“Nonsensical” Caring in Ali Smith’s Fiction and Its Kierkegaardian Defence

Q2 Arts and Humanities Roczniki Filozoficzne Pub Date : 2023-06-28 DOI:10.18290/rf237102.14
J. Teske
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Abstract

The present paper considers the possible sense of “nonsensical” caring—caring (1) which for various reasons apparently cannot help the cared-for, and (2) in which the carer, though convinced that it will not be effective, whole-heartedly engages. The project is inspired by the fiction of Ali Smith, which offers varied, vivid and memorable examples of such caring: worried that her dead sister misses life experience, Clare in Hotel World makes sure her sensations are doubly intense and rich though she knows her sister, being dead, will not benefit from them; in Summer Hannah and Daniel write to each other tender letters which they immediately burn for safety’s sake so that the addressee has not even the slightest chance of ever reading them; in “Virtual” a bed-ridden girl diligently takes care of her virtual pet, well aware that it is not alive, let alone sentient. Smith’s examples of “nonsensical” caring are strangely compelling, yet in real life such caring—predictably ineffective (as regards helping the other) and costly—is rare. Why? Under what metaphysical assumptions, if any, could “nonsensical” caring make sense? The paper considers these questions, taking Søren Kierkegaard’s extensive discussion of agape love in Works of Love (1847) as its primary point of reference.
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阿里·史密斯小说中的“荒谬”关怀及其克尔凯郭尔式辩护
本论文考虑了“荒谬”关怀的可能意义——关怀(1)由于各种原因显然不能帮助被照顾者,以及(2)尽管被照顾者确信这不会有效,但却全心全意地参与其中。该项目的灵感来自阿里·史密斯的小说,小说中提供了各种各样、生动而令人难忘的关爱例子:克莱尔在《世界酒店》中担心死去的妹妹会错过生活经历,尽管她知道死去的妹妹不会从中受益,但她还是确保自己的感觉加倍强烈和丰富;夏天,Hannah和Daniel互相写了一封温柔的信,为了安全起见,他们立即把信烧掉,这样收件人就再也看不到了;在“虚拟”中,一个卧床不起的女孩勤奋地照顾她的虚拟宠物,她清楚地意识到它不是活着的,更不用说有知觉了。史密斯的“荒谬”关怀的例子令人奇怪地信服,但在现实生活中,这种关怀——不出所料是无效的(在帮助他人方面)和昂贵的——是罕见的。为什么?在什么形而上学的假设(如果有的话)下,“荒谬的”关心才有意义?本文以瑟伦·克尔凯郭尔在《爱的作品》(1847)中对沉浮爱的广泛论述为主要参考点,对这些问题进行了思考。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Roczniki Filozoficzne Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
0.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
56
期刊介绍: Annals of Philosophy is one of the oldest philosophical journals in Poland (since 1948). It is published four times per year in both the online and traditional ways. The journal aims to publish the best original research papers in philosophy, as well as translations, reviews, accounts and polemics.
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