世这一事实可能仍然是合适的。
期刊介绍:
Dialectica publishes first-rate articles predominantly in theoretical and systematic philosophy. It is edited in Switzerland and has a focus on analytical philosophy undertaken on the continent. Continuing the work of its founding members, dialectica seeks a better understanding of the mutual support between science and philosophy that both disciplines need and enjoy in their common search for understanding.