The Nuclear Taboo and the Inevitability of Uncertainty

Abstract

The nuclear taboo—a strong normative inhibition on the use of nuclear weapons—is one of the most important concepts in the study of nuclear weapons. In the last few years, however, the idea of the taboo has come under attack. Notably, a series of studies have shown that mass publics appear quite comfortable with using nuclear weapons. When given hypothetical scenarios in which nuclear use might be considered, publics appear willing to use nuclear weapons, and concerns about (im)morality appear to weigh less heavily than narrow assessments of military utility. In the latest contribution to this research agenda, Janina Dill, Scott D. Sagan, and Benjamin A. Valentino (hereafter DSV) demonstrate that not only Americans appear comfortable with nuclear use. Surveying publics in France, Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States, they show similar patterns in each country: respondents are surprisingly willing to use nuclear weapons and appear responsive to assessments of military utility. Scholars previously raised the possibility that US publics might be unusual as a caveat qualifying prior findings. DSV’s argument and evidence thus represent an important contribution, showing that prior findings can in fact be replicated across a range of democracies. As someone who has contended that states use nuclear weapons in opportunistic ways relatively unencumbered by normative constraints, and elsewhere has found elements of consistency in public opinion across