THE DE JURE OBJECTION AGAINST BELIEF IN MIRACLES

Abstract

Alvin Plantinga (1993a, 1993b, 2000) argues that de jure objections to theism depend on de facto objections: in order to say that belief in God is not warranted, one should first assume that this belief is false. Assuming Plantinga’s epistemology and his de facto/de jure distinction, In this essay, I argue that to show that belief in miracles is not warranted, one must suppose that belief in miracles is always false. Therefore, a person who holds a skeptical position regarding miracles must choose either to find evidence that all of the supposed miracles are false, or admit that one is assuming an areligious commitment as a starting point. The De Jure Objection Against Belief in Miracles 435 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 44, n. 4, pp. 434-452, Oct.-Dec. 2021.