For Canada, Insularism Leads to a Lost Opportunity in the Arctic and Asia

IF 1.3 Asia Policy Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI:10.1353/asp.2023.0003
J. Reeves
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Abstract

F or decades, China, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea have invested in and expanded their presence in the Arctic, often working together with each other or cooperating with Russia or the Nordic Arctic states to increase their regional impact. Indeed, in terms of institutional development, climate change research, port development, or icebreaker technologies, these four Asian actors have been at the forefront of Arctic activity since the early 2000s, bringing both state-backed development plans and resources to the region. As a result, Beijing, Tokyo, Seoul, and Singapore have become essential actors in the high north, as they singularly and collectively provide finance and capabilities equal to—if not in excess of—any littoral state. Whereas the 20th century was the trans-Atlantic era of Arctic development, the growth of activity by Asian states suggests that 21st-century Arctic affairs will be decidedly more global, if not also more Asian, in orientation.1 Traditional Arctic actors Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Russia have embraced engagement with Asian states interested in the Arctic and established bilateral and multilateral modalities to facilitate even deeper regional cooperation.2 Norway and Russia, for instance, have worked with Asian countries on matters of regional governance, particularly with respect to fisheries agreements, natural resource management, shipping, and environmental protection.3 Similarly, Sweden has integrated bilateral and multilateral engagement with several Asian states into its own strategic approach to the Arctic, particularly with respect to regional trade facilitation and expansion, scientific governance, and geothermal energy
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对加拿大来说,叛乱导致失去了在北极和亚洲的机会
几十年来,中国、日本、新加坡和韩国一直在北极投资并扩大其存在,经常相互合作,或与俄罗斯或北欧北极国家合作,以增加其地区影响力。事实上,自21世纪初以来,在体制发展、气候变化研究、港口开发或破冰船技术方面,这四个亚洲参与者一直处于北极活动的前沿,为该地区带来了国家支持的发展计划和资源。因此,北京、东京、首尔和新加坡已成为北方高地的重要参与者,因为它们单独和集体提供的资金和能力即使不超过任何沿海国家,也与之相当。尽管20世纪是跨大西洋的北极开发时代,但亚洲国家活动的增长表明,21世纪的北极事务在方向上无疑将更加全球化,如果不是更加亚洲化的话,挪威和俄罗斯接受了与对北极感兴趣的亚洲国家的接触,并建立了双边和多边模式,以促进更深入的区域合作。2例如,挪威和俄罗斯就区域治理问题与亚洲国家合作,特别是在渔业协议、自然资源管理、航运、,3同样,瑞典已将与几个亚洲国家的双边和多边接触纳入其北极战略方针,特别是在区域贸易便利化和扩大、科学治理和地热能方面
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来源期刊
Asia Policy
Asia Policy Arts and Humanities-History
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
55
期刊介绍: Asia Policy is a peer-reviewed scholarly journal presenting policy-relevant academic research on the Asia-Pacific that draws clear and concise conclusions useful to today’s policymakers.
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