DO CONFLICTING INTENTIONS GIVE RISE TO MULTIPLE DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE? REPLY TO MENA

IF 0.2 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Manuscrito Pub Date : 2020-12-01 DOI:10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mn
Mario Gómez-Torrente
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

: According to Ricardo Mena, a demonstrative refers to all the objects that the utterer has an intention for it to refer to, which may be more than one in cases where her referential intentions conflict. In this note I argue that Mena’s proposal has several serious problems.
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相互冲突的意图是否会产生多重示范参考?回复MENA
:根据Ricardo Mena的说法,指示语指的是说话者有意指代的所有对象,在她的指代意图冲突的情况下,可能不止一个。在本说明中,我认为梅纳的提议存在几个严重问题。
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来源期刊
Manuscrito
Manuscrito PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
31
审稿时长
32 weeks
期刊介绍: Information not localized
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