The Russian Political Regime: A Flexibility Test

Abstract

The past 20 years under the rule of Vladimir Putin, his close circle, and his enormous number of supporters at all levels of the government provide an instructive example of how to take advantage of public and private resources and the institutional characteristics of electoral authoritarianism. In spite of the political crisis of 2011 and 2012, we cannot say that this regime has experienced serious difficulties or faced dangerous challenges over the 20 years of its existence. And no matter how much opposition publicists are focusing on signs of a crisis, it’s hard to agree with them right now: The regime is actively and quite flexibly reacting to changes in the political and, specifically, electoral situation in the country as it prepares for the 2021 parliamentary elections and, most importantly, the 2024 presidential election, which marks the end of Putin’s second of “two terms in a row” enshrined in the Constitution. The problem, of course, is not that figures in the regime have made a thorough study of specialists’ work on electoral authoritarianism or that they consult with them, while the opposition does not. They are merely opportunistically and deviously seeking and finding newer and newer ways to apply “rules to rule by” in changing circumstances. Their efforts have taken the shape of an institutionalized form of a personalist electoral authoritarian regime. If it were more profitable to cancel the elections, or introduce (one-)party rule, or even establish a military dictatorship, then the corresponding political system would be the side effect of their activities. Control over state resources is the basic condition for endlessly prolonging rule. Even though there have been isolated glitches caused by assorted interests within the ruling group and the government and problems with coordination, a huge advantage in resources over other political groups has given the regime the chance to fix its errors: All it has to do is avoid critical strategic miscalculations—everything else can be fixed. In principle, the