On Rights without Natural Law

Abstract

What is important for the historiography of human rights is that Dan Edelstein worked with early modern texts on legal theory and recognized that the real issue was the question of rights after the social contract .1 Most historians would just ask whether philosophers acknowledged human rights or not, but would not enquire about further conditions . Another good thing is that he appreciates the historical logic which induced early modern thinkers to prioritize the reform of existing laws over the invention of new rights .2 These are signs that this interpretation is based on inductive reasoning and not deduced from preconceived conclusions . The problem, then, is that the book does not look for historical legal solutions to the survival of rights within a legal system but satisfies itself with the notion of the preservation regime . 3 This might be the impact of the metaphorical language which approaches rights as if they were a flowing river or a growing plant .4 It should be said that such metaphors are quite common in intellectual history, but they may hide lacunae in relevant knowledge by creating fictional connections . Even though this story is balanced with some contextual reconstructions, it may be misread as another version of skepticism which denies the significance of natural law for the formulation of „universal human rights“ . If we take „human rights“ as a legal instrument artificially made, and not as a good to be protected, then we also have to explain how this instrument was construed and I am afraid that this is not possible without early modern natural law .