Thinking, Guessing, and Believing

IF 1.4 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Philosophers' Imprint Pub Date : 2022-04-19 DOI:10.3998/phimp.2123
Ben Holguín
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引用次数: 20

Abstract

This paper defends the view, put roughly, that to think that p is to guess that p is the answer to the question at hand, and that to think that p rationally is for one’s guess to that question to be in a certain sense non-arbitrary. Some theses that will be argued for along the way include: that thinking is question-sensitive and, correspondingly, that ‘thinks’ is context-sensitive; that it can be rational to think that p while having arbitrarily low credence that p; that, nonetheless, rational thinking is closed under entailment; that thinking does not supervene on credence; and that in many cases what one thinks on certain matters is, in a very literal sense, a choice. Finally, since there are strong reasons to believe that thinking just is believing, there are strong reasons to think that all this goes for belief as well.
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思考、猜测和相信
本文大致地为这样一种观点辩护,即认为p就是猜测p是手头问题的答案,而理性地认为p就是在某种意义上对这个问题的猜测是非任意的。在这一过程中,一些论点包括:思维是问题敏感的,相应地,“思考”是上下文敏感的;认为p是合理的,而对p的信任度任意低;尽管如此,理性思维在蕴涵下是封闭的;这种想法并不依赖于信任;在许多情况下,从字面意义上讲,一个人对某些事情的想法是一种选择。最后,既然有充分的理由相信思考就是相信,那么也有充分的原因认为所有这些都是为了相信。
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来源期刊
Philosophers' Imprint
Philosophers' Imprint PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
7.10%
发文量
27
审稿时长
20 weeks
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