{"title":"Combining Egalitarian and Proportional Sharing Rules in Team Tournaments to Incentivize Energy-Efficient Behavior in a Principal-Agent Context","authors":"Christin Hoffmann, K. Thommes","doi":"10.1177/1086026620945343","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Triggering the energy-efficient behavior of agents in firms simultaneously decreases costs and mitigates CO2 emissions. If firms use team tournaments to increase energy-efficient behavior and thus employee performance, they may face unintended consequences, like a bifurcation effect: Individuals drop out if they believe that they cannot win the contest. By contrast, high-performing employees may overexert themselves. Additionally, some individuals might be tempted to free-ride. In a field experiment with truck drivers, we analyze whether proportional sharing of the bonus within teams based on individual effort instead of egalitarian sharing reduces both bifurcation and free-riding during team tournaments. Our results reveal that (1) the team contest improves performance; (2) this increase in performance is overall slightly stronger under the proportional than under the egalitarian sharing rule, using ceteris paribus comparisons; and (3) the performance increase is mainly driven by the team member performing worse.","PeriodicalId":47984,"journal":{"name":"Organization & Environment","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.2000,"publicationDate":"2020-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1086026620945343","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Organization & Environment","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1086026620945343","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Triggering the energy-efficient behavior of agents in firms simultaneously decreases costs and mitigates CO2 emissions. If firms use team tournaments to increase energy-efficient behavior and thus employee performance, they may face unintended consequences, like a bifurcation effect: Individuals drop out if they believe that they cannot win the contest. By contrast, high-performing employees may overexert themselves. Additionally, some individuals might be tempted to free-ride. In a field experiment with truck drivers, we analyze whether proportional sharing of the bonus within teams based on individual effort instead of egalitarian sharing reduces both bifurcation and free-riding during team tournaments. Our results reveal that (1) the team contest improves performance; (2) this increase in performance is overall slightly stronger under the proportional than under the egalitarian sharing rule, using ceteris paribus comparisons; and (3) the performance increase is mainly driven by the team member performing worse.
期刊介绍:
Organization & Environment encourages informed discussion about the social roots and consequences of environmental problems and stimulates deeper reflection on the meaning and significance of the natural world. By critically examining the impact of human production and consumption systems on the natural environment, Organization & Environment develops new perspectives on organizations that encourage environmentally sensitive reflection, inquiry, and practice.