Editor’s Note

Mary Beth Genter
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Abstract

In June 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States demonstrated, as it has done many times in the past, the enduring versatility of the marketplace of ideas theory. The issue in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra was the constitutionality of a California law requiring pregnancy-related clinics to provide information to clients about abortion rights and services. Writing for the five-member majority, Justice Clarence Thomas found the law unconstitutional because, in part, “When the government polices the content of professional speech, it can fail to ‘preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.’” Professionals might have a number of goodfaith disagreements, Justice Thomas wrote, and government interference by requiring some professionals to disseminate certain messages, runs counter to the notion that “‘[t]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.’” Writing in dissent, Justice Anthony Kennedy took issue with the use of the marketplace of ideas to suppress information. The marketplace, he wrote, “is fostered, not hindered, by providing information to patients to enable them to make fully informed medical decisions in respect to their pregnancies.” In its most recent application of the marketplace theory, therefore, as has happened many times in the past, both sides found solace in the marketplace of ideas, demonstrating that the theory is arguably the most enduring, most powerful and most versatile of any theory called upon by the Court. Justices have referenced the marketplace of ideas theory hundreds of times since its 1919 emergence as part of free speech
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Editor’s音符
2018年6月,美国最高法院证明了思想市场理论的持久多功能性,就像它过去多次做过的那样。国家家庭和生命倡导协会诉贝塞拉案的问题是加州一项法律的合宪性,该法律要求与怀孕有关的诊所向客户提供有关堕胎权利和服务的信息。法官克拉伦斯·托马斯(Clarence Thomas)在代表五人多数的意见书中认为,这项法律违宪,部分原因是,“当政府监管专业言论的内容时,它可能无法‘保持一个不受约束的思想市场,在这个市场中,真理最终会占上风。托马斯法官写道,专业人士可能会有一些善意的分歧,政府通过要求一些专业人士传播某些信息来进行干预,这与“对真理的最佳检验是思想在市场竞争中被接受的力量”这一概念背道而驰。’”大法官安东尼·肯尼迪(Anthony Kennedy)在反对意见中对利用思想市场压制信息的做法提出了异议。他写道,这个市场“通过向患者提供信息,使他们能够在怀孕方面做出充分知情的医疗决定,从而得到促进,而不是阻碍。”因此,在市场理论最近的应用中,正如过去多次发生的那样,双方都在思想的市场中找到了安慰,这表明该理论可以说是最高法院所要求的任何理论中最持久、最有力和最通用的。自1919年思想市场理论作为言论自由的一部分出现以来,大法官们已经引用了数百次
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.60
自引率
33.30%
发文量
7
期刊介绍: The societal, cultural, economic and political dimensions of communication, including the freedoms of speech and press, are undergoing dramatic global changes. The convergence of the mass media, telecommunications, and computers has raised important questions reflected in analyses of modern communication law, policy, and regulation. Serving as a forum for discussions of these continuing and emerging questions, Communication Law and Policy considers traditional and contemporary problems of freedom of expression and dissemination, including theoretical, conceptual and methodological issues inherent in the special conditions presented by new media and information technologies.
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