Collateralized Loan Obligations: A Primer

IF 0.7 Q4 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Applied Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2022-09-29 DOI:10.1111/jacf.12514
John Martin, Akin Sayrak
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Abstract

In recent years, collateralized loan obligations, or CLOs, have become the largest nonbank lender in the U.S. This added source of financing, which lies outside the purview of banking regulation, has given rise to the concept of a “shadow banking system.” And the lack of transparency and regulatory oversight of CLOs and shadow banking have led to concern that this growing market might contribute to a financial crisis similar to the GFC of 2007-2008, which was triggered by the securitization of subprime mortgages.

The authors provide a first look at CLOs and their distinctive features as a securitization vehicle that allowed them not only to weather the 2007-2008 financial crisis but to thrive in the post-GFC world. Though the collateral performance of CLOs suffered during GFC, their recovery was faster and stronger than that of mortgage-backed CDOs. Furthermore, the return performance of CLO tranches has in general also been superior to the returns from the comparable leveraged loans upon which CLOs are based—though there are difficulties in measuring returns for CLO tranches since transaction prices are not public information, especially in the case of the equity tranche.

After describing their remarkable growth, the authors focus on two fundamental risks posed by CLOs. The first risk relates to the reliability of credit ratings—though it's important to note that the extensive due diligence behind leverage loans versus mortgage loans effectively reduces CLO investors' reliance on the rating agencies. The second risk relates to the systematic risk borne by the CLO investors, which is lower than that of MBS if only by virtue of the fact that CLOs are based on shorter-term floating rate instruments than 30-year mortgages. More important, what happens in most MBS, CLO managers can actively manage their loan portfolios in the secondary markets, and effective and active management of collateral works to limit both default risk and the possible effects of systemic shocks.

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贷款抵押债券:入门
近年来,抵押贷款凭证(clo)已成为美国最大的非银行贷款机构。这种不受银行监管的新增融资来源,催生了“影子银行体系”的概念。clo和影子银行缺乏透明度和监管,这让人们担心,这个不断增长的市场可能会引发类似2007-2008年全球金融危机的金融危机,那次危机是由次级抵押贷款证券化引发的。作者首次介绍了clo及其作为证券化工具的独特特征,这些特征不仅使clo经受住了2007-2008年的金融危机,而且在全球金融危机后的世界中蓬勃发展。尽管clo的抵押品表现在全球金融危机期间受到了影响,但它们的复苏速度比抵押贷款支持的cdo更快、更强劲。此外,CLO部分的回报表现总体上也优于CLO所基于的可比杠杆贷款的回报——尽管由于交易价格不是公开信息,特别是在股权部分的情况下,衡量CLO部分的回报存在困难。在描述了clo的显著增长之后,作者将重点放在了clo带来的两个基本风险上。第一个风险与信用评级的可靠性有关——尽管需要注意的是,杠杆贷款与抵押贷款背后的广泛尽职调查有效地降低了CLO投资者对评级机构的依赖。第二个风险与CLO投资者承担的系统风险有关,如果仅仅因为CLO是基于比30年期抵押贷款更短的浮动利率工具这一事实,CLO的风险就低于MBS。更重要的是,在大多数MBS中,CLO管理者可以在二级市场上积极管理他们的贷款组合,有效和积极地管理抵押品可以限制违约风险和系统性冲击的可能影响。
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