According to epistemic instrumentalism, epistemic reasons are a species of a familiar and unmysterious type of reason: instrumental or means‐end reasons. Believing that p is the means to some relevant cognitive end. If this view is correct, then whether one has an epistemic reason to believe p isn't merely a matter of having evidence for p; one must also have (or have reason to have) the relevant cognitive end. In this article, I raise a challenge for the view, one concerned with its implications concerning basing beliefs on epistemic reasons. We regularly base our beliefs on epistemic reasons. I see the pouring raining and conclude that the planned picnic will be canceled; the realtor checks the client's financial statements and concludes that they won't be able to afford a certain house. In such cases, one doesn't merely have good epistemic reasons to believe a certain proposition; one believes the proposition for those reasons; and this might be part of the explanation of how one comes to have an epistemically justified belief or knowledge. I argue that the instrumentalist does a poor job of accommodating the phenomenon of basing belief on epistemic reasons.
{"title":"Basing Beliefs on Epistemic Reasons: A Challenge for Instrumentalism","authors":"Matthew McGrath","doi":"10.1111/phis.70002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.70002","url":null,"abstract":"According to epistemic instrumentalism, epistemic reasons are a species of a familiar and unmysterious type of reason: instrumental or means‐end reasons. Believing that p is the means to some relevant cognitive end. If this view is correct, then whether one has an epistemic reason to believe p isn't merely a matter of having evidence for p; one must also have (or have reason to have) the relevant cognitive end. In this article, I raise a challenge for the view, one concerned with its implications concerning basing beliefs on epistemic reasons. We regularly base our beliefs on epistemic reasons. I see the pouring raining and conclude that the planned picnic will be canceled; the realtor checks the client's financial statements and concludes that they won't be able to afford a certain house. In such cases, one doesn't merely have good epistemic reasons to believe a certain proposition; one believes the proposition for those reasons; and this might be part of the explanation of how one comes to have an epistemically justified belief or knowledge. I argue that the instrumentalist does a poor job of accommodating the phenomenon of basing belief on epistemic reasons.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":"127 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147380781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article argues that there are two fundamentally different types of alethic and epistemic progress in philosophy. It is widely assumed that such progress is to be assessed by reference to the quantity or quality of philosophy's product (i.e., a type of output or outcome, such as true answers, coherent views, knowledge, or understanding), rather than to the manner in which philosophy is done—its performance . That assumption is mistaken. Performance progress is not reducible to product progress. This carries implications for debates about peer disagreement, epistemic consequentialism, philosophical methods, and the idea of philosophy as a “spiritual exercise.”
{"title":"Robust Pluralism About Philosophical Progress","authors":"John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau","doi":"10.1111/phis.70008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.70008","url":null,"abstract":"This article argues that there are two fundamentally different types of alethic and epistemic progress in philosophy. It is widely assumed that such progress is to be assessed by reference to the quantity or quality of philosophy's <jats:italic>product</jats:italic> (i.e., a type of output or outcome, such as true answers, coherent views, knowledge, or understanding), rather than to the manner in which philosophy is done—its <jats:italic>performance</jats:italic> . That assumption is mistaken. Performance progress is not reducible to product progress. This carries implications for debates about peer disagreement, epistemic consequentialism, philosophical methods, and the idea of philosophy as a “spiritual exercise.”","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146261011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article aims to solve a puzzle for instrumental conceptions of epistemic normativity. The puzzle is this: If the usefulness of epistemic norms explains their normative grip on us, why does it seem improper to violate these norms even when doing so would benefit us? To solve this puzzle, we argue that epistemic instrumentalists must adopt a more social approach to normativity. In particular, they should not account for the nature of epistemic norms by appealing to the goals of individual agents. Rather, they should appeal to norms or rules of inquiry that serve our collective goals. We argue that epistemic normativity grows out of our need to promote a deep kind of coordination in our basic epistemic practices. By subscribing to an appropriate system of norms, we can coordinate epistemic rule‐following across the community. This makes testimony more trustworthy and reliable. This account not only solves a puzzle about epistemic instrumentalism but also sheds new light on the foundations of normativity and emphasizes the need for a truly social epistemology.
{"title":"The Construction of Epistemic Normativity","authors":"Michael Hannon, Elise Woodard","doi":"10.1111/phis.70010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.70010","url":null,"abstract":"This article aims to solve a puzzle for instrumental conceptions of epistemic normativity. The puzzle is this: If the usefulness of epistemic norms explains their normative grip on us, why does it seem improper to violate these norms even when doing so would benefit us? To solve this puzzle, we argue that epistemic instrumentalists must adopt a more social approach to normativity. In particular, they should not account for the nature of epistemic norms by appealing to the goals of individual agents. Rather, they should appeal to norms or rules of inquiry that serve our collective goals. We argue that epistemic normativity grows out of our need to promote a deep kind of coordination in our basic epistemic practices. By subscribing to an appropriate system of norms, we can coordinate epistemic rule‐following across the community. This makes testimony more trustworthy and reliable. This account not only solves a puzzle about epistemic instrumentalism but also sheds new light on the foundations of normativity and emphasizes the need for a truly social epistemology.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":"72 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146215716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When does an agent possess a proposition P as evidence? According to Timothy Williamson, the answer is when, and only when, they know that P . Call this view E = K. In this article, I point out an unwanted consequence of E = K, which is that people who suffer from anxiety have impoverished empirical evidence due to their anxiety. Although anxiety can manifest in a variety of ways and to different degrees, I take it that in some cases a person's anxiety functions in a way that prevents a person from believing in accordance with their empirical evidence. However, E = K has trouble explaining the descriptive and normative dimensions of a case like this, because the view implies that whenever an agent's anxiety prevents them from outright believing a proposition this ipso facto deprives them of empirical evidence.
{"title":"Anxiety and Evidence","authors":"Rhys Borchert","doi":"10.1111/phis.70001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.70001","url":null,"abstract":"When does an agent possess a proposition <jats:italic>P</jats:italic> as evidence? According to Timothy Williamson, the answer is when, and only when, they know that <jats:italic>P</jats:italic> . Call this view E = K. In this article, I point out an unwanted consequence of E = K, which is that people who suffer from anxiety have impoverished empirical evidence due to their anxiety. Although anxiety can manifest in a variety of ways and to different degrees, I take it that in some cases a person's anxiety functions in a way that prevents a person from believing in accordance with their empirical evidence. However, E = K has trouble explaining the descriptive and normative dimensions of a case like this, because the view implies that whenever an agent's anxiety prevents them from outright believing a proposition this ipso facto deprives them of empirical evidence.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146205086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This essay asks a new question: When someone with a firm understanding of basic operations nevertheless remains ignorant of a complex logical or mathematical truth, precisely what kind of information are they missing? I introduce “catenary truths,” a significant component of this non‐omniscient shortfall. Traditional epistemologies of the a priori don't extend to catenary knowledge, so I offer a novel proposal for how we acquire catenary information. The proposal answers Benacerraf‐inspired worries about access to abstracta by showing how processes of reasoning instantiate catenary truths. The proposal also sheds new light on whether logic is ampliative, how a calculation is like an experiment, higher‐order doubts about deductive reasoning, the inconceivability of logically impossible worlds, and commonalities between mathematical and moral intuition.
{"title":"The Logical Firmament","authors":"Michael G. Titelbaum","doi":"10.1111/phis.70012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.70012","url":null,"abstract":"This essay asks a new question: When someone with a firm understanding of basic operations nevertheless remains ignorant of a complex logical or mathematical truth, precisely what kind of information are they missing? I introduce “catenary truths,” a significant component of this non‐omniscient shortfall. Traditional epistemologies of the a priori don't extend to catenary knowledge, so I offer a novel proposal for how we acquire catenary information. The proposal answers Benacerraf‐inspired worries about access to abstracta by showing how processes of reasoning instantiate catenary truths. The proposal also sheds new light on whether logic is ampliative, how a calculation is like an experiment, higher‐order doubts about deductive reasoning, the inconceivability of logically impossible worlds, and commonalities between mathematical and moral intuition.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":"65 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146205089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There is a natural view of the relationship between preference and choice: an option is choiceworthy if and only if no alternative is strictly preferred to it. I argue against this view on two grounds. First, it makes false predictions about which options are choiceworthy in games and in multidimensional choice settings. Second, it conflates two distinct attitudes: choiceworthiness, which is assessed ex ante, and preference, which is assessed ex post. I explore the consequences of rejecting this natural view, including how it simplifies the relationship between game theory and decision theory, and how it complicates debates about what Ruth Chang calls “parity” between options.
{"title":"Are Choices Binary?","authors":"Brian Weatherson","doi":"10.1111/phis.70011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.70011","url":null,"abstract":"There is a natural view of the relationship between preference and choice: an option is choiceworthy if and only if no alternative is strictly preferred to it. I argue against this view on two grounds. First, it makes false predictions about which options are choiceworthy in games and in multidimensional choice settings. Second, it conflates two distinct attitudes: choiceworthiness, which is assessed ex ante, and preference, which is assessed ex post. I explore the consequences of rejecting this natural view, including how it simplifies the relationship between game theory and decision theory, and how it complicates debates about what Ruth Chang calls “parity” between options.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146215710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Thomas Kelly and Stuart Cohen argue that intuitions about rationality provide a direct argument against the pragmatist's claim that there are practical reasons for and against belief. Although Susanna Rinard offers an insightful response to their “Rationality Argument” on behalf of robust pragmatism (the view that there are only practical reasons for and against belief), this article offers a response to the argument on behalf of pluralist pragmatism (the view that there are both practical and epistemic reasons for and against belief). I argue that contrary to what Kelly and Cohen claim, the pluralist pragmatist may adopt the very same view of rationality and all the same intuitive verdicts about cases as the anti‐pragmatist. So, intuitions about rationality can't be wielded as an argument against pluralist pragmatism. Moreover, I argue that even if the pluralist pragmatist adopts a different view of rationality than the anti‐pragmatist, they can still accommodate Kelly and Cohen's intuitions about the sorts of cases they appeal to. So, no matter which view of rationality the pluralist pragmatist accepts, Kelly and Cohen's Rationality Argument fails.
{"title":"Pluralist Pragmatism and Rationality","authors":"Stephanie Leary","doi":"10.1111/phis.70014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.70014","url":null,"abstract":"Thomas Kelly and Stuart Cohen argue that intuitions about rationality provide a direct argument against the pragmatist's claim that there are practical reasons for and against belief. Although Susanna Rinard offers an insightful response to their “Rationality Argument” on behalf of robust pragmatism (the view that there are only practical reasons for and against belief), this article offers a response to the argument on behalf of pluralist pragmatism (the view that there are both practical and epistemic reasons for and against belief). I argue that contrary to what Kelly and Cohen claim, the pluralist pragmatist may adopt the very same view of rationality and all the same intuitive verdicts about cases as the anti‐pragmatist. So, intuitions about rationality can't be wielded as an argument against pluralist pragmatism. Moreover, I argue that even if the pluralist pragmatist adopts a different view of rationality than the anti‐pragmatist, they can still accommodate Kelly and Cohen's intuitions about the sorts of cases they appeal to. So, no matter which view of rationality the pluralist pragmatist accepts, Kelly and Cohen's Rationality Argument fails.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146198733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Having evidence does not in itself make a doxastic attitude justified even if the evidence supports the attitude in question. Plausibly, one must also appreciate the support one's evidence provides for the doxastic attitude. Although such appreciation seems central to the picture of justification offered by Evidentialism, its nature has been largely unexplored by Evidentialists. This article seeks to rectify this situation by explaining how Evidentialists should understand appreciation and its role in justification. Additionally, the account of appreciation defended here is put to work in explicating the justification had during the process of deliberation and in clarifying what we should think about cases of epistemic akrasia.
{"title":"Appreciating the Evidence","authors":"Kevin McCain","doi":"10.1111/phis.70000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.70000","url":null,"abstract":"Having evidence does not in itself make a doxastic attitude justified even if the evidence supports the attitude in question. Plausibly, one must also appreciate the support one's evidence provides for the doxastic attitude. Although such appreciation seems central to the picture of justification offered by Evidentialism, its nature has been largely unexplored by Evidentialists. This article seeks to rectify this situation by explaining how Evidentialists should understand appreciation and its role in justification. Additionally, the account of appreciation defended here is put to work in explicating the justification had during the process of deliberation and in clarifying what we should think about cases of epistemic akrasia.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146169473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Some concepts generate paradoxes by licensing inconsistent beliefs. We can try to revise some of those beliefs by doing some “conceptual engineering,” but this leads to a puzzle. However exactly the details of conceptual engineering get filled in, it seems that what happens is we revise our beliefs without gaining any evidence against our old views or in support of our new views. But epistemically rational belief change always requires new evidence—or so it seems. I respond to the puzzle by proposing a view of epistemic rationality on which we are required to hold a belief only if two conditions hold: Our evidence supports the belief, and our attention is directed at the evidence and the supported belief's content. Thus, we can rationally withdraw a belief by withdrawing our attention to its content, even without having any new evidence. Its ability to solve this puzzle for conceptual engineering, in addition to some other important puzzles that I briefly show it also solves, gives us a strong case for this proposed connection between rationality and attention.
{"title":"How Is “Conceptual Engineering” Rational? Solving Some Puzzles by Connecting Rationality and Attention","authors":"Sinan Dogramaci","doi":"10.1111/phis.70013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.70013","url":null,"abstract":"Some concepts generate paradoxes by licensing inconsistent beliefs. We can try to revise some of those beliefs by doing some “conceptual engineering,” but this leads to a puzzle. However exactly the details of conceptual engineering get filled in, it seems that what happens is we revise our beliefs without gaining any evidence against our old views or in support of our new views. But epistemically rational belief change always requires new evidence—or so it seems. I respond to the puzzle by proposing a view of epistemic rationality on which we are required to hold a belief only if two conditions hold: Our evidence supports the belief, <jats:italic>and</jats:italic> our attention is directed at the evidence and the supported belief's content. Thus, we can rationally withdraw a belief by withdrawing our attention to its content, even without having any new evidence. Its ability to solve this puzzle for conceptual engineering, in addition to some other important puzzles that I briefly show it also solves, gives us a strong case for this proposed connection between rationality and attention.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146169478","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When what justifies you in believing a proposition is some evidence you have, you are doxastically justified only if you believe that proposition on the basis of that evidence. According to causal theories of basing, this basing relation must be a causal relation. In this article, we discuss the role that defeaters play in an account of this kind. We first argue that doxastic justification for believing a certain proposition requires, not just basing the belief on evidence that one has and that is sufficient to propositionally justify the belief, but also being sensitive to the absence of sufficiently weighty defeaters. We then argue that causal theories of basing have the right kinds of resources to incorporate this role played by defeaters (and the relevant role played by disqualifiers) in the concept of doxastic justification. Our argument borrows from action theory in that it is inspired by similar arguments on behalf of causalist accounts of action and freedom. We end with a discussion of the bearing of our view on Pryor's dogmatism.
{"title":"Basing on Absences","authors":"Juan Comesaña, Carolina Sartorio","doi":"10.1111/phis.70003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.70003","url":null,"abstract":"When what justifies you in believing a proposition is some evidence you have, you are <jats:italic>doxastically</jats:italic> justified only if you believe that proposition on the basis of that evidence. According to causal theories of basing, this basing relation must be a causal relation. In this article, we discuss the role that defeaters play in an account of this kind. We first argue that doxastic justification for believing a certain proposition requires, not just basing the belief on evidence that one has and that is sufficient to propositionally justify the belief, but also being sensitive to the <jats:italic>absence</jats:italic> of sufficiently weighty defeaters. We then argue that causal theories of basing have the right kinds of resources to incorporate this role played by defeaters (and the relevant role played by disqualifiers) in the concept of doxastic justification. Our argument borrows from action theory in that it is inspired by similar arguments on behalf of causalist accounts of action and freedom. We end with a discussion of the bearing of our view on Pryor's dogmatism.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":"278 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146184242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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