Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/10611428.2022.2135300
V. Slobodchikov, I. Korolkova, A. A. Ostapenko, M. Zakharchenko, Y. V. Shestun, S. Rybakov, D. Moiseyev, S. N. Korotkikh
ABSTRACT The authors describe the factors that are destroying the Russian education system, a strategy and tactics for overcoming the crisis, as well as model ideas about the future of education in Russia.
摘要：作者描述了破坏俄罗斯教育系统的因素，克服危机的战略和策略，以及对俄罗斯教育未来的模式构想。
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Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/10611428.2022.2135309
T. Vorozheikina
alternative political models and programs and the private establishment of opposition political parties, this is not merely because there is a general feeling of apathy toward public affairs and a loss of that sense of higher responsibility; in other words, it is not just a consequence of the general demoralization. There is also a bit of healthy social instinct at work in this attitude. It is as if people sensed intuitively that ‘nothing is what it seems any longer,’ as the saying goes, and that from now on, therefore, things must be done entirely differently as well.” 8 experience of showed that self-organization is possible at the level of local urban communities. Society, which appeared from the outside to have made its peace with the tightening of the authoritarian state at all levels, remained free in reality. Its active members were prepared to take advantage of this freedom by at a minimum protecting their urban, seemingly nonpolitical rights and becoming potential agents of change capable of transforming society from a crowd of inhabitants into a community of citizens united by a common cause.”
{"title":"What Is the State of Russian Society After 20 Years of Putin?","authors":"T. Vorozheikina","doi":"10.1080/10611428.2022.2135309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10611428.2022.2135309","url":null,"abstract":"alternative political models and programs and the private establishment of opposition political parties, this is not merely because there is a general feeling of apathy toward public affairs and a loss of that sense of higher responsibility; in other words, it is not just a consequence of the general demoralization. There is also a bit of healthy social instinct at work in this attitude. It is as if people sensed intuitively that ‘nothing is what it seems any longer,’ as the saying goes, and that from now on, therefore, things must be done entirely differently as well.” 8 experience of showed that self-organization is possible at the level of local urban communities. Society, which appeared from the outside to have made its peace with the tightening of the authoritarian state at all levels, remained free in reality. Its active members were prepared to take advantage of this freedom by at a minimum protecting their urban, seemingly nonpolitical rights and becoming potential agents of change capable of transforming society from a crowd of inhabitants into a community of citizens united by a common cause.”","PeriodicalId":85479,"journal":{"name":"Russian social science review : a journal of translations","volume":"63 1","pages":"352 - 370"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45521897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/10611428.2022.2134720
N. Zubarevich
The crisis is now in its fourth year and has become a difficult challenge for the system of governance overall and for relationships between the center and the regions. All levels of government have had to adapt to shrinking financial resources. But adaptation requires an assessment of how long the crisis will last, the risks connected with it, and the most likely trajectory it will take as it ends, be it stagnation or moderate or rapid growth. With dwindling resources, the federal government will have to review priorities and the degree of support for regions. It will also have to seek out new sources of income and stimulate drivers of growth. Finally, it will have to change the system of governance to make it more effective. How can these tasks be resolved?
{"title":"The Center–Regions Relationship: What Has Changed in Four Years of Crisis?","authors":"N. Zubarevich","doi":"10.1080/10611428.2022.2134720","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10611428.2022.2134720","url":null,"abstract":"The crisis is now in its fourth year and has become a difficult challenge for the system of governance overall and for relationships between the center and the regions. All levels of government have had to adapt to shrinking financial resources. But adaptation requires an assessment of how long the crisis will last, the risks connected with it, and the most likely trajectory it will take as it ends, be it stagnation or moderate or rapid growth. With dwindling resources, the federal government will have to review priorities and the degree of support for regions. It will also have to seek out new sources of income and stimulate drivers of growth. Finally, it will have to change the system of governance to make it more effective. How can these tasks be resolved?","PeriodicalId":85479,"journal":{"name":"Russian social science review : a journal of translations","volume":"63 1","pages":"245 - 258"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46818815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/10611428.2022.2135304
Karina Pipiia
The definition of the term “generation” continues to be among the most lacking in conceptual clarity, and researchers and scholars tend to avoid it. Yet generations are just as important as social classes and genders in explaining individual and group differences in culture, interests, and behavior. The sociological approach to analyzing the phenomenon of generations is represented by K. Mannheim, who proposed the idea of “social location” as the most important characteristic of a generation, based on which “a group of individuals share a common location in the social and historical process, and thereby they are limited to a specific range of potential experience, predisposing them for a certain characteristic mode of thought (our emphasis— Author) and experience.” Four basic approaches have been defined for the periodization and study of generations. They are: (a) genealogical kinship (generations of children and parents); (b) age cohorts (young and older generations); (c) periods of life and socialization; (d) historical periods (the 1968 generation, the postwar generation). Often these principles for categorizing generations are combined. Under the approach of the Russian sociologist Yu. Levada, the twentieth-century generational sequence in Russia numbered six generations. This approach was based on combining the concept of the significance of historical events (and their related processes) with age. Considering the sample design in Russia-wide mass surveys and natural population decline, it should be noted that the first three generations, born before 1929, are for practical purposes unrepresented at present. The analysis is therefore limited to the generations of the Thaw, Stagnation, and Perestroika out of the six types originally proposed by Levada (Table 1).
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Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/10611428.2022.2135310
S. Ryzhenkov
The past 20 years under the rule of Vladimir Putin, his close circle, and his enormous number of supporters at all levels of the government provide an instructive example of how to take advantage of public and private resources and the institutional characteristics of electoral authoritarianism. In spite of the political crisis of 2011 and 2012, we cannot say that this regime has experienced serious difficulties or faced dangerous challenges over the 20 years of its existence. And no matter how much opposition publicists are focusing on signs of a crisis, it’s hard to agree with them right now: The regime is actively and quite flexibly reacting to changes in the political and, specifically, electoral situation in the country as it prepares for the 2021 parliamentary elections and, most importantly, the 2024 presidential election, which marks the end of Putin’s second of “two terms in a row” enshrined in the Constitution. The problem, of course, is not that figures in the regime have made a thorough study of specialists’ work on electoral authoritarianism or that they consult with them, while the opposition does not. They are merely opportunistically and deviously seeking and finding newer and newer ways to apply “rules to rule by” in changing circumstances. Their efforts have taken the shape of an institutionalized form of a personalist electoral authoritarian regime. If it were more profitable to cancel the elections, or introduce (one-)party rule, or even establish a military dictatorship, then the corresponding political system would be the side effect of their activities. Control over state resources is the basic condition for endlessly prolonging rule. Even though there have been isolated glitches caused by assorted interests within the ruling group and the government and problems with coordination, a huge advantage in resources over other political groups has given the regime the chance to fix its errors: All it has to do is avoid critical strategic miscalculations—everything else can be fixed. In principle, the
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Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/10611428.2022.2134717
O. L. Rybakovskii
ABSTRACT This article assesses the likelihood that the objectives for replacement of the population established by the President of the Russian Federation in the May 2018 Decree [1] (hereinafter the “Decree”) can be achieved. For each of the objectives, the author outlines the current situation, current trends, and the most likely outcomes. He surfaces the factors that either contribute to a solution to the indicated problems or aggravate them. In particular, any growth in or even simple maintenance of the current number of births will be hindered by the constantly decreasing number of women of active reproductive age (25–39 years of age) that has been observed since 2015. Women in this age range account for four-fifths of all births. 1 1. The study was performed with the financial support of RFBR, project no. 19-011-00626.All of the indicators that have not been footnoted in the article were calculated based on the Rosstat database: http//cbsd.gks.ru [2]. The number of women in this group will decline from 17.9 million in 2015 to 15.0 million in 2024 and then to 12.0 million in 2030. The task of reducing mortality from diseases of the circulatory system and from cancer will be hampered by the aging of the population; the inability of many members of the population to quickly break bad habits, such as smoking and regularly consuming alcohol to excess; the poor quality of consumed food and alcohol; and so on. In addition, in the future, as life expectancy (LE) increases in Russia, those who have been cured of diseases associated with other major causes of death will eventually begin to die from diseases of the circulatory system or from cancer. These diseases are the leading causes of death in countries with high LE. The author draws the following basic conclusions: It will be practically impossible to achieve the goal of “increasing the population of the country” (in accordance with the Decree) by reproduction alone in the near future. It will be necessary to achieve a balance by both increasing the birth rate and encouraging migration in order to solve the general demographic problems facing Russia (ensuring the growth of the country’s population; optimizing the distribution of the population across its territory in order to serve not only the economic but also the geopolitical interests of the state; compensating for volatile shifts in the country’s demographic structure; and so on).
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Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/10611428.2022.2135319
N. Petrov
the replacement of the chief and follow-up purges; Moscow, with wrangles in the context of agency conflicts; and Kurgan and Samara oblasts.
局长的更换和后续的清洗;莫斯科，在机构冲突的背景下争吵不休;以及库尔干和萨马拉州。
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Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/10611428.2022.2134718
E. Avraamova, D. Loginov
ABSTRACT The article considers the adaptive behavior of Russians during 2015–2017 (a period that is often referred to as the “new reality”) by analyzing how Russians perceive the prospects of economic development, and the available resources they can use to formulate their strategies for adapting to the new conditions. We likewise describe the available resources that Russians can bring to bear on the situation and the results of their efforts. We used the database produced by the monitoring study “The Social Well-Being of the Population,” which was conducted by the Institute of Social Analysis and Forecasting, (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration) via eight rounds of annual representative population surveys with a sample size of 1,600 respondents per each round. The population is not alarmed at the current economic situation, but has little hope for improvement. Most people have adapted not by actively maintaining or improving their material well-being, but by becoming inured to lower consumer standards. Only a fifth of the population has the necessary resources to develop a variety of adaptive strategies, and twice as many people have low resource potential. Apart from restricting their spending, people in the low resource group also turned to the use of private household plots. A third of the population implemented active forms of adaptation associated with a variety of resources.
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Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/10611428.2022.2134713
P.A.K.
Kremlin politics may be as opaque today as in 1939, but the existential problems the regime confronts are not difficult to discern. This was true before February 24, 2022, and it is true today, but we can now begin to consider how Russia’s attempted conquest (or reconquest) of Ukraine might fit into that larger picture. It’s not only about NATO expansion or offended pride. Arguably, both situations have been made worse for Russia, at least in the near term. The same will almost certainly be true of the war’s effects on Russia’s domestic challenges: demographic decline, brain drain, economic stagnation, the solipsism of a personalist regime. These issues are discussed in the articles gathered in this issue of the Russian Social Science Review, all of which were written before the 2022 invasion but (with one exception) after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and backing of Donbas separatists. The longer-term course of events is beyond our ken, but the impact of the war on Russia’s demographic problems is unlikely to be unambiguously positive under any scenario other than the Kremlin’s initial best case of an easy decapitation and Ukrainian surrender to an army of liberators. Surely, the heavy losses of young men’s lives on both sides of the ongoing conflict will depress birth rates. The actual status of well over a million Ukrainian citizens transported to the Russian interior as well as those in occupied territory who are required to accept Russian identity documents or be excluded from aid distributions, will not be known for a very long time. However, the intention of adding those people, including hundreds of thousands of children, to the Russian population seems clear enough. The severe sanctions regime and export controls that cut off access to advanced technologies, services, replacement parts, investors, and markets will compound Russia’s economic problems and motivate an ongoing brain drain, at least in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, some Russian hawks have argued that the enlargement of Russia’s control over fuel and food RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW 2022, VOL. 63, NOS. 4–6, 213–215 https://doi.org/10.1080/10611428.2022.2134713
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Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/10611428.2022.2135297
A. Sinitsa
ABSTRACT The current changes in ratio of Russia’s main socioeconomic groups (working-age, youth, and elderly) are adversely impacting the country’s economic development. The purpose of this article is to reflect these changes during a demographic wave. To that end, we use official statistics and predicted population changes up to the year 2050. Our analysis shows that the number and share of the working-age population will decline, the elderly population will grow, and the youth population can either decrease or increase. This will lead to a decline in the number of people employed and to a significant increase in employment of the elderly, to a substantial demographic burden, and to a decrease both in standard of living and in volume of the domestic market.
{"title":"Economic Consequences of Changes in Russia’s Age Distribution During Demographic Waves","authors":"A. Sinitsa","doi":"10.1080/10611428.2022.2135297","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10611428.2022.2135297","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The current changes in ratio of Russia’s main socioeconomic groups (working-age, youth, and elderly) are adversely impacting the country’s economic development. The purpose of this article is to reflect these changes during a demographic wave. To that end, we use official statistics and predicted population changes up to the year 2050. Our analysis shows that the number and share of the working-age population will decline, the elderly population will grow, and the youth population can either decrease or increase. This will lead to a decline in the number of people employed and to a significant increase in employment of the elderly, to a substantial demographic burden, and to a decrease both in standard of living and in volume of the domestic market.","PeriodicalId":85479,"journal":{"name":"Russian social science review : a journal of translations","volume":"63 1","pages":"272 - 285"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42078431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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