Higher‐order omissions and the stacked view of agency

Abstract

Omissions are puzzling, and theyraise myriad questions for many areas of philosophy. In contrast, omissions ofomissions are not usually taken to be very puzzling since they are oftenthought to just be a fancy way of describing ordinary “positive” events, statesof affairs, or actions. This paper contends that – as far as agency isconcerned – at least some omissions of omissions are omissions, not actions. First,this paper highlights how our actions are accompanied by many first‐orderomissions ‐ i.e., omissions to act – and that there already are many strongreasons to think that at least some of these first‐order omissions are agentiallydistinct from simultaneous actions and from other first‐order omissions. Itthen argues that our actions and first‐order omissions are also accompanied byhigher‐order omissions – i.e., omissions to omit to act – and that higher‐orderomissions are distinct from actions and first‐order omissions for similarreasons. Higher‐order omissions also illuminate a more holistic picture of agency,which involves recognizing that our exercises of agency at a moment in timeinclude all of our overlapping behaviors – our actions, first‐order omissions,and higher‐order omissions. This paper concludes by exploring the impacts ofhigher‐order omissions.