Open science and epistemic pluralism: A tale of many perils and some opportunities

Abstract

Broadly, open science can be defined as “transparent and accessible knowledge that is shared and developed through collaborative networks” (Vicente-Saez & Martinez-Fuentes, 2018, p. 434). Hence, it refers to a broad range of practices aimed at detecting scientific fraud and enhancing transparency and replicability of research. In their focal article, Guzzo et al., (2022) highlighted several tensions between these values and applied research in organizations. In this commentary, we develop a slightly different argument: the open science movement, as a direct offspring of (post)positivist research paradigms1, has the potential to stifle epistemological and scientific pluralism and reproduce historical scientific hierarchies it purports to redress. In doing so, we distinguish between the spirit of open science (i.e., promoting participation, transparency, and access to science) and its implementations (e.g., OSF badges, TOP guidelines, and multi-laboratory research, but also sexist attacks on social media and podcasts by other scholars in the field [e.g., the Twitter pile-on in November 2021 regarding Roxanne Felig and her coauthors’ paper], and a general disregard of feminist epistemologies; Brabeck, 2021). In the first part of this commentary, we focus on open science’s ideals and examine a few unstated assumptions, advancing a set of equally valid assumptions based on constructionist thought, and then we discuss how unchecked implementations of open science practices can marginalize scholars that do not subscribe to its epistemic premises. We conclude with a few thoughts to improve the open science movement.