Haji argues that determinism threatens deontic morality, not via athreat to moral responsibility, but directly, because of the principlethat "ought" implies "can". Haji's argument requires not only that weembrace an "ought" implies "can" principle, but also that we adopt theprinciple that "ought" implies "able not to". I argue that we havelittle reason to adopt the latter principle, and examine whether deonticmorality might be destroyed on the basis of the more commonly embraced"ought" implies "can" principle alone. I argue that despite what looklike initially compelling reasons why we might suppose that this weakerconclusion is similarly destructive to deontic morality, we actuallyhave good reason to doubt that it has any practical relevance for moraldeliberation at all.
{"title":"Determinism, \"Ought\" Implies \"Can\" and Moral Obligation","authors":"N. Elzein","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i1.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i1.03","url":null,"abstract":"Haji argues that determinism threatens deontic morality, not via athreat to moral responsibility, but directly, because of the principlethat \"ought\" implies \"can\". Haji's argument requires not only that weembrace an \"ought\" implies \"can\" principle, but also that we adopt theprinciple that \"ought\" implies \"able not to\". I argue that we havelittle reason to adopt the latter principle, and examine whether deonticmorality might be destroyed on the basis of the more commonly embraced\"ought\" implies \"can\" principle alone. I argue that despite what looklike initially compelling reasons why we might suppose that this weakerconclusion is similarly destructive to deontic morality, we actuallyhave good reason to doubt that it has any practical relevance for moraldeliberation at all.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45536066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper has two components. The first, longer component (sec. 1-6) is a critical exposition of Armstrong's views about the metaphysics of mathematics, as they are presented in Truth and Truthmakers and Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics. In particular, I discuss Armstrong's views about the nature of the cardinal numbers, and his account of how modal truths are made true. In the second component of the paper (sec. 7), which is shorter and more tentative, I sketch an alternative account of the metaphysics of mathematics. I suggest we insist that mathematical truths have physical truthmakers, without insisting that mathematical objects themselves are part of the physical world.
{"title":"David Armstrong on the Metaphysics of Mathematics","authors":"Thomas Donaldson","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i4.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i4.05","url":null,"abstract":"This paper has two components. The first, longer component (sec. 1-6) is a critical exposition of Armstrong's views about the metaphysics of mathematics, as they are presented in Truth and Truthmakers and Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics. In particular, I discuss Armstrong's views about the nature of the cardinal numbers, and his account of how modal truths are made true. In the second component of the paper (sec. 7), which is shorter and more tentative, I sketch an alternative account of the metaphysics of mathematics. I suggest we insist that mathematical truths have physical truthmakers, without insisting that mathematical objects themselves are part of the physical world.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41349594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A sophisticated version of the zombie argument due to David Chalmers runs roughly as follows: a zombie world is ideally primarily conceivable, and whatever is ideally primarily conceivable is primarily possible. Thus, a zombie world is primarily possible, which implies, in turn, that either physicalism is false or Russellian monism is true. Appealing to some plausible mereological considerations, Daniel Giberman presents a novel argument to the effect that zombies are not ideally primarily conceivable. I shall argue, firstly, that a main premise of Giberman's argument is ill-supported, as it trades on a confusion between the primary and the secondary intensions of the "actually" operator. I then consider two lines of reasoning, which might be extracted from Giberman's text, in favour of another chief premise of his argument. I shall argue that the first line of reasoning is flawed, and the second one, in effect, will transform Giberman's argument into a kind of "parity argument" in which his mereological considerations play no role.
{"title":"Mereology is not a Guide to (In)conceivability","authors":"Mahmoud Morvarid","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i3.07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i3.07","url":null,"abstract":"A sophisticated version of the zombie argument due to David Chalmers runs roughly as follows: a zombie world is ideally primarily conceivable, and whatever is ideally primarily conceivable is primarily possible. Thus, a zombie world is primarily possible, which implies, in turn, that either physicalism is false or Russellian monism is true. Appealing to some plausible mereological considerations, Daniel Giberman presents a novel argument to the effect that zombies are not ideally primarily conceivable. I shall argue, firstly, that a main premise of Giberman's argument is ill-supported, as it trades on a confusion between the primary and the secondary intensions of the \"actually\" operator. I then consider two lines of reasoning, which might be extracted from Giberman's text, in favour of another chief premise of his argument. I shall argue that the first line of reasoning is flawed, and the second one, in effect, will transform Giberman's argument into a kind of \"parity argument\" in which his mereological considerations play no role.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43820283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Most theories of promising are insufficiently broad, for they ground promissory obligation in some external or contingent feature of the promise. In this paper, I introduce a new kind of theory. The Mental States First (MSF) theory grounds promissory obligation in something internal and essential: the mental state expressed by promising, or the state that promisors purport to be in. My defense of MSF relies on three claims. First, promising to Φ expresses that you have resolved to Φ. Second, resolving to Φ commits you to Φing, all else being equal. Third, the norms on speech acts are determined by the norms on the mental states they express, such that publicly expressing that you are in a state subjects you to whatever commitments are normally incurred by being in that state, regardless of whether you really are in it. I suggest that this general approach might also explain how the norms on other sorts of speech acts work.
{"title":"The Mental States First Theory of Promising","authors":"A. Liberman","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i4.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i4.03","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000Most theories of promising are insufficiently broad, for they ground promissory obligation in some external or contingent feature of the promise. In this paper, I introduce a new kind of theory. The Mental States First (MSF) theory grounds promissory obligation in something internal and essential: the mental state expressed by promising, or the state that promisors purport to be in. My defense of MSF relies on three claims. First, promising to Φ expresses that you have resolved to Φ. Second, resolving to Φ commits you to Φing, all else being equal. Third, the norms on speech acts are determined by the norms on the mental states they express, such that publicly expressing that you are in a state subjects you to whatever commitments are normally incurred by being in that state, regardless of whether you really are in it. I suggest that this general approach might also explain how the norms on other sorts of speech acts work.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45777897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michael Esfeld & Dirk-André Deckert, A Minimalist Ontology of the Natural World. New York/Abingdon: Routledge, 2018.
Michael Esfeld & dirk - andr Deckert，《自然世界的极简本体论》。纽约/阿宾登:劳特利奇出版社，2018。
{"title":"Review of Esfeld and Deckert (2018)","authors":"Alastair Wilson","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i3.09","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i3.09","url":null,"abstract":"Michael Esfeld & Dirk-André Deckert, A Minimalist Ontology of the Natural World. New York/Abingdon: Routledge, 2018.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43864074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is widely held that assertions are partially governed by an epistemic norm. But what is the epistemic condition set out in the norm? Is it knowledge, truth, belief, or something else? In this paper, I defend a view similar to that of Stanley (2008), according to which the relevant epistemic condition is epistemic certainty, where epistemic certainty (but not knowledge) is context-sensitive. I start by distinguishing epistemic certainty, subjective certainty, and knowledge. Then, I explain why it's much more plausible to think that "certain", rather than "know", is context-sensitive. After that, I respond to an important worry raised by Pritchard, according to which the proposed view is too strong to accommodate our current practice of assertion. I then show that the main linguistic and conversational data advanced in the recent literature in favour of the knowledge condition are best explained by the certainty view. Finally, I offer two principled considerations: the certainty view is the only one compatible with three independently plausible claims and it fits very well with the common thought that knowledge does not entail certainty.
{"title":"Certainty and Assertion","authors":"J. Vollet","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i3.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i3.02","url":null,"abstract":"It is widely held that assertions are partially governed by an epistemic norm. But what is the epistemic condition set out in the norm? Is it knowledge, truth, belief, or something else? In this paper, I defend a view similar to that of Stanley (2008), according to which the relevant epistemic condition is epistemic certainty, where epistemic certainty (but not knowledge) is context-sensitive. I start by distinguishing epistemic certainty, subjective certainty, and knowledge. Then, I explain why it's much more plausible to think that \"certain\", rather than \"know\", is context-sensitive. After that, I respond to an important worry raised by Pritchard, according to which the proposed view is too strong to accommodate our current practice of assertion. I then show that the main linguistic and conversational data advanced in the recent literature in favour of the knowledge condition are best explained by the certainty view. Finally, I offer two principled considerations: the certainty view is the only one compatible with three independently plausible claims and it fits very well with the common thought that knowledge does not entail certainty.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45576676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Markus Willaschek, Kant on the Sources of Metaphysics: The Dialectic of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
Markus Willaschek，康德论形而上学的来源：纯粹理性的辩证法。剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，2018。
{"title":"Review of Willaschek (2018)","authors":"A. Stephenson","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i3.08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i3.08","url":null,"abstract":"Markus Willaschek, Kant on the Sources of Metaphysics: The Dialectic of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42574696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I argue for the instability of an increasingly popular position about how metaphysicians ought to regard parsimony. This instability is rooted in an unrecognized tension between two claims. First, we as metaphysicians ought to minimize the number of ontological kinds we posit. Second, it is not the case that we ought to minimize the number of ideological expressions we employ, especially when those expressions are of the same ideological kind (e.g. the compositional predicates "is a part of" and "overlaps"). I argue that the two claims are in tension with one other. At the very least, minimizing the number of ontological kinds posited entails minimizing the number of expressions employed---more specifically, the "ontologically committing" predicates. But, plausibly, the tension runs deeper than that. I suggest that minimizing the number of ontological kinds just is a specific way of minimizing the number of ideological expressions employed in stating a theory. The two activities target the same aspect of reality, the world's metaphysical structure. I end by evaluating three different responses to this puzzle. Ultimately, I suggest that metaphysicians should treat the minimization of the number of ideological expressions as more important than it currently is treated.
{"title":"Puzzle About Parsimony","authors":"P. Finocchiaro","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i4.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i4.04","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I argue for the instability of an increasingly popular position about how metaphysicians ought to regard parsimony. This instability is rooted in an unrecognized tension between two claims. First, we as metaphysicians ought to minimize the number of ontological kinds we posit. Second, it is not the case that we ought to minimize the number of ideological expressions we employ, especially when those expressions are of the same ideological kind (e.g. the compositional predicates \"is a part of\" and \"overlaps\"). I argue that the two claims are in tension with one other. At the very least, minimizing the number of ontological kinds posited entails minimizing the number of expressions employed---more specifically, the \"ontologically committing\" predicates. But, plausibly, the tension runs deeper than that. I suggest that minimizing the number of ontological kinds just is a specific way of minimizing the number of ideological expressions employed in stating a theory. The two activities target the same aspect of reality, the world's metaphysical structure. I end by evaluating three different responses to this puzzle. Ultimately, I suggest that metaphysicians should treat the minimization of the number of ideological expressions as more important than it currently is treated.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48943834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Reflective equilibrium, as a methodology for the "formation of logics," fails on the *fringe*, where intricate details can make or break a logical theory. On the fringe, the process of theorification cannot be methodologically governed by anything like reflective equilibrium. When logical theorising gets tricky, there is nothing on the pre-theoretical side on which our theoretical claims can reflect of---at least not in any meaningful way. Indeed, the fringe is exclusively the domain of theoretical negotiations and the methodological power of reflective equilibrium is merely nominal.
{"title":"Reflective Equilibrium on the Fringe","authors":"Bogdan Dicher","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i2.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i2.03","url":null,"abstract":"Reflective equilibrium, as a methodology for the \"formation of logics,\" fails on the *fringe*, where intricate details can make or break a logical theory. On the fringe, the process of theorification cannot be methodologically governed by anything like reflective equilibrium. When logical theorising gets tricky, there is nothing on the pre-theoretical side on which our theoretical claims can reflect of---at least not in any meaningful way. Indeed, the fringe is exclusively the domain of theoretical negotiations and the methodological power of reflective equilibrium is merely nominal.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43682196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recently John Turri (2015b) has argued, contra the orthodoxy amongst epistemologists, that reliability is not a necessary condition for knowledge. From this result, Turri (2015a, 2017, 2016a, 2019) defends a new account of knowledge — called abilism — that allows for unreliable knowledge. I argue that Turri’s arguments fail to establish that unreliable knowledge is possible and argue that Turri’s account of knowledge is false because reliability must be a necessary condition for knowledge.
{"title":"Reliable Knowledge","authors":"J. Dixon","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i3.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i3.03","url":null,"abstract":"Recently John Turri (2015b) has argued, contra the orthodoxy amongst epistemologists, that reliability is not a necessary condition for knowledge. From this result, Turri (2015a, 2017, 2016a, 2019) defends a new account of knowledge — called abilism — that allows for unreliable knowledge. I argue that Turri’s arguments fail to establish that unreliable knowledge is possible and argue that Turri’s account of knowledge is false because reliability must be a necessary condition for knowledge.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46036402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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