Pub Date : 2024-05-10DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2024.2334081
Riccardo Vecellio Segate
{"title":"Channeled Beneath International Law: Mapping Infrastructure and Regulatory Capture as Israeli–American Hegemonic Reinforcers in Palestine","authors":"Riccardo Vecellio Segate","doi":"10.1080/10811680.2024.2334081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10811680.2024.2334081","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42622,"journal":{"name":"Communication Law and Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140992919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-30DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2023.2271461
Ángela Moreno Bobadilla
This article opens with an analysis of the scope of the protectable legal right to be forgotten, since this must be understood not only in relation to the right to erasure. The right to be forgotte...
本文首先分析了可受保护的被遗忘的法律权利的范围，因为这不仅要结合删除权来理解。被遗忘权...
{"title":"Digital Rights in Europe After the Entry Into Force of Regulations for the Protection of Personal Data: Before and After the Right to Be Forgotten","authors":"Ángela Moreno Bobadilla","doi":"10.1080/10811680.2023.2271461","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10811680.2023.2271461","url":null,"abstract":"This article opens with an analysis of the scope of the protectable legal right to be forgotten, since this must be understood not only in relation to the right to erasure. The right to be forgotte...","PeriodicalId":42622,"journal":{"name":"Communication Law and Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139770810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-12DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2023.2241449
Jiyan Faris, Pieter Maeseele, Kevin Smets
{"title":"Regulatory Capture in a Transitional Democracy: Media Laws in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq","authors":"Jiyan Faris, Pieter Maeseele, Kevin Smets","doi":"10.1080/10811680.2023.2241449","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10811680.2023.2241449","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42622,"journal":{"name":"Communication Law and Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135879179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-03DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2023.2224711
Benjamin W. Cramer
Abstract This article discusses attempts by the American government to regulate robocalls – the automated and often fraudulent messages that are sent to citizens' phones by the billions every year. The earliest regulations against uninvited telephone solicitations were positioned by Congress and regulatory agencies as content-neutral protections of privacy in the home. This perspective aroused little controversy for years, but it has recently been overtaken by misleading free speech analyses demanded by robocall purveyors, who in turn use such arguments to chip away at privacy protections. This article argues that regulations and statutes intended to restrict robocalls were enacted with the intent of protecting consumer privacy over the speech-related rights of telemarketers. However, telemarketers have adopted the argument that such restrictions are unconstitutional infringements on free speech. The judiciary has responded with tortured attempts to balance privacy and speech, when that sort of analysis should not be necessary if all parties revisited the privacy values of the relevant statutes and regulations.
{"title":"Paranoid Androids: Free Speech Versus Privacy in America’s Resistance Against Intrusive Robocalls","authors":"Benjamin W. Cramer","doi":"10.1080/10811680.2023.2224711","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10811680.2023.2224711","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article discusses attempts by the American government to regulate robocalls – the automated and often fraudulent messages that are sent to citizens' phones by the billions every year. The earliest regulations against uninvited telephone solicitations were positioned by Congress and regulatory agencies as content-neutral protections of privacy in the home. This perspective aroused little controversy for years, but it has recently been overtaken by misleading free speech analyses demanded by robocall purveyors, who in turn use such arguments to chip away at privacy protections. This article argues that regulations and statutes intended to restrict robocalls were enacted with the intent of protecting consumer privacy over the speech-related rights of telemarketers. However, telemarketers have adopted the argument that such restrictions are unconstitutional infringements on free speech. The judiciary has responded with tortured attempts to balance privacy and speech, when that sort of analysis should not be necessary if all parties revisited the privacy values of the relevant statutes and regulations.","PeriodicalId":42622,"journal":{"name":"Communication Law and Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47970213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-15DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2023.2216192
Eric P. Robinson
Abstract Several defamation cases stemming from apparently irrational statements are testing the boundaries and standards of defamation law. The constitutional standard for defamation of public figures, actual malice, is based on the speaker’s knowledge that a statement is false or their reckless disregard for whether it is true. An irrational speaker who believes their statement is true confounds this test. This article delineates aspects of defamation law that are challenged by an irrational speaker and concludes with a recommendation to include a stronger “objective” element in the application of the actual malice standard to such cases.
{"title":"An Unreasonable Standard?: The Dilemma of Applying Actual Malice to Irrational Speakers","authors":"Eric P. Robinson","doi":"10.1080/10811680.2023.2216192","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10811680.2023.2216192","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Several defamation cases stemming from apparently irrational statements are testing the boundaries and standards of defamation law. The constitutional standard for defamation of public figures, actual malice, is based on the speaker’s knowledge that a statement is false or their reckless disregard for whether it is true. An irrational speaker who believes their statement is true confounds this test. This article delineates aspects of defamation law that are challenged by an irrational speaker and concludes with a recommendation to include a stronger “objective” element in the application of the actual malice standard to such cases.","PeriodicalId":42622,"journal":{"name":"Communication Law and Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41259803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-15DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2023.2212656
Erin K. Coyle, Ayla Oden
Abstract Originalism explores the intentions for, or understandings of, constitutional rights held by drafters of the Constitution or founders of the United States. This qualitative historical analysis evaluates the accuracy and adequacy of U.S. Supreme Court justices’ citations of founders’ intentions for, or understandings of, free press rights in opinions addressing journalists’ rights to cover and access court proceedings. Our research found that justices some times have accurately and adequately cited founders’ writings. Yet, justices too often have cited court opinions and other documents from the 1800s or 1900s to support their assertions about original intentions for or understandings of freedom of speech or of the press and First Amendment values. When referencing writings by founders, justices sometimes provided inadequate context. Such practices have harmed the accuracy of legal and historical records. To improve accuracy in future opinions, justices need to stop citing sections of previous opinions that lack accurate citation, adequate citation, or proper context.
{"title":"“The Gloss of History”: A Historical Analysis of U.S. Supreme Court Justices’ Framing of First Amendment Press Rights to Cover and Access Court Proceedings","authors":"Erin K. Coyle, Ayla Oden","doi":"10.1080/10811680.2023.2212656","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10811680.2023.2212656","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Originalism explores the intentions for, or understandings of, constitutional rights held by drafters of the Constitution or founders of the United States. This qualitative historical analysis evaluates the accuracy and adequacy of U.S. Supreme Court justices’ citations of founders’ intentions for, or understandings of, free press rights in opinions addressing journalists’ rights to cover and access court proceedings. Our research found that justices some times have accurately and adequately cited founders’ writings. Yet, justices too often have cited court opinions and other documents from the 1800s or 1900s to support their assertions about original intentions for or understandings of freedom of speech or of the press and First Amendment values. When referencing writings by founders, justices sometimes provided inadequate context. Such practices have harmed the accuracy of legal and historical records. To improve accuracy in future opinions, justices need to stop citing sections of previous opinions that lack accurate citation, adequate citation, or proper context.","PeriodicalId":42622,"journal":{"name":"Communication Law and Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47361981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2023.2193571
C. Carlson
Abstract In the United States, hate speech is protected by the First Amendment. This approach differs from most other Western democracies, many of which have enacted criminal or civil laws to punish those who publicly incite hatred toward groups based on their fixed identity characteristics such as race or ethnicity. Traditionally, U.S. jurisprudence and legal scholarship have relied on several discrete theories to justify this approach. These include the marketplace of ideas, political self-governance, personal liberty, the bellwether argument, the safety valve argument, and the reverse enforcement argument. For decades, these theories have been cited as the reasons why the United States allows hate speech. But do they still hold water? Social norms are changing. More Americans are beginning to understand how systems of oppression have shaped our laws and institutions. Young people are more willing now than they've been in the past to accept limits on our right to free expression to promote an inclusive society that welcomes diverse groups. Given these shifting norms, this article asks whether and to what extent each of these theories remains a viable justification for protecting hate speech. The result of this analysis is a comprehensive picture of how these ideas operate in our modern social, political, and media environments. With this clear-eyed view, we can more accurately weigh the potential benefits and drawbacks of our collective decision to protect hate speech in the United States.
{"title":"On Shaky Ground: Reconsidering the Justifications for First Amendment Protection of Hate Speech","authors":"C. Carlson","doi":"10.1080/10811680.2023.2193571","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10811680.2023.2193571","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the United States, hate speech is protected by the First Amendment. This approach differs from most other Western democracies, many of which have enacted criminal or civil laws to punish those who publicly incite hatred toward groups based on their fixed identity characteristics such as race or ethnicity. Traditionally, U.S. jurisprudence and legal scholarship have relied on several discrete theories to justify this approach. These include the marketplace of ideas, political self-governance, personal liberty, the bellwether argument, the safety valve argument, and the reverse enforcement argument. For decades, these theories have been cited as the reasons why the United States allows hate speech. But do they still hold water? Social norms are changing. More Americans are beginning to understand how systems of oppression have shaped our laws and institutions. Young people are more willing now than they've been in the past to accept limits on our right to free expression to promote an inclusive society that welcomes diverse groups. Given these shifting norms, this article asks whether and to what extent each of these theories remains a viable justification for protecting hate speech. The result of this analysis is a comprehensive picture of how these ideas operate in our modern social, political, and media environments. With this clear-eyed view, we can more accurately weigh the potential benefits and drawbacks of our collective decision to protect hate speech in the United States.","PeriodicalId":42622,"journal":{"name":"Communication Law and Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43640763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2023.2206382
V. Obia
Abstract This article considers the regulation of social media usage in Nigeria and Africa, drawing from ideas on critical political economy, securitization, and state–citizen distrust. Using a methodology that combines policy analysis, case studies, and qualitative reading of social media texts, it introduces for the first time the concept of regulatory annexation. This is the extension of standards, principles, and sanctions originally meant for one particular frame of reference to another. I establish the concept by drawing from case studies on broadcast media regulation to show that this is being mapped onto the emerging regulation of social media and Internet content in what I describe as the politics of regulation. I argue that regulatory annexation bears significant implications for the control of the entire media architecture and our understanding of new media regulation in the wider sense, both now and in the future.
{"title":"Regulatory Annexation: Extending Broadcast Media Regulation to Social Media and Internet Content","authors":"V. Obia","doi":"10.1080/10811680.2023.2206382","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10811680.2023.2206382","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article considers the regulation of social media usage in Nigeria and Africa, drawing from ideas on critical political economy, securitization, and state–citizen distrust. Using a methodology that combines policy analysis, case studies, and qualitative reading of social media texts, it introduces for the first time the concept of regulatory annexation. This is the extension of standards, principles, and sanctions originally meant for one particular frame of reference to another. I establish the concept by drawing from case studies on broadcast media regulation to show that this is being mapped onto the emerging regulation of social media and Internet content in what I describe as the politics of regulation. I argue that regulatory annexation bears significant implications for the control of the entire media architecture and our understanding of new media regulation in the wider sense, both now and in the future.","PeriodicalId":42622,"journal":{"name":"Communication Law and Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43366352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-29DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2023.2185405
Isabela M. Palmieri, Amanda Reid
Abstract An emerging change in judicial interpretation of copyright law threatens to unsettle well-settled expectations about the permissibility of embedding Internet content. Changes to the permissibility of embedding would inject uncertainty into a legal landscape that has proven foundational and has supported creators of all kinds. This jurisprudential shift would likely prompt social media platforms to alter the technological affordances offered to users, such as removing features that facilitate embedding. To preserve embedding affordances, this article offers a novel solution: model contractual language that platforms can adopt in their user agreements to license embedding and foster shareability. This article’s proposed licensing provisions would give clarity, precision, and predictability about the permissibility of embedding online, notwithstanding any change in judicial interpretations of copyright law.
{"title":"Copyright and Shareability: A Contractual Solution to Embedding via Social Media","authors":"Isabela M. Palmieri, Amanda Reid","doi":"10.1080/10811680.2023.2185405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10811680.2023.2185405","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract An emerging change in judicial interpretation of copyright law threatens to unsettle well-settled expectations about the permissibility of embedding Internet content. Changes to the permissibility of embedding would inject uncertainty into a legal landscape that has proven foundational and has supported creators of all kinds. This jurisprudential shift would likely prompt social media platforms to alter the technological affordances offered to users, such as removing features that facilitate embedding. To preserve embedding affordances, this article offers a novel solution: model contractual language that platforms can adopt in their user agreements to license embedding and foster shareability. This article’s proposed licensing provisions would give clarity, precision, and predictability about the permissibility of embedding online, notwithstanding any change in judicial interpretations of copyright law.","PeriodicalId":42622,"journal":{"name":"Communication Law and Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46591781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2023.2180266
Kamrul Faisal
Abstract Protection of privacy rights in the context of smart cities is novel, currently underdeveloped, and a hot topic worldwide. This article examines the purpose limitation of European data protection law in the context of smart cities. The “purpose limitation” principle of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) outlines the ways and means of processing personal data to protect individuals’ fundamental right to personal data protection and related risks. The principle, which empowers controller(s) to process data in a controlled manner, requires that controller(s) process personal data only after meeting two fundamental requirements: they must act on the requirements of purpose specification, and they must perform an “incompatibility test” while processing personal data for further purposes. This article aims to outline the permissible limits of the purpose limitation principle to pursue different purposes in the context of smart cities. Indeed, the principle only applies when controllers process personal data in smart cities. With the authority provided by the principle, data controllers may process personal data for primary and secondary purposes. However, processing purposes cannot go beyond defined restrictions. The study, which is conducted within the European legal framework, deploys a multimethod approach to address different parts of the research question.
{"title":"Applying the Purpose Limitation Principle in Smart-City Data-Processing Practices: A European Data Protection Law Perspective","authors":"Kamrul Faisal","doi":"10.1080/10811680.2023.2180266","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10811680.2023.2180266","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Protection of privacy rights in the context of smart cities is novel, currently underdeveloped, and a hot topic worldwide. This article examines the purpose limitation of European data protection law in the context of smart cities. The “purpose limitation” principle of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) outlines the ways and means of processing personal data to protect individuals’ fundamental right to personal data protection and related risks. The principle, which empowers controller(s) to process data in a controlled manner, requires that controller(s) process personal data only after meeting two fundamental requirements: they must act on the requirements of purpose specification, and they must perform an “incompatibility test” while processing personal data for further purposes. This article aims to outline the permissible limits of the purpose limitation principle to pursue different purposes in the context of smart cities. Indeed, the principle only applies when controllers process personal data in smart cities. With the authority provided by the principle, data controllers may process personal data for primary and secondary purposes. However, processing purposes cannot go beyond defined restrictions. The study, which is conducted within the European legal framework, deploys a multimethod approach to address different parts of the research question.","PeriodicalId":42622,"journal":{"name":"Communication Law and Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43161510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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