Decision Theory and large deviations for dynamical hypotheses tests: The Neyman-Pearson Lemma, Min-Max and Bayesian tests

IF 0.3 Q3 MATHEMATICS, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2021-01-20 DOI:10.3934/jdg.2021031
Hermes H. Ferreira, A. Lopes, S. Lopes
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

We analyze hypotheses tests using classical results on large deviations to compare two models, each one described by a different Hölder Gibbs probability measure. One main difference to the classical hypothesis tests in Decision Theory is that here the two measures are singular with respect to each other. Among other objectives, we are interested in the decay rate of the wrong decisions probability, when the sample size \begin{document}$ n $\end{document} goes to infinity. We show a dynamical version of the Neyman-Pearson Lemma displaying the ideal test within a certain class of similar tests. This test becomes exponentially better, compared to other alternative tests, when the sample size goes to infinity. We are able to present the explicit exponential decay rate. We also consider both, the Min-Max and a certain type of Bayesian hypotheses tests. We shall consider these tests in the log likelihood framework by using several tools of Thermodynamic Formalism. Versions of the Stein's Lemma and Chernoff's information are also presented.
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决策理论与动态假设检验的大偏差:Neyman-Pearson引理、Min-Max和贝叶斯检验
我们使用大偏差的经典结果来分析假设检验,以比较两个模型,每个模型由不同的Hölder-Gibbs概率测度描述。与决策理论中的经典假设检验的一个主要区别是,这里的两个度量相对于彼此是奇异的。在其他目标中,我们感兴趣的是当样本量\开始{文档}$n$\结束{文档}为无穷大时,错误决策概率的衰减率。我们展示了Neyman-Pearson引理的一个动态版本,它在某类类似测试中显示了理想测试。当样本量达到无穷大时,与其他替代测试相比,该测试变得指数级更好。我们能够给出显式的指数衰减率。我们还考虑了最小-最大和某种类型的贝叶斯假设检验。我们将使用热力学形式主义的几种工具,在对数似然框架中考虑这些测试。还介绍了斯坦因引理和切尔诺夫信息的版本。
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来源期刊
Journal of Dynamics and Games
Journal of Dynamics and Games MATHEMATICS, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS-
CiteScore
2.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
26
期刊介绍: The Journal of Dynamics and Games (JDG) is a pure and applied mathematical journal that publishes high quality peer-review and expository papers in all research areas of expertise of its editors. The main focus of JDG is in the interface of Dynamical Systems and Game Theory.
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