Jason T. Wright , Chelsea Haramia , Gabriel Swiney
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引用次数: 2
Abstract
We discuss the recent “realpolitik” analysis of Wisian and Traphagan (2020) of the potential geopolitical fallout of the success of the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI). They conclude that “passive” SETI involves an underexplored yet significant risk. This is the risk that, in the event of a successful, passive detection of extraterrestrial technology, state-level actors could seek to gain an information monopoly on communications with an extraterrestrial intelligence. These attempts could lead to international conflict and potentially disastrous consequences. In response to this possibility, they argue that scientists and facilities engaged in SETI should preemptively engage in significant security protocols to forestall this risk. We find several flaws in their analysis. While we do not dispute that a realpolitik response is possible, we uncover concerns with Wisian and Traphagan's presentation of the realpolitik paradigm, and we argue that sufficient reason is not given to justify treating this potential scenario as action-guiding over other candidate geopolitical responses. Furthermore, even if one assumes that a realpolitik response is the most relevant geopolitical response, we show that it is highly unlikely that a nation could successfully monopolize communication with ETI. Instead, the real threat that the authors identify is based on the perception by state actors that an information monopoly is likely. However, as we show, this perception is based on an overly narrow contact scenario. Overall, we critique Wisian and Traphagan's argument and resulting recommendations on technical, political, and ethical grounds. Ultimately, we find that not only are Wisian and Traphagan's recommendations unlikely to work, they may also precipitate the very ills that they foresee. As an alternative to the Wisian and Traphagan recommendations, we recommend transparency and data sharing (which are consistent with currently accepted best practices), further development of postdetection protocols, and better education of policymakers in this space.
期刊介绍:
Space Policy is an international, interdisciplinary journal which draws on the fields of international relations, economics, history, aerospace studies, security studies, development studies, political science and ethics to provide discussion and analysis of space activities in their political, economic, industrial, legal, cultural and social contexts. Alongside full-length papers, which are subject to a double-blind peer review system, the journal publishes opinion pieces, case studies and short reports and, in so doing, it aims to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas and opinions and a means by which authors can alert policy makers and international organizations to their views. Space Policy is also a journal of record, reproducing, in whole or part, official documents such as treaties, space agency plans or government reports relevant to the space community. Views expressed in the journal are not necessarily those of the editors or members of the editorial board.