{"title":"A short history of European law: the last two and a half millennia","authors":"Thomas Duve","doi":"10.1080/2049677X.2021.1908938","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"resisters to hide people known as the Landelijke Organisatie voor Hulp aan Onderduikers, or LO (National Organization for Help to Those in Hiding). Before readers brush that off as mere domestic rearrangement, consider the logistical challenge of hiding three hundred thousand individuals in a densely urbanized, mostly flat country run by two Nazis, Arthur SeyssInquart and Hanns Rauter, who were later executed for crimes against humanity. For the single matter of food for the onderduikers, someone needed to forge or steal ration coupons, and different people, usually young women, needed to carry them past enemy soldiers to deliver them to those in hiding. Someone else had to go shopping for more people than were legally registered in his or her household—not once, but weekly or monthly. In fact, the leaders of the LO found they needed their own assault groups, the Landelijke Knokploegen (LKP), to destroy population registers and discourage overly enthusiastic collaborators. SOE’s reaction to all this popular ferment was to ignore it or deplore it as premature, meaning before Allied tanks arrived to protect the population. Allied strategists somehow decided that “the lethargy of the people” (282) in the Netherlands ruled out anything more than passive resistance. If one uses the broader definition of “resistance” as opposition to Nazi rule, however, one can only conclude that the Dutch Resistance had widespread popular support, engaged in energetic measures, and suffered high losses because of it. In addition to challenging long-standing myths about the Resistance, Wieviorka promises the first transnational history of the Resistance in Western Europe. Once again, though, we run into the problem of definition. This is a well-written and masterfully structured discussion of an international agency’s operations in six countries. But international is not the same as transnational. Nor does movement across borders and the participation of citizens of several nations make something transnational. International, surely, even global, but not necessarily transnational. It is entirely possible that some of the SOE agents parachuted behind enemy lines who spoke more than one language and went deeply undercover had transnational experiences in which national categories and boundaries blurred to the point of meaninglessness to them. But Wieviorka discusses only the higher-ups who dispatched such people from the United Kingdom. Even so, Wieviorka’s contention that, despite what Charles de Gaulle said, resistance did not adhere to strictly national groupings is correct. The big movements and the secret armies tended to be national in scope, but more homegrown opposition sometimes thought outside the national box. In December 1943, for example, French resisters who rescued the crew of a crashed American B-17 bomber passed the men to their Belgian neighbors because they knew the Germans searching for the men had more respect for the international border than they did. The Belgians passed the Americans to the Dutch-Paris escape line, a network of men and women spanning five nations. They thought of the landscape only in terms of “occupied” and “not occupied.” The Americans returned to their base thanks to a relay of civilians who belonged to homegrown resistance groups who shared a respect for the value of human life rather than a national identity. The circumstances of the war also meant that many people spent the occupation outside their home countries as expatriates or refugees. Some of these people made common cause with others in defense of the values of humanism against Nazism. In fact, in many instances, resistance offered the kind of harrowing defense of ideals that brought individuals into transnational communities and actions. Historians are now beginning to explore such transnational resistance. Wieviorka gives us an excellent history of SOE and of subversive warfare in Western Europe. The comparison of political reactions to events in several countries allows for judicious discussion of several longstanding myths. But his exceedingly narrow definition of “resistance” prevents him from writing a history of “the Resistance in Western Europe” as his title promises. MEGAN KOREMAN Independent Scholar","PeriodicalId":53815,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Legal History","volume":"9 1","pages":"116 - 118"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/2049677X.2021.1908938","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Comparative Legal History","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/2049677X.2021.1908938","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Abstract
resisters to hide people known as the Landelijke Organisatie voor Hulp aan Onderduikers, or LO (National Organization for Help to Those in Hiding). Before readers brush that off as mere domestic rearrangement, consider the logistical challenge of hiding three hundred thousand individuals in a densely urbanized, mostly flat country run by two Nazis, Arthur SeyssInquart and Hanns Rauter, who were later executed for crimes against humanity. For the single matter of food for the onderduikers, someone needed to forge or steal ration coupons, and different people, usually young women, needed to carry them past enemy soldiers to deliver them to those in hiding. Someone else had to go shopping for more people than were legally registered in his or her household—not once, but weekly or monthly. In fact, the leaders of the LO found they needed their own assault groups, the Landelijke Knokploegen (LKP), to destroy population registers and discourage overly enthusiastic collaborators. SOE’s reaction to all this popular ferment was to ignore it or deplore it as premature, meaning before Allied tanks arrived to protect the population. Allied strategists somehow decided that “the lethargy of the people” (282) in the Netherlands ruled out anything more than passive resistance. If one uses the broader definition of “resistance” as opposition to Nazi rule, however, one can only conclude that the Dutch Resistance had widespread popular support, engaged in energetic measures, and suffered high losses because of it. In addition to challenging long-standing myths about the Resistance, Wieviorka promises the first transnational history of the Resistance in Western Europe. Once again, though, we run into the problem of definition. This is a well-written and masterfully structured discussion of an international agency’s operations in six countries. But international is not the same as transnational. Nor does movement across borders and the participation of citizens of several nations make something transnational. International, surely, even global, but not necessarily transnational. It is entirely possible that some of the SOE agents parachuted behind enemy lines who spoke more than one language and went deeply undercover had transnational experiences in which national categories and boundaries blurred to the point of meaninglessness to them. But Wieviorka discusses only the higher-ups who dispatched such people from the United Kingdom. Even so, Wieviorka’s contention that, despite what Charles de Gaulle said, resistance did not adhere to strictly national groupings is correct. The big movements and the secret armies tended to be national in scope, but more homegrown opposition sometimes thought outside the national box. In December 1943, for example, French resisters who rescued the crew of a crashed American B-17 bomber passed the men to their Belgian neighbors because they knew the Germans searching for the men had more respect for the international border than they did. The Belgians passed the Americans to the Dutch-Paris escape line, a network of men and women spanning five nations. They thought of the landscape only in terms of “occupied” and “not occupied.” The Americans returned to their base thanks to a relay of civilians who belonged to homegrown resistance groups who shared a respect for the value of human life rather than a national identity. The circumstances of the war also meant that many people spent the occupation outside their home countries as expatriates or refugees. Some of these people made common cause with others in defense of the values of humanism against Nazism. In fact, in many instances, resistance offered the kind of harrowing defense of ideals that brought individuals into transnational communities and actions. Historians are now beginning to explore such transnational resistance. Wieviorka gives us an excellent history of SOE and of subversive warfare in Western Europe. The comparison of political reactions to events in several countries allows for judicious discussion of several longstanding myths. But his exceedingly narrow definition of “resistance” prevents him from writing a history of “the Resistance in Western Europe” as his title promises. MEGAN KOREMAN Independent Scholar
藏匿人员的抵抗者被称为“国家藏匿人员帮助组织”(Landelijke Organisatie voor Hulp aan Onderduikers)。在读者将其视为仅仅是国内的重新安排之前,请考虑一下将30万人藏匿在一个由两名纳粹分子Arthur SeyssInquirt和Hanns Rauter统治的高度城市化、基本平坦的国家的后勤挑战,他们后来因反人类罪被处决。对于流浪者的食物,需要有人伪造或偷走配给券,不同的人,通常是年轻女性,需要把它们带过敌方士兵,送到躲藏的人那里。其他人不得不为比他或她的家庭合法登记的人更多的人购物——不是一次,而是每周或每月。事实上,LO的领导人发现他们需要自己的攻击组织Landelijke Knokploegen(LKP)来摧毁人口登记册,并劝阻过于热情的合作者。SOE对所有这些普遍发酵的反应是忽视它,或者谴责它为时过早,这意味着在盟军坦克抵达保护民众之前。盟军战略家不知何故决定,荷兰“人民的无精打采”(282)排除了被动抵抗之外的任何可能性。然而,如果用更广泛的“抵抗”定义来反对纳粹统治,人们只能得出结论,荷兰抵抗运动得到了广泛的民众支持,采取了强有力的措施,并因此遭受了巨大损失,维维奥尔卡承诺开创西欧抵抗运动的第一个跨国历史。然而,我们再一次遇到了定义的问题。这是一篇关于一家国际机构在六个国家的业务的精心撰写和结构巧妙的讨论。但国际性与跨国性不同。跨国流动和几个国家公民的参与也不意味着什么是跨国的。国际的,当然,甚至是全球性的,但不一定是跨国的。完全有可能的是,一些空降敌后、会说多种语言并深入卧底的国有企业特工有跨国经历,在这些经历中,国家类别和边界模糊到对他们来说毫无意义的地步。但维维奥尔卡只讨论了从英国派遣这些人的高层。即便如此,维维奥尔卡的论点是正确的,即尽管戴高乐说过,抵抗并没有严格遵守国家团体。大型运动和秘密军队的范围往往是全国性的,但更多的本土反对派有时会跳出国家的框框。例如,1943年12月,营救一架坠毁的美国B-17轰炸机机组人员的法国抵抗者将这些人交给了他们的比利时邻居,因为他们知道寻找这些人的德国人比他们更尊重国际边界。比利时人把美国人带到荷兰-巴黎逃亡线,这是一个横跨五个国家的男女网络。他们只从“被占领”和“未被占领”的角度来看待这片土地。美国人回到他们的基地,这要归功于一群属于本土抵抗组织的平民,他们共同尊重人类生命的价值,而不是民族身份。战争的环境也意味着许多人在国外以外籍人士或难民的身份度过了占领期。其中一些人与其他人共同捍卫反对纳粹主义的人道主义价值观。事实上,在许多情况下,抵抗提供了一种对理想的痛苦捍卫,这种理想将个人带入跨国社区和行动。历史学家现在开始探索这种跨国抵抗。维维奥尔卡为我们讲述了SOE和西欧颠覆战争的优秀历史。比较几个国家对事件的政治反应,可以明智地讨论几个长期存在的神话。但他对“抵抗”的定义过于狭隘,使他无法像书名所承诺的那样书写“西欧抵抗”的历史。MEGAN KOREMAN独立学者
期刊介绍:
Comparative Legal History is an international and comparative review of law and history. Articles will explore both ''internal'' legal history (doctrinal and disciplinary developments in the law) and ''external'' legal history (legal ideas and institutions in wider contexts). Rooted in the complexity of the various Western legal traditions worldwide, the journal will also investigate other laws and customs from around the globe. Comparisons may be either temporal or geographical and both legal and other law-like normative traditions will be considered. Scholarship on comparative and trans-national historiography, including trans-disciplinary approaches, is particularly welcome.