Thomas Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Human Act by Can Laurens Löwe (review)

Abstract

heteronomous, because they are dependent on the moral outlook of others, and (2) making developing moral agents superficial, because they focus on how they appear to others rather than how they really are. Judged by its own aim, this book is a success: it provides a plausible reconstruction of the nature of shame in Aristotle and its function in the habituation of virtue in developing moral agents. It is also enviably clear and well-organized, with an adept balance of textual interpretation, engagement with contemporary secondary sources, and an intuitive presentation of a concept that would operate very differently in the original Greek context of Aristotle’s thought than we are likely to view it today. In some ways, however, the narrow focus of this book works to its detriment, as there are many topics that the reader might like to see discussed more thoroughly. For instance, the discussion of moral education in the Politics is only passingly addressed, though Jimenez’s reliance on other texts (such as Rhetoric II.6 and Metaphysics IX.8) shows that the work is not restricted to being a treatment of the Nicomachean Ethics account specifically. The Eudemian Ethics is assumed to be mostly consonant with the NE and is therefore used largely as a resource for additional textual support to supplement the NE. It is a striking omission that Jimenez does not discuss the inclusion of shame as its own virtue in the EE’s table of virtues and vices at 1221a1: this is at least a prima facie departure from NE IV.9’s treatment of shame as merely a protovirtue, and calls into question the methodology of pulling from both the NE and EE together to defend a single interpretation. Moreover, if shame is a real virtue in the EE, this would seem to complicate chapter 6’s thesis that shame ceases to be a praiseworthy state once agents develop into fully virtuous adults (for an excellent treatment of this topic, see Christopher Raymond, “Shame and Virtue in Aristotle,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 53 [2017]: 111–61). As to the sui generis nature of shame in Aristotle’s ethics, one might have questions about the assimilation of shame and honor in chapter 5 (concepts that Aristotle treats distinctly in the NE and EE) and wonder why other states like friendship or pride could not operate in a similar way to shame in moral development or hold a similar mixed-state role in Aristotle’s moral psychology. Despite these lingering questions, Jimenez’s book does an admirable job of doing what it sets out to do. It deserves a space on the shelf of any scholar interested in Aristotle’s moral psychology. J e r r y G r e e n University of Central Oklahoma