The Law vs. the Sword: Arthur Ripstein’s Account of the Morality and Law of War

Q2 Social Sciences Criminal Justice Ethics Pub Date : 2021-09-02 DOI:10.1080/0731129X.2021.1993673
Cécile Fabre
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Suppose that state A wages war against state D. We want to know at least three things. First, does state A have a moral and legal justification for going to war? Second, what may and must those states’ armed forces do, morally and legally, in the course of fighting their war? Third, if those states’ leaders and ordinary soldiers act wrongly and/or illegally, ought they be punished and if so, by whom? In the parlance of just war theory, we want to know what moral and legal norms regulate the resort to war ( jus ad bellum), belligerents’and soldiers’ conduct in war ( jus in bello), and their conduct after war ( jus post bellum). Arthur Ripstein’s Rules for Wrongdoers, which is the published text of his Berkeley Tanner Lectures on Human Values, offers novel and interesting responses to those questions. It includes comments by Oona Hathaway, Christopher Kutz and Jeff McMahan, and Ripstein’s response to those comments. The book’s chief aim is to provide a solution to a deep and important puzzle about the morality and the law of war. The puzzle is this: According to the law of war and the moral norms which underpin it, states may not (morally and legally) initiate war against other states. They may resort to war only (a) to defend their territorial integrity and political independence against a military aggression, (b) to come to one another’s assistance in the face of aggression, or (c) to prevent the commission of atrocities in other states. Failing that, they and their leadership commit the moral wrong and the legal crime of aggression. Once the war has started, soldiers from both sides are prohibited from employing a range of tactics. In particular, they are legally and morally prohibited from deliberately killing anyone who is not or is no longer participating in the war, such as soldiers who have surrendered and, crucially, innocent civilians. They are also ∗Cécile Fabre. Email: cecile.fabre@all-souls. ox.ac.uk Criminal Justice Ethics, 2021 Vol. 40, No. 3, 256–268, https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2021.1993673
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法律与刀剑:亚瑟·里普斯坦对战争道德与法律的描述
假设A州对D州发动战争。我们至少想知道三件事。首先,A州是否有发动战争的道德和法律依据?第二,这些国家的武装部队在战争过程中,在道德和法律上可以做什么,也必须做什么?第三,如果这些国家的领导人和普通士兵行为错误和/或非法,他们应该受到惩罚吗?如果是,由谁来惩罚?用正义战争理论的说法,我们想知道是什么道德和法律规范规范了诉诸战争(战争法)、交战方和士兵在战争中的行为(战时法)以及他们在战争后的行为(战后法)。Arthur Ripstein的《犯错者规则》是他在伯克利-坦纳人类价值观讲座上发表的文本,对这些问题做出了新颖而有趣的回答。其中包括Oona Hathaway、Christopher Kutz和Jeff McMahan的评论,以及Ripstein对这些评论的回应。这本书的主要目的是解决一个关于战争道德和法律的深刻而重要的谜题。难题在于:根据战争法及其背后的道德规范,国家不得(在道德和法律上)对其他国家发动战争。他们可能诉诸战争,只是为了(a)捍卫其领土完整和政治独立免受军事侵略,(b)在面对侵略时相互援助,或(c)防止在其他国家犯下暴行。如果做不到这一点,他们和他们的领导就犯下了道德错误和侵略的法律罪行。一旦战争开始,双方士兵都被禁止使用一系列战术。特别是,法律和道义上禁止他们蓄意杀害任何没有或不再参与战争的人,例如投降的士兵,以及至关重要的无辜平民。他们也是*Cécile Fabre。电子邮件:cecile.fabre@all-souls.ox.ac.uk《刑事司法伦理》,2021年第40卷,第3期,256-268,https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2021.1993673
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来源期刊
Criminal Justice Ethics
Criminal Justice Ethics Social Sciences-Law
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
11
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