The Dialectics of Affect

Abstract

Initially influenced by Schelling’s lectures on positive philosophy (1841–1842), Kierkegaard ultimately withdrew from his lectures, devoting his attention exclusively to the redaction of Either/Or. The Concept of Anxiety was written in the shadow of that work under a uniquely anonymous pseudonym. Of course, anxiety in his deformalization of late idealism was not a concept; it belonged and did not belong to the understanding. Indeed, it precedes human actions under the sign of inherited “sinfulness” and as sheer possibility. If Kierkegaard aligned freedom with a leap, then anxiety was the affect precursive to it. Anxiety was the prethetic knowing that we are able to do. . . X. Tracing the “spiritual” history of the human race which carries the sins of the fathers even as it freely enacts sin, Kierkegaard urged that the more spiritual the culture, the more anxious it was. No longer the adjuvant of reason as in Hegel, anxiety belonged to the irreducible condition of a living subject. Over the five years that separated the Concept of Anxiety from Sickness onto Death, Kierkegaard’s mood of “Angest” will intensify as it is approached from his new perspective of Coram Deo (“before God”). Within the new perspective, the status and the meaning of the self is altered, showing a clearer relation to infinity. For the task of Kierkegaard’s philosophy—learning to become the nothing that one is—had attained a new stage in his existential dialectic. His arguments influenced Heidegger’s recourse to anxiety as a passage toward the question of being.