Who governs? State versus jihadist political order in Somalia

Abstract

ABSTRACT Why has the Somali government failed to provide public order and essential services, while Al-Shabaab has had relatively more success in its governance objectives? To explain this variation in governance success, we offer a political economy explanation of wartime order-making based on the competing bargains that governing actors create to uphold their power. We identify two key political bargains in Somalia: (1) an elite deal, forged among members of the Somali Federal Government (SFG) and Federal Member States (FMS); and (2) a civilian deal, which Al-Shabaab directly establishes with the citizens under its control. Looking at these two deals, we examine how access to foreign support can affect a governing actor’s taxation impetus, and subsequently its commitment to governance. Our results reveal that not only can foreign support undermine the normal taxation-protection relationship between citizen and state, but it can also inadvertently provide jihadists with an opportunity to establish alternative forms of order.