Reputation Lasts Longer Than Life: How can Central Banks Quantify their Reputational Risk?

IF 1.7 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI:10.2478/jcbtp-2023-0029
P. Kafle
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Abstract

Abstract It takes multiple decades of commitment and credibility to create repute but only a few seconds to tarnish it, as the instances of misinformation, disinformation and malinformation galore. In light of this, Central banks, as delicate and sensitive public institutions, are significantly vulnerable to such reputation risk due to their mandate for policy decisions and implementation. Thus, this study aims to formulate a barometer that quantifies the reputation score of central banks. The Central Bank Reputation (CBR) score is derived based on the respondents’ responses to a questionnaire that includes twelve attributes and twenty-eight indicators, which is administered among the eight set of audiences. The reputation score ranges from −100 to +100, that indicates the reputation of the Central Bank at a point of time. The deviation in reputation score between two points of time thus measures the reputational risk. However, the study suggests applying other qualitative analysis tools in complement with this quantitative barometer, to come up with the robust assessment.
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声誉比生命更长久:央行如何量化其声誉风险?
摘要创造声誉需要几十年的承诺和信誉,但玷污声誉只需要几秒钟,因为错误信息、虚假信息和虚假信息的例子比比皆是。有鉴于此,中央银行作为敏感敏感的公共机构,由于其政策决策和执行的授权,极易受到此类声誉风险的影响。因此,本研究旨在制定一个衡量央行声誉得分的晴雨表。中央银行声誉(CBR)分数是根据受访者对问卷的回答得出的,该问卷包括12个属性和28个指标,在8组受众中进行管理。信誉评分范围从−100到+100,表示中央银行在某个时间点的信誉。因此,声誉得分在两个时间点之间的偏差可以衡量声誉风险。然而,该研究建议应用其他定性分析工具来补充这一定量晴雨表,以得出稳健的评估结果。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.80
自引率
57.10%
发文量
31
审稿时长
7 weeks
期刊介绍: Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice is a scientific journal dedicated to publishing quality papers and disseminating original, relevant and applicable economic research. Scientific and professional papers that are published in the Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice cover theoretical and practical aspects of central banking, monetary policy, including the supervision issues, as well as banking and management in central banks. The purpose of the journal is to educate the general public about the key issues that the central bankers globally face, as well as about contemporary research and achievements in the field of central banking theory and practice.
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