{"title":"“Believing at will is possible”−or is it? Some remarks on Peels’s “truth depends on belief” cases and voluntariness","authors":"Claudio Cormick, Valeria Edelszten","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2023.v46n2.cv","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":": This article discusses Rik Peels's response to Williams's argument against voluntary belief. Williams argues that voluntary beliefs must be acquired independently of truth-considerations, so they cannot count as beliefs after all, since beliefs aim at truth. Peels attempted to reply by showing that in cases of self-fulfilling","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Manuscrito","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2023.v46n2.cv","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
: This article discusses Rik Peels's response to Williams's argument against voluntary belief. Williams argues that voluntary beliefs must be acquired independently of truth-considerations, so they cannot count as beliefs after all, since beliefs aim at truth. Peels attempted to reply by showing that in cases of self-fulfilling