Market Efficiency and Censoring Bias in College Football Gambling

IF 1.8 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Journal of Sports Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-17 DOI:10.1177/15270025221148991
R. Arscott
{"title":"Market Efficiency and Censoring Bias in College Football Gambling","authors":"R. Arscott","doi":"10.1177/15270025221148991","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The team totals and point spread betting lines jointly predict team scores in college football games. The gambling market’s score predictions are shown to be biased due to censoring at zero points. This presents arbitrage opportunities for gamblers who place wagers on the team totals line in cases for which expected bias is high. A naïve betting strategy that exploits this bias using only information contained within the two betting lines themselves yields a win percentage of over 55 percent over the past two decades. This significantly exceeds the typical transaction costs associated with wagers, indicating the market is semi-strong inefficient.","PeriodicalId":51522,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Sports Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Sports Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/15270025221148991","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

The team totals and point spread betting lines jointly predict team scores in college football games. The gambling market’s score predictions are shown to be biased due to censoring at zero points. This presents arbitrage opportunities for gamblers who place wagers on the team totals line in cases for which expected bias is high. A naïve betting strategy that exploits this bias using only information contained within the two betting lines themselves yields a win percentage of over 55 percent over the past two decades. This significantly exceeds the typical transaction costs associated with wagers, indicating the market is semi-strong inefficient.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
大学橄榄球赌博的市场效率与审查偏见
球队总数和点差投注线共同预测球队在大学橄榄球比赛中的得分。由于零分审查,博彩市场的分数预测被证明是有偏差的。这为赌徒提供了套利机会,他们在预期偏差较高的情况下,在团队总数线上下注。在过去的二十年里,一种天真的投注策略,只使用两条投注线本身包含的信息来利用这种偏见,其获胜率超过55%。这大大超过了与下注相关的典型交易成本,表明市场是半强低效的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
17.60%
发文量
36
期刊介绍: Journal of Sports Economics publishes scholarly research in the field of sports economics. The aim of the journal is to further research in the area of sports economics by bringing together theoretical and empirical research in a single intellectual venue. Relevant topics include: labor market research; labor-management relations; collective bargaining; wage determination; local public finance; and other fields related to the economics of sports. Published quarterly, the Journal of Sports Economics is unique in that it is the only journal devoted specifically to this rapidly growing field.
期刊最新文献
Nontransitive Patterns in Long-Term Football Rivalries The Well-Being and Social Value of Playing Soccer for Women and Men Migrants Networks and Survival in the Job: Evidence from Foreign Newcomers on the PGA Tour Updating Beliefs Based on Observed Performance: Evidence From NFL Head Coaches Should I Stay or Should I Go Pro? Early NFL Draft Entry by NCAA FBS Underclassmen
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1