Authentic Autonomy: A Practical Reasoning Critique of Directive Moral Education

Abstract

Programs of directive moral education (DME) that attempt to pre-rationally condition particular values are often criticized as violating autonomy. A common defense of DME is that if individuals, later in life, can respond to reasons, then autonomy has not been violated. In this paper I argue that this defense is a weak one because it does not pay sufficient attention to what is involved in responding to reasons. By adopting a theory of practical reasoning, I show that the reasons we can respond to are determined by the values that we hold. As such, the source of those values is crucial. If we are responding to reasons based merely upon values we have been conditioned to hold, then autonomy is compromised. We must, rather, hold values that we have chosen for our own. In this way I argue that authenticity is a necessary component of autonomy.