Should I stay or should I go? British voter you got to let me know! Prime Ministers, intra-party conflict, and membership referendums in the British Westminster model

IF 0.6 4区 社会学 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-09-15 DOI:10.1177/0951629820956273
T. König, Xiao Lu
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

We explain the referendums on British membership of the European Communities and European Union from a principal–agent perspective between the Prime Minister and the rank-and-file. We show that announcing a referendum on the Prime Minister’s membership proposal helps the incumbent party to win the general election when the rank-and-file is divided on the terms of membership. When the Prime Minister overcomes the rank-and-file’s mistrust of her effectiveness in negotiating new membership terms with other member states, the voters are more likely to follow her proposal. However, when intra-party controversies reveal principal–agent problems, the initially uninformed voters can learn about the dysfunctionality of the terms and are more likely to reject the Prime Minister’s proposal.
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我该留下还是走?英国选民,你得让我知道!英国威斯敏斯特模式下的首相、党内冲突和成员公投
我们从首相和普通民众之间的委托代理角度解释了英国加入欧洲共同体和欧盟的公投。我们表明,当普通党员在党员条件上存在分歧时,宣布对首相的党员提案进行全民公投有助于现任政党赢得大选。当首相克服了普通民众对她在与其他成员国谈判新成员条款方面有效性的不信任时,选民更有可能遵循她的提议。然而,当党内争议暴露出委托代理问题时,最初不知情的选民可以了解到条款的功能失调,更有可能拒绝首相的提议。
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来源期刊
Journal of Theoretical Politics
Journal of Theoretical Politics POLITICAL SCIENCE-
CiteScore
2.10
自引率
10.00%
发文量
19
期刊介绍: The Journal of Theoretical Politics is an international journal one of whose principal aims is to foster the development of theory in the study of political processes. It provides a forum for the publication of original papers seeking to make genuinely theoretical contributions to the study of politics. The journal includes rigorous analytical articles on a range of theoretical topics. In particular, it focuses on new theoretical work which is broadly accessible to social scientists and contributes to our understanding of political processes. It also includes original syntheses of recent theoretical developments in diverse fields.
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