Is being itself colonial?

Abstract

ABSTRACT Nelson Maldonado-Torres’s coloniality of being thesis promises to add a metaphysical dimension to the decoloniality theory of Grupo Modernidad/Colonialidad. While Aníbal Quijano’s coloniality of power thesis is robustly empirical, the coloniality of being thesis postulates that “colonized Dasein” and “ordinary Dasein” differ in the fundamental structure of their being. It may have been hoped that this philosophical thesis would clarify and provide a firm foundation for the coloniality of knowledge thesis, developed by Walter Mignolo and Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, which entails two apparently contradictory forms of standpoint epistemology. I argue that the coloniality of being thesis does not add a new metaphysical dimension to decoloniality theory and does not justify any other aspects of decoloniality theory. If Maldonado-Torres’s claims about the differences between “the damné” and “ordinary Dasein” are correct, then Dasein is facticity all the way down. If his claims are correct, then there are no essential, a priori knowable fundamental structures of Dasein’s being for philosophical investigation to uncover: “the ontological colonial difference” stands for nothing beyond or beneath “the colonial difference” tout court. Proponents of fundamental ontology would doubtless contest Maldonado-Torres’s assertions. As for decoloniality theory, the coloniality of being thesis leaves everything exactly as it found it.