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Desire 欲望
IF 1.4 1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2022-09-01 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.2116
Kyle Blumberg, J. Hawthorne
In this paper, we present two puzzles involving desire reports concerning series of events. What does a person want to happen in the first event – is it the event with the highest expected return, or the event that is the initial part of the best series? We show that existing approaches fail to resolve the puzzles around this question and develop a novel account of our own. Our semantics is built around three ideas. First, we propose that desire ascriptions are evaluated relative to a contextually supplied set of propositions, or alternatives. The semantic value of an ascription ‘S wants p’ is determined by S's preference ordering over these alternatives. Second, we propose that desire reports carry a requirement to the effect that the prejacent of the ascription must be suitably related to the background set of alternatives. Finally, we suggest that desire reports carry a dominance condition concerning the subject's ranking of the alternatives. Overall, we argue that our theory provides us with an elegant resolution of our puzzles, and yields a promising approach to desire.
在本文中,我们提出了两个谜题,涉及一系列事件的欲望报告。一个人希望在第一个事件中发生什么?是期望回报最高的事件,还是最好系列的最初部分?我们表明,现有的方法无法解决围绕这个问题的困惑,也无法发展出我们自己的新颖叙述。我们的语义是围绕三个想法构建的。首先,我们提出,欲望归属是相对于上下文提供的命题集或备选方案来评估的。一个归属“S想要p”的语义值是由S对这些备选方案的偏好排序决定的。其次,我们提出愿望报告有一个要求,即归属的前提必须与备选方案的背景集适当相关。最后,我们建议欲望报告带有关于受试者对备选方案的排名的支配条件。总的来说,我们认为我们的理论为我们提供了一个优雅的谜题解决方案,并产生了一种很有前途的欲望方法。
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引用次数: 3
Embedded Epistemic Instrumentalism: An Account of Epistemic Normativity 嵌入的认识工具主义:对认识规范性的一种解释
IF 1.4 1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2022-08-29 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.745
J. Willoughby
We are bombarded with epistemic norms. Respect your evidence. Don’t believe in contradictions. Don’t arbitrarily change beliefs. But how do such norms get their normative force? Why should we respect our evidence, for example?  In this paper I offer a familiar type of answer, epistemic instrumentalism. Epistemic instrumentalism holds that epistemic norms get their normative force by being useful. You should respect your evidence because it will help you achieve some valuable ends. This answer, while familiar, is not very popular. There is a widely accepted objection to epistemic instrumentalism, the too few reasons objection. The objection looms so large that standard developments of instrumentalism have become bloated with philosophical machinery to respond to it. This does a disservice to epistemic instrumentalism. Rather than focusing completely on the objection, I focus on describing a simple model for how conforming to the epistemic norms is broadly useful. Once I describe the simple model, the too few reasons objection becomes much easier to answer. This strategy results in a well-motivated philosophical theory based on uncontroversial facts that has many advantages over rival theories.   
我们被认知规范轰炸。尊重你的证据。不要相信矛盾。不要随意改变信仰。但这些规范是如何获得其规范力的呢?例如,我们为什么要尊重我们的证据?在这篇论文中,我提供了一种熟悉的答案,即认识工具主义。认识工具主义认为,认识规范是通过有用而获得规范力的。你应该尊重你的证据,因为它会帮助你达到一些有价值的目的。这个答案虽然很熟悉,但并不太受欢迎。人们普遍反对认识工具主义,反对的理由太少。反对声音如此之大,以至于工具主义的标准发展已经膨胀为哲学机器来回应它。这对认识工具主义是有害的。我没有完全关注反对意见,而是专注于描述一个简单的模型,说明遵守认识规范是如何广泛有用的。一旦我描述了这个简单的模型,反对理由太少就更容易回答了。这种策略产生了一种基于无争议事实的积极性很高的哲学理论,与竞争对手的理论相比有很多优势。
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引用次数: 4
Hume on Temporal Experience and the Fiction of Time Without Change 休谟论时间经验与时间不变的小说
IF 1.4 1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2022-07-08 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.1626
Miren Boehm, Maité Cruz
Hume identifies the idea of time with the idea of succession and denies that we have or even can have an idea of time without change.  He argues that our idea of time is not applicable to unchanging objects and that unchanging objects cannot be said to endure.  At the center of Hume’s treatment of time is a fiction that is supposed to explain how we falsely believe that we can form an idea of time without change and how we consider unchanging objects to endure. The literature has struggled to make sense of Hume’s riddled arguments and obscure claims.  Against the background of Hume’s intention to establish a new foundation for the sciences, we consider the most important and controversial texts from the perspective of Hume’s likely target: the idea of absolute time.  From this perspective, we offer important insights into the questions that have dominated the literature.
休谟将时间的概念与继承的概念相结合,并否认我们拥有甚至可以拥有不变的时间概念。他认为,我们的时间观念不适用于不变的物体,也不能说不变的物体是持久的。休谟处理时间的核心是一部小说,该小说旨在解释我们如何错误地相信我们可以形成一种不变的时间观念,以及我们如何认为不变的物体是可以忍受的。文学界一直在努力理解休谟千疮百孔的论点和晦涩难懂的主张。在休谟意图为科学建立一个新的基础的背景下,我们从休谟可能的目标——绝对时间思想的角度来考虑最重要和最具争议的文本。从这个角度来看,我们对文学中占主导地位的问题提供了重要的见解。
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引用次数: 0
Darwin's Causal Argument Against Creationism 达尔文反对神创论的因果论证
IF 1.4 1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2022-07-08 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.930
Hayley Clatterbuck
In the Origin, Darwin forwards two incompatible lines of attack on special creationism. First, he argues that imperfect or functionless traits are evidence against design. Second, he argues that since special creationism can be made compatible with any observation, it is unscientific and explanatorily vacuous. In later works, Darwin shifts to an argument that he finds much more persuasive and which would undermine theistic evolutionism as well. He argues that variation is random with respect to selection and that this demonstrates that there is no design in the biological world. I examine why Darwin found the argument from independence of variation and selection more compelling than the argument from imperfection. I argue that Darwin utilized general principles of causal inference, akin to those used in modern causal modeling, to rule out any unified cause behind the evolutionary process. 
在《起源》一书中,达尔文对特殊创造论提出了两条互不相容的攻击路线。首先,他认为不完美或无功能的特征是反对设计的证据。其次,他认为,由于特殊的创造论可以与任何观察相兼容,它是不科学的,而且在解释上是空洞的。在后来的著作中,达尔文转向了一个他认为更有说服力的论点,这也会破坏有神论进化论。他认为,在选择方面,变异是随机的,这表明生物学世界中没有设计。我研究了为什么达尔文发现从变异和选择的独立性出发的论点比从不完美出发的论点更有说服力。我认为达尔文利用了因果推理的一般原理,类似于现代因果建模中使用的原理,来排除进化过程背后的任何统一原因。
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引用次数: 0
Too Easy, Too Good, Too Late? 太容易,太好,太迟?
IF 1.4 1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2022-07-07 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.1336
A. Dietz
Plausibly, one important part of a good life is doing work that makes a contribution, or a positive difference to the world. In this paper, however, I explore contribution pessimism, the view that people will not always have adequate opportunities for making contributions. I distinguish between three interestingly different and at least initially plausible reasons why this view might be true: in slogan form, things might become too easy, they might become too good, or we might be too late. Now, one response to these problems might be to deliberately attempt to undo them. However, I claim that this solution is intuitively misguided, and argue that explaining this supports a holistic approach to the value of contributions. Finally, I argue that if contribution pessimism is correct, it could provide an explanation of some widely held intuitions about issues in population ethics, with implications about the practical issue of how much priority we should give to addressing risks of human extinction.
似乎,美好生活的一个重要组成部分是做一些对世界有贡献或积极影响的工作。然而,在本文中,我探讨了贡献悲观主义,认为人们并不总是有足够的机会做出贡献。我区分了三种有趣的、不同的、至少在最初看似合理的理由来解释为什么这种观点可能是正确的:以口号的形式,事情可能变得太容易了,它们可能变得太好了,或者我们可能太迟了。现在,对这些问题的一种回应可能是故意试图消除它们。然而,我认为这种解决方案在直觉上是错误的,并认为解释这一点支持对贡献价值的整体方法。最后,我认为,如果贡献悲观主义是正确的,它可以解释一些关于人口伦理问题的普遍直觉,并暗示我们应该在多大程度上优先考虑解决人类灭绝的风险。
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引用次数: 0
Does Compositionality Entail Complexity? 复合性包含复杂性吗?
IF 1.4 1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2022-06-21 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.2977
John A. Keller
Propositions are (generally taken to be) the semantic values of declarative sentences in context. There is a long history of thinking that an important reason for taking propositions to be structured stems from the fact that the semantic values of such sentences are (typically) compositionally determined. In this paper, I argue that compositionality does not entail, nor provide good evidence for, the claim that propositions are structured. I go on to argue that there is no additional feature of declarative sentences—for example, that they are true or false—that, in conjunction with compositionality, entails or provides good evidence for the claim that the semantic values of those sentences are complex.
命题通常被认为是陈述句在语境中的语义值。有一个很长的思考历史,认为命题是结构化的一个重要原因源于这样一个事实,即这些句子的语义值(通常)是由组成决定的。在本文中,我认为组合性并不意味着命题是结构化的,也没有提供很好的证据。我继续论证,陈述句没有附加的特征——例如,它们是真或假——与组合性结合在一起,为这些句子的语义值是复杂的主张带来或提供了很好的证据。
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引用次数: 0
Old Bad Attitudes 旧的坏态度
IF 1.4 1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2022-05-17 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.2606
R. Pasnau
The systematic study of male misogyny began with Christine de Pizan at the start of the fifteenth century. Although her work has generally been neglected within the history of philosophy, her ideas illuminate many questions of pressing current philosophical concern, including the nature of epistemic injustice, the prospects for an individualistic methodology in social theory, and the epistemology of disagreement.
对男性厌女症的系统研究始于十五世纪初的克莉丝汀·德·皮赞。尽管她的作品在哲学史上通常被忽视,但她的思想阐明了当前哲学关注的许多问题,包括认识论不公正的性质、社会理论中个人主义方法论的前景,以及分歧的认识论。
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引用次数: 2
Essentialist Non-Reductivism 实在说Non-Reductivism
IF 1.4 1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2022-05-16 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.1205
Taylor-Grey Miller
According to many contemporary metaphysicians, we ought to theorize in terms of grounding because of its promise to explicate the idea of reality having a layered structure. However, a tension emerges when one combines the layered structure view with the view that higher-level facts are not reducible to lower level facts. This tension emerges from two problems. The first problem arises from the fact that grounding explanations entail true universal generalizations. In order to satisfy this constraint, we will face serious pressure to make sure the entities involved in the grounded facts are appropriately connected to the entities involved in the grounding facts, otherwise the generalizations associated with those grounding claims will come out false. However, ensuring the appropriate connections seemingly leaves no way for the non-reductivist to fully squeeze out reference to higher-level entities as we descend the levels of ground. This threatens the result that some higher-level facts must be taken as fundamental, which the non-reductivist cannot accept. I’ll argue that we can resolve the tension by taking the connections at issue to be essentially true. We can call this view essentialist non-reductivism. One significant upshot of the argument is that we can see not only that essentialist non-reductivism successfully resolves the tension, but that in principle no better solution could be offered.
根据许多当代形而上学家的观点,我们应该从基础的角度进行理论化,因为它有望解释现实具有分层结构的概念。然而,当人们将分层结构观点与更高层次的事实不能简化为更低层次的事实的观点结合起来时,矛盾就出现了。这种紧张源于两个问题。第一个问题源于这样一个事实,即基础解释需要真正的普遍概括。为了满足这一约束,我们将面临巨大的压力,必须确保基础事实中涉及的实体与基础事实中涉及的实体有适当的联系,否则与这些基础主张相关的概括就会出现错误。然而,确保适当的联系似乎没有办法让非还原主义者在我们下降地面层次时完全挤出对更高层次实体的引用。这就威胁到必须把某些更高层次的事实当作根本的结果,而这是非还原论者不能接受的。我想说的是,我们可以通过让有争议的联系本质上为真来解决这种矛盾。我们可以称这种观点为本质主义非还原论。这个论点的一个重要结论是,我们不仅可以看到本质主义的非还原论成功地解决了这种紧张关系,而且原则上也没有更好的解决方案。
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引用次数: 1
The Intransparency of Political Legitimacy 政治合法性的不透明
IF 1.4 1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2022-05-05 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.1533
Matthias Brinkmann
Some moral value istransparent just in case an agent with average mental capacities can feasiblycome to know whether some entity does, or does not, possess that value. In thispaper, I consider whether legitimacy—that is, the property of exercises ofpolitical power to be (at least) permissible—is transparent. Implicit in muchtheorising about legitimacy is the idea that it is. I will offer twocounter-arguments. First, injustice can defeat legitimacy, and injustice can beintransparent. Second, legitimacy can play a critical function in our practicalthought, which sometimes requires intransparency.
一些道德价值观不仅仅是为了让一个心智能力一般的代理人能够知道某个实体是否拥有这种价值观。在本文中,我考虑合法性——也就是说,行使政治权力的性质(至少)是允许的——是否是透明的。在许多关于合法性的理论中,隐含着这样一种观点:合法性。我将提出两个相反的论点。首先,不公正可以击败合法性,而不公正可以是透明的。其次,合法性可以在我们的实践思维中发挥关键作用,这有时需要内部的谨慎。
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引用次数: 0
The Specious Present in English Philosophy 1749-1785: Theories and Experiments in Hartley, Priestley, Tucker, and Watson 1749-1785年英国哲学中的幽灵:哈特利、普里斯特利、塔克和华生的理论与实验
IF 1.4 1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2022-05-04 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.1281
E. Thomas
Drawing on the 1870s-1880s work of Shadworth Hodgson and Robert Kelly, William James famously characterised the specious present as ‘the short duration of which we are immediately and incessantly sensible’. Literature on the pre-history of late nineteenth century specious present theories clusters around the work of John Locke and Thomas Reid, and I argue it is incomplete. The pre-history is missing an inter-connected group of English philosophers writing on the present between 1749 and 1785: David Hartley, Joseph Priestley, Abraham Tucker, and William Watson. With William Herschel, Watson even conducted experiments to determine the limits of human temporal perception. These thinkers do not appear in the specious present literature, or broader historical surveys of temporal consciousness. Yet this paper shows they each held specious present theories, exploring those theories and placing them within each figure’s system. It argues all their work deserves further study; contextualises the nineteenth century theories of James and others; pushes back the start date of the history of experimental psychology on time perception by decades; and explores a possible line of influence from Hartley to Hodgson.
威廉·詹姆斯(William James)借鉴了沙德沃斯·霍奇森(Shadworth Hodgson)和罗伯特·凯利(Robert Kelly。关于十九世纪晚期前史的文献,似是而非的现有理论围绕着约翰·洛克和托马斯·里德的作品,我认为这是不完整的。《史前史》缺少了一批在1749年至1785年间撰写关于当下的相互关联的英国哲学家:大卫·哈特利、约瑟夫·普里斯特利、亚伯拉罕·塔克和威廉·沃森。与威廉·赫歇尔一起,沃森甚至进行了实验来确定人类时间感知的极限。这些思想家没有出现在似是而非的当代文学中,也没有出现在对时间意识的更广泛的历史调查中。然而,本文表明,他们每个人都持有似是而非的现有理论,探索这些理论,并将其置于每个人物的系统中。它认为他们所有的工作都值得进一步研究;将詹姆斯等人的十九世纪理论置于语境之中;将时间感知实验心理学的历史起点向后推了几十年;并探讨了从哈特利到霍奇森的一条可能的影响线。
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引用次数: 1
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