Soziale Wirklichkeit erfassen

Abstract

Abstract In this paper I consider emotions as the ability to grasp meaningfulness, understood as an essential component of (social) reality, which is necessary for a rational discourse and which cannot be apprehended by means of a supposedly “sober” approach. I explicitly take into account the socio-cultural situatedness of feeling subjects and put epistemically relevant emotional abilities into perspective. This approach reveals that emotions can also contribute to questioning one’s own world view and to being able to correct it if necessary. The ability tobe affectively disrupted, as I call it, enables one to see the contingency of one’s emotion repertoire and habitualised schemata of grasping meaningfulness. Further, a severe affective disruption can bring about a transformation of one’s emotion repertoire and habitualised schemata, thus permanently altering the subject’s epistemic position and epistemic practice.