Do I see what you see? Institutional quality, action observability, and multimarket contact in the global mobile phone industry

IF 5.7 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS Global Strategy Journal Pub Date : 2022-03-17 DOI:10.1002/gsj.1433
Claudio Giachetti, Joseph Lampel, Ergun Onoz
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Abstract

Research Summary

Drawing on signaling theory and the international business literature that addresses the role of institutions, we argue that multinational enterprises (MNEs) that use multimarket contact (MMC)—that is, meet the same competitors in multiple countries—to reduce rivalry in a given country, will have their actions and performance influenced by the institutional quality of that country. More specifically, we contend that action observability is the mechanism that explains why institutional quality facilitates an MNE's use of MMC with competitors in a host country. We also contend that an MNE's ability to successfully reduce rivalry with host country competitors via MMC is contingent on the institutional quality distance between the MNE's home and host country. We test our hypotheses with data from the mobile phone industry.

Managerial Summary

MNEs often meet the same rivals simultaneously in multiple countries, a phenomenon known as market overlap or MMC. Prior studies have found that MMC deters rivals from attacking each other in the countries they have in common. However, these studies have not taken into account the heterogeneity of the institutional environments of the countries in which multimarket rivals compete. We contend that the quality of countries' institutions and the institutional quality distance between home and host countries affect the extent to which MNEs can observe each other's actions, which in turn helps rival MNEs to avoid mutually damaging moves for their sales performance in the countries they have in common.

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我看到你看到的了吗?全球手机行业的制度质量、行动可观察性和多市场联系
研究摘要 借鉴信号传递理论和有关制度作用的国际商业文献,我们认为,跨国企业利用多市场接触(MMC)--即在多个国家遇到相同的竞争对手--来减少在某个国家的竞争,其行动和绩效会受到该国制度质量的影响。更具体地说,我们认为,行动的可观察性是解释为什么制度质量有利于多国企业与东道国竞争对手进行多式接触的机制。我们还认为,多国企业能否通过多式联运成功减少与东道国竞争对手的竞争,取决于多国企业母国与东道国之间的制度质量距离。我们用移动电话行业的数据检验了我们的假设。 管理摘要 多国企业经常会在多个国家同时遇到相同的竞争对手,这种现象被称为市场重叠(MMC)。先前的研究发现,MMC 会阻止竞争对手在共同的国家相互攻击。然而,这些研究并没有考虑到多市场竞争对手所在国家制度环境的异质性。我们认为,各国的制度质量以及母国与东道国之间的制度质量距离会影响多国企业观察对方行动的程度,进而帮助竞争对手避免在共同国家采取对其销售业绩造成相互损害的行动。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
14.20
自引率
11.80%
发文量
46
期刊介绍: The Global Strategy Journal is a premier platform dedicated to publishing highly influential managerially-oriented global strategy research worldwide. Covering themes such as international and global strategy, assembling the global enterprise, and strategic management, GSJ plays a vital role in advancing our understanding of global business dynamics.
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